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ABSTRACT
One of the most perilous pitfalls of constitutional criminal procedure scholarship
is the inexact treatment of race vis-à-vis the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. This
imprecision exists because of historical and theoretical blind spots. In right to counsel
literature, race is either neglected, subsumed under poverty, or understood in the
simple terms of disproportionality (e.g., how indigent defense’s failures acutely impact
racial minorities). A historical examination of early legal aid institutions and
jurisprudence reveals the centrality of race in modern indigent defense schemes.
Throughout the twentieth century, the politics of race informed right to counsel
decisions and policies in ways that shape the current landscape but have been
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unrealized by scholars. Inattention to the role of race ultimately limits intellectual
discussions on the right to counsel as well as indigent defense reform eﬀorts.
This Article supplies a distinct way of thinking about the right to counsel and, in
doing so, extends a diﬀerent set of analytical possibilities. It argues that race has
shaped the scope and trajectory of indigent defense. The Article uses a diverse array
of untapped historical sources to radically reinterpret the legal landscape before
Gideon v. Wainwright—a period that is often insuﬃciently attended to—and shows
how race operated in the background of constitutional interpretations of the right to
counsel and governmental commitment to this provision. The Article then revisits the
post-Gideon world. It demonstrates how unacknowledged anxieties about race,
along with recoded ideas about indigent defense as a social welfare policy, influenced
the Court’s clarification of Gideon. The Article concludes with a discussion on how
this history can inform contemporary criminal justice reform.
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INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel that is taught in law schools and
mechanized in legal practice is unmoored from the racial politics that gave
birth to its modern form. Rich treatments of race and the criminal justice
system exist, but current scholarship overlooks the instrumental role race
played in the development of right to counsel jurisprudence. The right to
counsel’s relationship to race is typically understood in one of two ways. First,
the right to counsel is often bundled with other criminal procedure provisions
and considered in the context of larger judicial attempts to address racial
inequality in the early and mid-twentieth century.1 This approach is
informative but does not fully explain a constitutional provision that helped
erect bureaucratic systems that many claim fail criminal defendants, and
minorities in particular. A second line of interrogation uses the ﬂaws and
failures of indigent defense as one explanation for racialized mass
incarceration.2 The idea here is that minority defendants are
disproportionately impacted by under resourced indigent defense providers.
This rendering has merit but is susceptible to a response of indistinctiveness
(i.e., many aspects of the criminal justice system have racially
disproportionate eﬀects); it can also be ungenerously dismissed as another
racial complaint. History demonstrates that indigent defense is not a part of
the criminal justice system that simply produces racially disparate outcomes.
Instead, the politics of race fundamentally shaped indigent defense
jurisprudence and policy. Inattention to this fact limits understandings of the
right to counsel and ultimately of the criminal justice system itself. Indigent
defense providers are tasked with protecting the rights of poor defendants in
a criminal justice system that is widely understood as being infected by racial
discrimination. They are uniquely situated to challenge such bias in speciﬁc
proceedings or in the context of larger criminal justice reform. But raceoblivious understandings of indigent defense—in the practitioner and
scholarly contexts—limits these communities’ ability to combat racial bias in
the criminal justice system. Sensitivity to the racial character and history of
indigent defense invites distinct ways of thinking about how legal services
might shape criminal justice reform eﬀorts.

1 See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 48, 48 (2000); Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal
Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1155 (1998); Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal
Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2002 (1998); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between
Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 18-19 (1997).
2 See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 84-86 (2012); AMY BACH, ORDINARY INJUSTICE: HOW AMERICA
HOLDS COURT 29-34 (2012).
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This Article unearths a lost history of race and indigent defense. It argues
that race played a significant role in the creation, maturation, and curtailment
of the modern right to counsel. Before the Court recognized the right to
counsel as an affirmative right, Progressive Era elites developed legal aid
organizations. These reformers developed a racial framework that emphasized
the race, poverty, and incompetence of southern and eastern Europeans in
their institutionalization of legal aid. Once the Court recognized the right to
counsel as an affirmative obligation in Powell v. Alabama,3 it would deploy this
same framework for decades, but in service of black defendants. The Warren
Court would eventually reject this framework in Gideon v. Wainwright4 and
develop a more expansive right to counsel doctrine that was not as express but
conscious about the ways indigent defense could curb racial discrimination in
the criminal justice system. The advent of racialized law and order politics in
the late 1960s led the Court to slowly abandon race-sensitive approaches to the
right to counsel and curtail that right in ways that would shape the current
indigent defense landscape. The Article draws on a range of historical sources
to make this argument. These materials include archival documents, primary
sources, oral histories, case law, and secondary literature.
The Article focuses on four diﬀerent points in twentieth-century
American indigent defense history. The ﬁrst two—the pre–Powell v. Alabama
era (1890–1931)5 and the period between Powell and Gideon v. Wainwright
(1931–1963)—are often given short shrift in scholarly renderings of the right
to counsel’s development. The ﬁrst period is sometimes neglected because the
Court had no substantive jurisprudence on the right to counsel before Powell.
The second period, that between Powell and Gideon, is also given scant
attention because of the Court’s erratic and noncommittal indigent defense
holdings. Notwithstanding the brief treatment these moments receive in
indigent defense literature, this Article contends that these periods were rife
with bureaucratic and jurisprudential happenings that hinged in part on race
and would lay the foundation for the right to counsel’s development during
the Warren Court era.
The remaining Parts of the Article travel down the supposedly welltrodden territory of post-Gideon developments. Part IV focuses primarily on
the period between Gideon and Argersinger v. Hamlin6 (1963–1972). During
this decade, which saw larger criminal procedure reforms, the Court had the
most generous approach toward indigent defense. Part V discusses the period
287 U.S. 45, 59 (1932).
372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
1890 is when the Legal Aid Society of New York expanded its services beyond its initial focus
on German immigrants. See infra note 66. Although the Legal Aid Society is understood as the ﬁrst
legal aid institution, this is incorrect. See infra note 12.
6 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
3
4
5
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after Argersinger and the lead up to Strickland v. Washington7 (1972-1984). There
is no shortage of scholarship on the cases described in Parts IV and V. Yet these
Parts of the Article deploy historical sources to make sense of and outstrip the
common narratives of indigent defense failure as byproducts of judicial
abandonment of Warren Court principles, legislative stinginess, and/or the
punitive turn. No doubt, these factors are in play, but they tell an incomplete
story. Race figured meaningfully into indigent defense policy in the 1960s.
During that period, which Part IV details, the Warren Court moved beyond
the racial framework legal aid reformers developed before Powell and used by
Courts afterward. Instead, it developed an ostensibly race-neutral prophylactic
right to counsel rule in Gideon that coincided with the larger trend of using
criminal procedure to address social inequality.8 Thereafter, a racially clever
law and order campaign, propagated by a president who nominated four
Supreme Court Justices in part on that crusade, played a role in the
clarification and curtailment of Gideon and its progeny.
Accordingly, the paper’s normative contentions comprise the substance of
Part VI. I argue that this underexplored history of the right to counsel can
inform our legal present. I suggest that this traversal into history can oﬀer
insight into the racial politics of indigent defense, which are often eﬀaced
from indigent defense discourse or subsumed within the proxy category of
class. I contend that, in the absence of this history, scholars miss an important
element of indigent defense. There is a methodologically diverse and
voluminous body of scholarship that explores how race has inﬂuenced and
continues to shape policing, prosecutorial decisionmaking, jury composition
and deliberation, and judging.9 Yet indigent defense and its relationship to
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
As described in Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in
Criminal Procedure:
7
8

[T]he Court seemed to see the criminal trial as a kind of morality play in which largescale social forces, having little or nothing to do with criminal law, were joined in
combat . . . . [T]he Warren Court turned to the special magic of the criminal
courtroom to demonstrate its commitment to racial justice . . . [but] there is an
obvious tension between the trial as a method of making individualized factual
judgments concerning guilt and innocence and the trial as a method of ﬁghting proxy
battles over issues of social policy.
Louis Michael Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change
in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 442 (1980).
9 See generally SALLY E. HADDEN, SLAVE PATROLS: LAW AND VIOLENCE IN VIRGINIA AND
THE CAROLINAS (2003) (providing historical analysis of slave patrols as a form of policing); Angela
J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13 (1998)
(arguing that prosecutorial discretion is a cause of racial inequality in the criminal justice system);
Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611 (1985) (using social
science research to explore racial bias in jury decisionmaking); Ian F. Haney López, Institutional
Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717 (2000)
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race have received less sustained analysis. This scholarly gap exists despite
the reality that the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel is, in the words of
Chief Justice Roberts, “the most precious right a defendant has, because it is
his attorney who will ﬁght for the other rights the defendant enjoys.”10 The
takeaway from this part of the argument is that indigent defense scholars and
practitioners will be hampered if they fail to seriously engage the role of race
independent of indigence.
Individuals with diﬀerent beliefs about race’s salience in society may need
diﬀerent kinds of convincing. Race skeptics may be unpersuaded by statistics
that demonstrate racial motivations and disparities in the criminal justice
system and therefore may not accept the speciﬁc claim that race has shaped
the development of indigent defense. On the other hand, people who believe
that race aﬀects criminal justice administration may ﬁnd my claim about
race’s inﬂuence on indigent defense to be unsurprising. This Article addresses
both audiences. It attends to race skeptics by providing the unﬁltered racial
language of legal reformers who created indigent defense organizations and
the courts that formulated the early right to counsel jurisprudence. In many
places the evidence is unambiguous. For race-conscious individuals, this
Article demonstrates how race has inﬂuenced indigent defense. It may be
unsurprising to these people that race operates in a wing of the criminal
justice system. But the unavailability of rigorous analytical or historical
accounts of the race–indigent defense interface belies such predictability.
Besides the historical reveal, the Article takes a further step by demonstrating
the sophisticated ways that race has operated in indigent defense. Outright
racial discrimination looms large in the story, but so do other dynamics, which
include, but are not limited to, forms of racial neglect that do not hinge on
animus, strategic deployments of race across racial groups, racial
egalitarianism, racial fear, and imprecise understandings of race through the
lens of poverty. Overall, the Article provides a dynamic description of how
race shaped an important aspect of our legal system.
(historicizing and theorizing racial discrimination in grand jury selection and judicial
decisionmaking); Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Looking Across the Empathic Divide: Racialized Decision
Making on the Capital Jury, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 573 (2011) (detailing social psychology
experiments that found that jurors were more likely to sentence black defendants to death than
white defendants); Darrell Steﬀensmeier & Chester L. Britt, Judges’ Race and Judicial Decision
Making: Do Black Judges Sentence Diﬀerently?, 82 SOC. SCI. Q. 749 (2001) (using archival and
quantitative analysis to demonstrate that black judges are more likely to sentence black and white
oﬀenders to prison).
10 Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 344 (2014) (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.
648, 653-54 (1984)); see also David A. Sklansky, Quasi-Aﬃrmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 88 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1280 (2002) (arguing that since suppression motions are the principal
enforcement mechanism for all criminal procedure rights, defense attorneys are crucial to the
enforcement of constitutional criminal procedure and the regulation of police).
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A few clariﬁcations are necessary. First, it is important to note that
race is not a static concept. As scholars across diﬀerent disciplinary and
topical ﬁelds have shown and as the Court has noted, race is a category of
social division that morphs over time, which makes it diﬃcult to tell a tidy,
linear story where race operates similarly.11 Still, this Article focuses on how
diﬀerent concerns about race surfaced for the key protagonists in indigent
defense history. Additionally, scholars are increasingly and helpfully
historicizing legal aid.12 This Article is in conversation with, but distinct from,
these contributions because it focuses on the role of race, which is a social
category that has eluded thorough longitudinal analysis in regard to legal
aid.13 Nevertheless, this Article is not a comprehensive history. It focuses on
speciﬁc moments in time. Although some parts of the paper make causal
arguments, this Article highlights recurrent but undertheorized themes in the
development of indigent defense. My goal is to excavate the above-mentioned
conﬂicts with a focus on criminal legal aid, but I inevitably touch on civil legal
aid because, as a historical matter, some organizations did not make
11 See Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 (1987) (holding that an Iraqi
petitioner was protected from racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and noting that “[t]he
understanding of ‘race’ in the 19th century, however, was diﬀerent. Plainly, all those who might be
deemed Caucasian today were not thought to be of the same race at the time § 1981 became law”).
Race has been tied to ideas about skin type, biological myths, assumptions about morality and
deservingness, changing census designations, political and economic imperatives, arbitrary legal
categorizations, demographic anxieties, and self-identiﬁcation by groups and individuals. See
generally LEE D. BAKER, FROM SAVAGE TO NEGRO: ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE CONSTRUCTION
OF RACE, 1896–1954 (1998); ALLYSON HOBBS, A CHOSEN EXILE: A HISTORY OF RACIAL
PASSING IN AMERICAN LIFE (2014); THOMAS C. LEONARD, ILLIBERAL REFORMERS: RACE,
EUGENICS, AND AMERICAN ECONOMICS IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (2016); IAN HANEY LÓPEZ,
WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996); MELISSA NOBLES, SHADES OF
CITIZENSHIP: RACE AND THE CENSUS IN MODERN POLITICS (2000); MICHAEL OMI &
HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1994); DOROTHY ROBERTS,
FATAL INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG BUSINESS RE-CREATE RACE IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2011); Barbara Jeanne Fields, Slavery, Race and Ideology in the United
States of America, NEW LEFT REV. (1990).
12 See, e.g., FELICE BATLAN, WOMEN AND JUSTICE FOR THE POOR: A HISTORY OF LEGAL AID,
1863–1945, at 47 (2015) (analyzing the role of gender in the development of legal aid); Sara Mayeux, What
Gideon Did, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 15, 24 (2016) (using historical research to describe how Gideon shifted
the profession’s consensus of legal aid away from a charity model and toward a government model).
13 See generally JEROLD AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
MODERN AMERICA (1976); BATLAN, supra note 12; ALAN K. CHEN & SCOTT CUMMINGS,
PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE (2012); MARTHA DAVIS,
BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960–1973 (1993); JACK
KATZ, POOR PEOPLE’S LAWYERS IN TRANSITION (1982); DEBORAH RHODE, ACCESS TO
JUSTICE (2004); Richard L. Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism, 32
UCLA L. REV. 474 (1985); Philip L. Merkel, At the Crossroads of Reform: The First Fifty Years of
American Legal Aid: 1876-1926, 27 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (1990); Chester L. Mirsky, The Political Economy
and Indigent Defense: New York City, 1917–1998, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 891; Mark Spiegel, The
Boston Legal Aid Society: 1900-1925, 9 MASS. LEGAL HIST. 17 (2003).
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distinctions. Relatedly, I use legal aid and indigent defense interchangeably.
To the extent that I focus speciﬁcally on civil legal aid, I use that term. Finally,
by “legal aid” I am referring to the institutional provision of representation,
advice, education, and/or counseling on a legal matter.
I. THE PRE-POWELL RIGHT TO COUNSEL
This Part of the Article examines what the right to counsel looked like
before Powell. In order to understand the evolution of indigent defense, it is
important to foreground this period because it entails almost half a century
of organized legal assistance in which race played a crucial role. This era
preceded the Court’s ﬁrst substantive and aﬃrmative statements on the right
to counsel and helped shape the contours of indigent defense discourse after
the Court enshrined the right to counsel in Powell.
The jurisprudential roots of the right to counsel often begin with Powell
because this case was the ﬁrst moment in which the Court explicitly outlined
a version of the indigent defense that is recognizable today. Until Powell,
which was limited to capital cases, the Court took a minimalist approach
toward the right to counsel, and understood the provision in terms of negative
liberties. Essentially, the government could not prevent defendants from
obtaining an attorney but did not have an aﬃrmative obligation to provide a
lawyer. In 1891, the Court made this point unanimously and unequivocally,
when Justice Brown held that there is “no general obligation on the part of
the government either to . . . retain counsel for defendants or prisoners.”14
“The object of the constitutional provision,” he continued, “was merely to
secure those rights which by the ancient rules of the common law had been
denied to them; but it was not contemplated that this should be done at the
expense of the government.”15 Although this pronouncement occurred in the
context of a right to counsel that was not yet incorporated by the Fourteenth
Amendment, it mirrored state statutory and constitutional provisions; more
aﬃrmative conceptions of the right would not appear for decades.16
The absence of an aﬃrmative right to counsel did not mean the absence
of administrative structures that provided counsel to indigents. One could, as
many do, tell a story that begins after this period. But such an account would
omit decades of civic and municipal administration of criminal legal aid. A
rendition of the right to counsel that begins after this period would miss the
administrative bedrock that Courts would rely upon—explicitly and tacitly—
when they ﬁnally recognized an aﬃrmative right to counsel. Similarly, an
United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U.S. 169, 173 (1891).
Id.
Pamela R. Metzger, Beyond the Bright Line: A Contemporary Right-to-Counsel Doctrine, 97 NW.
U.L. REV. 1635, 1637-42 (2003).
14
15
16
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account that begins with Powell would miss the ways that conceptions of race
undergirded the legal aid structures that would serve as the foundation for the
incipient right to counsel. For these reasons, courts are not the appropriate
site of analysis for this period. Instead, legal aid societies and a few public
defender offices provide a more dynamic story. This Part highlights how both
recognized a more robust right to counsel when courts would not.
A. Race, Americanization, and Legal Aid
Before an aﬃrmative right to counsel was enshrined by courts, it was
fulﬁlled by legal aid societies that provided assistance in criminal cases as well
as municipally funded public defender oﬃces that were modeled in part after
legal aid societies. Scholars typically trace the origins of institutionalized legal
aid to the 1890s.17 Recent scholarship on women’s organizations,18 in addition
to a well-established, albeit underutilized, literature on early-nineteenthcentury abolitionist societies and the Freedmen’s Bureau,19 complicate such
claims. Nevertheless, an analysis that begins where traditional legal aid
histories start would select the Progressive Era as its starting point. The
beginning of this period overlaps with the international “decade of regicide,”
a period between 1892 and 1901 when many political leaders were assassinated
across the world.20 At the turn of the century, the world witnessed the
attempted assassination of Prince Edward of Wales by a Belgian anarchist,
the assassination of King Umberto of Italy by an Italian-American anarchist,
and the assassination of President William McKinley by a Polish-American

17 Id.; see also BARBARA BABCOCK, WOMAN LAWYER: THE TRIALS OF CLARA FOLITZ, 13233 (2011) (describing Clara Foltz’s work in the early 1890s ﬁghting for disadvantaged people as an
attorney); CHEN & CUMMINGS, supra note 13, at 57 (“The provision of basic civil legal service to
those who could not aﬀord them was an issue that concerned the legal profession as early as the late
1800s.”); RHODE, supra note 13, at 58 (“The nation’s ﬁrst legal aid organization began in 1876 as part
of an eﬀort by New York German-American merchants to assist German immigrants.”).
18 See BATLAN, supra note 12, at 47 (describing the founding of the Chicago Protective Agency
for Women and Children in 1885 as an important moment for women attorneys involved in legal
aid); Gwen Hoerr Jordan, ‘Them Law Wimmin:’ The Protective Agency for Women and Children and the
Gendered Origins of Legal Aid, in FEMINIST LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS ON WOMEN AND LAW 156
(Tracy A. Thomas & Tracy Jean Boisseau eds., 2011) (noting that, after its founding in 1886, the
Protective Agency for Women and Children “began oﬀering free legal assistance to women and
children who had been the victims of every type of ﬁnancial, physical, and sexual crime”).
19 See, e.g., ROBERT S. NEWMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN ABOLITIONISM:
FIGHTING SLAVERY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 16 (2002); DONALD G. NIEMAN, TO SET THE LAW
IN MOTION: THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF BLACKS, 1865-1868 105-08
(1979) (explaining how amendments to the Freedman’s Bureau Act of 1865 gave Bureau oﬃcials
broad authority to guarantee rights to freedmen); Sara Rapport, The Freedmen’s Bureau as a Legal
Agent for Black Men and Women in Georgia: 1865-1868, 73 GA. HIST. Q. 26, 26 n.1 (1989).
20 RICHARD BACH JENSEN, THE BATTLE AGAINST ANARCHIST TERRORISM: AN
INTERNATIONAL HISTORY, 1878–1934 31 (2013).
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anarchist.21 Subsequently, anti-anarchist attitudes festered and inﬂuenced the
passage of the Immigration Act of 1903.22 This law failed to curb the political
disruption that produced the dynamiting of the Los Angeles Times building in
1910, the devastating bombing of Wall Street in 1920, and the spate of
successful and unsuccessful bombings in between.23
Anarchism terrified American reformers. Of course, political violence was
not new. The key difference, as historian Richard Jensen observes, is that “at
the time terrorism on this scale was still unheard of and made all the more
frightening by its successful assault on powerful symbols of authority and
stability.”24 World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 that prompted
the First Red Scare certainly did not ease American political anxieties.
Anarchism and socialism gnawed away at public confidence in American
exceptionalism as well as the presumed immunity of the United States to
European political unrest. Importantly, political violence became synonymous
with southern and eastern European immigrants, who were not yet considered
white in American society.25 Legal reformers acted in response to these global
developments, as well as the typical Progressive Era mélange of immigration,
industrialization, urbanization, and professionalization.26 Legal reformers
believed that southern and eastern European immigrants’ inability to receive
a “fair day in court” stoked political dissidence. Concern about injustice led
reformers to advocate for organized legal assistance schemes.27
Race animated the development of indigent defense before the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel jurisprudence helped spur legal aid apparatuses
across the country. Conceptually, it is imperative to note that understandings
Id. at 185-87; 237.
Immigration Act of 1903, ch. 1012, § 2, Pub. L. No. 162, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214 (1903); see also
WILLIAM PRESTON, ALIENS AND DISSENTERS: FEDERAL SUPPRESSION OF RADICALS, 19031933 31-32(2d ed. 1995).
23 See generally Beverly Gage, THE DAY WALL STREET EXPLODED: A STORY OF AMERICA
IN ITS FIRST AGE OF TERROR (2009); LEW IRWIN, DEADLY TIMES: THE 1910 BOMBING OF THE
LOS ANGELES TIMES AND AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN DECADE OF TERROR (2013).
24 Id.
25 See David B. Oppenheimer, Swati Prakash & Rachel Burns, Playing the Trump Card: The
Enduring Legacy of Racism in Immigration Law, 26 BERKLEY LA RAZA L.J. 1, 16 (2016) (overviewing
fears about the potential “Bolshevik” threat represented by European and Russian Jewish
immigrants that coalesced with parallel fears of anarchists).
26 See JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM,
1860–1925, at 102-03 (2002) (describing a legal organization devoted solely to convincing municipalities
to adopt a literacy Test to Exclude Immigrants from Many Aspects of Public Life); ROBERT H. WIEBE,
THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877–1920, at 117 (1967) (“Yet by the [eighteen] nineties a sense of
professionalism had undoubtedly captured a significant number of relatively young lawyers . . . far
more aware than their predecessors of the social implications of the law.”); Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search
Of Progressivism, 10 REVS. AM. HIST., Dec. 1982, at 113, 118 (describing the “dreams of social efficiency,
systematization, and scientifically adjusted harmony” that drove professionally conscious lawyers).
27 See generally REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR (1919).
21
22
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of race at the end of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century are
diﬀerent from today because race is not a static concept. The malleability of
race is easily demonstrated by the arbitrary race jurisprudence of this
period.28 Outside of categorizations for “negroes” and “Indians,” race was
often, although not exclusively, understood as something akin to nationality
(i.e., “the German race” or “the Irish race”).29 A variant of race as nationality
corresponded with pan-nationality (i.e., groups clustered by territorial
proximity such as the “Slavic” or “Nordic” races). Race as nationality was
endorsed by courts and has been interrogated in the work of historians,
scholars of race and ethnicity, and social scientists.30 Accordingly, this Part’s
discussion of the role of race in the expansion of legal aid takes up reformers’
understanding of race as nationality.
Despite reformers’ descriptions of legal assistance in racial terms and their
racialized normative commitments—both of which are described below—the
conceptual distinction between contemporary notions of race and the more
timeworn understanding of race as nationality is precisely what obscures this
untold story of legal aid. Today, southern and eastern Europeans are classiﬁed
simply as “white” in ways that ﬂatten the unstable racial position they
occupied in the early twentieth century. Legal reformers clung speciﬁcally to
the precarious racial position of ethnic whites by focusing on nationalism and
Americanization in their institutional eﬀorts. During the pre-Powell era, two
dominant visions of legal aid existed. The ﬁrst was the public defender model
advocated by Clara Foltz, which focused on legal aid as a government-funded
responsibility. The second approach was the legal aid model championed by
Arthur von Briesen, which hewed to Progressive Era notions of private
philanthropy. Race ﬁgured into each model.

28 See IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 2 (2006)
(“[T]he courts were responsible for deciding not only who was White, but why someone was White.”).
29 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
30 See also U.S. IMMIGRATION COMM’N, DICTIONARY OF RACES OF PEOPLES, S. DOC. NO.
61-662 (1911) (providing a classiﬁcation scheme of races based in part on country of origin). See
generally W. PAUL REEVE, RELIGION OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: RACE AND THE MORMON
STRUGGLE FOR WHITENESS 4 (2015) (“[R]ace was a loosely used word that sometimes referred to
nationality more than skin color . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); GEORGE W.
STOCKING, JR., DELIMITING ANTHROPOLOGY: OCCASIONAL ESSAYS AND REFLECTIONS 8
(2001) (arguing that, by the turn of the century, “the idea of race was in many ways and for many
people not very diﬀerent from what we would call today ‘national character’”); EMMA JINHUA
TENG, EURASIAN: MIXED IDENTITIES IN THE UNITED STATES, CHINA, AND HONG KONG,
1842–1943, at 63 (2013) (noting that “race has always been about much more than phenotype” and
arguing that “the conceptual slippage between ‘nationality’ as citizenship and ‘nationality’ as race”
was “particularly pronounced in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries”).
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1. The Public Defender Model
Clara Foltz was a pioneering attorney who is sometimes referred to as the
“mother” of legal aid.31 She successfully challenged the gendered exclusion of
women from the legal profession in California immediately after the Court’s
decision in Bradwell v. Illinois32 but was unable to secure stable employment.
She eked out a living by lecturing and by handling divorce and criminal law
cases.33 In 1893, she gave a speech at the World’s Columbian Exposition in
Chicago before the Congress of Jurisprudence and Law Reform, that was based
partly on her experience as a criminal lawyer. Her remarks detailed the
shortcomings of the legal system in ways that are eerily similar to contemporary
complaints about criminal adjudication. It is worth excerpting at length:
Connected with the court is a public prosecutor, selected for his skill in
securing convictions . . . . Around and behind him is an army of police oﬃcers
and detectives ready to do his bidding, and before him sits a plastic judge
with a large discretion often aﬀected by newspapers and police oﬃcers to the
injury of the prisoner. . . .
For the conviction of the accused every weapon is provided and used, even
those poisoned by wrong and injustice. But what machinery is provided for
the defense of the innocent? None. Absolutely none. . . .
[T]he rule is that court appointees are wholly unequal to the public oﬃcers
with whom they are to cope. . . . The appointees come from failures in the
profession, who hang about courts hoping [for] a stray dollar or two from the
unfortunate, or from the kindergartens of the profession just let loose from college and
anxious to learn the practice. . . . [They] come to trial wholly unequipped either
in ability, skill or preparation . . . . The defense is at most a sort of perfunctory
one. . . . The prisoner has asked for bread and received a stone. . . .
The accused, even if acquitted, comes from the court-house a changed man.
He remembers a malicious arrest, an unjust incarceration, an expense that has
impoverished him . . . . Henceforth his hand is against government and against
man. Disgrace has crushed his manhood and injustice has murdered his patriotism.34

31 Introductory Remarks by Earl Johnson, Jr., Justice, Cal. Ct. App., Conference on the 30th
Anniversary of the United States Supreme Court’s Decision in Gideon v. Wainwright: Gideon and the
Public Service Role of Lawyers in Advancing Equal Justice, 43 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 1, 5 (1993).
32 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
33 See BABCOCK, supra note 17, at 65 (outlining the ways in which Foltz supplemented her
income from her legal practice with political, lecturing, and editing work).
34 Clara Foltz, Public Defenders: Rights of Persons Accused of Crime-Abuses Now Existing, 48 ALB.
L.J. 248, 248-49 (1893) (emphasis added).
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To address the institutional maladies identiﬁed in her speech, Foltz
proposed that, for every prosecutor, the state should have a public defender;
the two would be treated as equals, paid from the same treasury, and both
should have authority over police oﬃcers and sheriﬀs. Foltz translated her
speech into a statutory proposal and introduced it in several states.35 In 1914,
Los Angeles would become the ﬁrst city to implement the idea. This vision,
however, remained in the minority, existing in a random assortment of cities
such as Portland and Columbus.
Two salient themes about the intended purposes of public defender
institutionalization emerge from Foltz’s speech: the production of fairer legal
outcomes and the purification of the bar’s haphazard assigned counsel system
(where it existed). Both would become popular subjects during the Progressive
Era. These themes are noteworthy because they signify principles that were
important to reformers outside of the legal assistance context but were still
very much marshalled in support of legal aid bureaucratization. Foltz’s disquiet
about injustice radiated throughout her speech and corresponded with the
legal profession’s general concern about professionalism, fairness, and
heightened ethical standards during that period and thereafter.36 The other
theme—purging the bar of unscrupulous attorneys—appears to be raceneutral in Foltz’s formulation. The historical record and biographical literature
on her life support this proposition.37 Nevertheless, speculation about raceneutrality is not necessary to support this Article’s argument about the role of
race in legal aid’s development. Supporters of the public defender idea
deployed the rhetoric of bar purification and patriotism in race-specific ways
to advance the development of legal aid.
The excision of “shyster” lawyers from the legal profession and
puriﬁcation of the bar was decidedly racial. Reformers made unscrupulous
“shyster” lawyers their primary targets and invariably depicted immigrant
and Jewish attorneys as the epitome of this group of lawyers.38 Importantly,
35 See, e.g., Public Defender: Clara Foltz, the Attorney, Wants One Provided for, SACRAMENTO
DAILY UNION, Feb. 1, 1897, at 4.
36 See ROBERT L. NELSON, DAVID M. TRUBEK & RAYMAN L. SOLOMON, LAWYERS’
IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION
100 (1992) (describing, as one impetus for applying ethical codes to lawyers, the desire to “protect
clients from experts who could manipulate the demand for their services and who alone could judge
the quality of those services”); Benjamin H. Barton, The ABA, the Rules, and Professionalism: The
Mechanics of Self-Defeat and a Call for a Return to the Ethical, Moral, and Practical Approach of the
Canons, 83 N.C. L. REV. 411, 411 (2005); Susan D. Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early
NAACP (1910–1920), 20 L. & HIST. REV. 97, 100 (2002).
37 Foltz, supra note 34, at 248.
38 See supra notes 41–42, 44–46 and accompanying text; see also Felice Batlan, The “Rabbi’s Daughter”
and the “Jewish Jane Addams”: Jewish Women, Legal Aid, and the Fluidity of Identity, 1890-1930, 4 IND. J.L.
& SOC. EQUALITY 135, 142 (2016) (“From the perspective of the elite bar, most Jewish immigrant
lawyers—and especially those from Eastern Europe—stood on the cusp of being ‘shysters.’”).
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southern and eastern Europeans, along with Jewish people, occupied a unique
space in the racial hierarchy: not fully white.39 The influx of immigrant attorneys
who sought to address legal aid needs that nonexistent or budding legal aid
organizations were unequipped to meet—and that corporate lawyers were
uninterested in providing—buoyed the anti-shyster campaign. The American Bar
Association’s (ABA) newly minted 1908 Canons of Professional Responsibility
mattered too.40 The xenophobic and anti-Semitic attempt to “purify” the bar was
similar to the Progressive Era campaign to rid the medical profession of quack
doctors and received attention inside and outside of the practice of law.41 Some
lawyers and reformers articulated visions of improving indigent defense that
were more concerned with ethics than race,42 but many did not.
In addition to serving as a justiﬁcation for discrimination against ethnic
white lawyers, the trope of the shyster emphasized the vulnerability of
39 There is a rich literature on European immigrants’ interstitial placement in the racial
hierarchy and their incorporation into whiteness. See generally KAREN BRODKIN, HOW JEWS
BECAME WHITE FOLKS & WHAT THAT SAYS ABOUT RACE IN AMERICA (1998); THOMAS A.
GUGLIELMO, WHITE ON ARRIVAL: ITALIANS, RACE, COLOR, AND POWER IN CHICAGO, 1890–
1945 (2003); NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE (1995); MATTHEW FRYE
JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS AND THE
ALCHEMY OF RACE (1999); DAVID R. ROEDIGER, WORKING TOWARD WHITENESS: HOW
AMERICA’S IMMIGRANTS BECAME WHITE: THE STRANGE JOURNEY FROM ELLIS ISLAND TO
THE SUBURBS (2006); DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE
MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (1991).
40 See Susan D. Carle, Lawyers’ Duty to Do Justice: A New Look at the History of the 1908 Canons,
24 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 1 (1999) (describing how the 1908 Canons aimed to address the growing
number of new ethnic lawyers).
41 See W. A. Evans, A Campaign Against Quacks 5 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 30, 35 (1915) (discussing
publicity campaigns against ill-qualiﬁed medical professionals during the Progressive Era).
42 Criminologist Maurice Parmelee noted,

Furthermore, public defense would almost entirely eliminate the disreputable lawyers
so frequently found in criminal practice. The existence of these so-called “shyster”
lawyers is favored on the one hand by professional criminals, who need the services of
unscrupulous counsel, and on the other hand by poor and ignorant defendants, whose
precarious situation makes them the easy prey of such lawyers. With public defense,
however, all the cases of professional criminals and of these poor and ignorant
defendants would be in the hands of the public defender, so that the ﬁeld of action of
the disreputable lawyer would be destroyed. This public defense would tend to purify
the legal profession.
Maurice Parmelee, Public Defense in Criminal Trials, 1 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 735,
739 (1910). A former public defender recounted
One of the greatest achievements that I look back to is the eﬀect of the Public
Defender upon the shyster lawyer who infests the police court and preys upon the
victims enmeshed in the toils of the law. After I had been on the job awhile these
gentlemen found ‘slim pickings.’ They were banned from the jail, were not allowed to
solicit business, and our court was free from their presence.
Thomas A. Larremore, Portland and Legal Aid, 1 OR. L. REV. 1, 21 n.70 (1921) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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European immigrants. Crucially, public defenders were imagined as
necessary to attend to the vulnerability that this immigrant group faced in
legal proceedings. In their advocacy for public defenders and legal aid
organizations, legal elites focused on three features that would be integral to
the development of institutionalized indigent defense: the racial vulnerability
of European immigrants, their poverty, and their intellectual incompetence—
the latter of which typically focused on their unfamiliarity with American
culture, language barriers, and/or law’s innate sophistication. This
congealment of race, poverty, and incompetence would be central to indigent
defense’s development for decades.
The shyster trope and the race-poverty-incompetence framework
appeared in the writings of lawyers as well as reformers who were law adjacent
(e.g., social workers). Robert Ferrari was a New York attorney who served as
an Associate Editor for The Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law
and Criminology. The publication was one of the premier sources of
information for cutting-edge scholarship on criminal law and criminology
and is one of the oldest journals in those ﬁelds today.43 A booster of the public
defender concept, Ferrari wrote extensively about indigent defense in the
journal. He made shysters and immigrant defendants particular points of
concern.44 In one article, Ferrari walks the reader through the typical
immigrant experience in New York criminal courts. For the author, the
foreign defendant in the adjudicative process is “a football” who is “kicked
hither and thither by individuals, by institutions, by society.”45 Police, judges,
and grand juries are objects of criticism for Ferrari, but he reserves particular
disdain for shysters and their exploitation of the vulnerable European
immigrant defendant who is “a stranger in a strange land . . . has no friends,
no one to aid him” and is “not yet enough acquainted with us to be capable of
making use of his intelligence . . . .”46 Ferrari insists that these lawyers are,
43 The journal, which is now the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, was the arm of the
American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology and its ﬁrst president was evidence luminary
John H. Wigmore. The goal of the organization was to “foster cooperation between lawyers and
scientists to improve criminal laws and the administration of criminal justice.” Jennifer Devroye,
The Rise and Fall of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 7, 7-8 (2010); see also AM. INST. CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY, BULLETIN
NUMBER EIGHT: GENERAL INFORMATION CONCERNING THE INSTITUTE, ITS PURPOSES,
HISTORY, WORK, COMMITTEES, AND MEMBERSHIP, AND THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW
AND CRIMINOLOGY 4 (1912).
44 See, e.g., Robert Ferrari, On the Public Defenders, 6 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
370, 370 (1915); Robert Ferrari, Analysis of New York and County Bar Reports on the Public Defender, 6
J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 18, 27 (1915); Robert Ferrari, Public Defender: The
Complement of the District Attorney, 2 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 704, 704 (1912).
45 See Robert Ferrari, The Immigrant in the New York County Criminal Courts, 3 J. AM. INST.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 194, 194 (1912).
46 Id.
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“as a rule, incompetent to the last degree. The unfortunate situation of the
client is enhanced to extremely perilous proportions when, as often
happens, an Irishman is called upon to defend a Russian, an Austrian, a
Bohemian, a Jew, or a Jew is called upon to defend an Italian.”47 Other legal
elites offered similar accounts in their support for public defender
institutionalization. In a speech turned article that advocated for public
defender institutionalization, legal leader Samuel Untermyer complained
that “[u]njust convictions among the poor and helpless, and especially
among our ignorant foreign population, are far more frequent than we
fortunates care to admit.”48 Untermyer may have been sensitive to the
shyster stereotype by way of his own advocacy for Jewish causes and used
less flagrant language in his depiction of the attorneys who provided counsel
to these defendants. He described these attorneys as invariably “young and
inexperienced men or lawyers without standing or ability.”49
Governmental institutions similarly described shyster lawyers as threats
to poor and ignorant ethnic whites. In 1909, Governor Charles Evans
Hughes, who would go on to become president of the New York Legal Aid
Society a few years later, created the New York Commission of Immigration.50
Hughes appointed Louis Marshall, founder of the American Jewish
Committee and director of National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People, as chair of this commission.51 In its discussion of
“unscrupulous shyster lawyers” and the assigned counsel system, the
Commission found that although abuses were not conﬁned to just
immigrants, “there are so many of them who are so easily victims of what
appears to be an organized system of graft, that it is highly important to call
attention to the situation.”52 The Commission found that “the ignorance of
the alien subjects him to the cupidity of this class of exploiters” and came to
the conclusion that foreigners’ inability to communicate with magistrates
during arraignment “undoubtedly causes undue hardships, and places him in
the power of the ‘shyster’ lawyer who . . . practically deprives him of his
constitutional rights.”53 In 1915, the Massachusetts Committee on
Id. at 195.
Samuel Untermyer, Evils and Remedies in the Administration of the Criminal Law, 36 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 145, 158 (1910).
49 Id.
50 See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF IMMIGRATION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, ii
(1909) [hereinafter REPORT]; WILLIAM G. ROSS, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF CHARLES EVANS
HUGHES, 1930–1941 241 (2007).
51 See generally REPORT, supra note 50, at iv; David Levering Lewis, Parallels and Divergences:
Assimilationist Strategies of Afro-American and Jewish Elites from 1910 to the Early 1930s, 71 J. AM. HIST.
543, 546, 554 (1984).
52 REPORT, supra note 50, at 54.
53 Id. at 55, 58.
47
48
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Immigration similarly found that “hundreds of misunderstanding and
misunderstood poor persons yearly suﬀer through the entrusting of their
cases to men lacking in ability, honesty, or energy.”54 That commission would
recommend the creation of a public defender oﬃce.
In their advocacy for public defender institutionalization, the broader
Progressive Era reform community also emphasized shysters’ exploitation of
poor, uneducated, ethnic white immigrants. Progressive Era reformer and
National Americanization Committee Director Frances Kellor noted,
“[w]hen the immigrant is brought into court [and] charged with the
commission of crime or with the infraction of one of the hundreds of city
ordinances, of which in many instances he has never heard, his medium of
justice is frequently the ‘shyster’ lawyer who speaks his language.”55 Grace
Abbott, the notable social worker who was Kellor’s contemporary and spent
much of her career addressing the plight of immigrants, agreed. In a 1915
report that was unambiguously titled “Immigration and Crime” and was
reproduced in The American Bar Association Journal, Abbott drew links
between race and indigent defense. She complained that “[t]he immigrant is
peculiarly at the mercy of the unscrupulous lawyer because of his complete
ignorance of American customs and criminal procedure” and insisted that
“because of his peculiar helplessness a public defender is especially needed
for the non-English speaking immigrant who is accused of crime.”56 The
Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) has been described as “the most
extensively-based Americanizing agency” during the Progressive Era because
of its outreach to European immigrants and its assimilation initiatives.57 Peter
Roberts was a national oﬃcer for the YMCA. In his 1920 book The Problem of
Americanization, which focused primarily on European immigrants, Roberts
noted that “[m]any shyster lawyers prey upon” these immigrants, and claimed
that these supposed deceivers were able to get away with fraud that “could
not be practiced on the English-speaking peoples.”58 Roberts, like many
54 S.S. Gluck, The Public Defender (Feb. 3, 1922), in A STUDY OF THE OFFICE OF PUBLIC
DEFENDER IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, IN THE UNITED STATES 7-8 (Harv. L. Sch. Libr., Hist.
& Special Collections).
55 FRANCES KELLOR, NOTARIES PUBLIC AND IMMIGRANTS 11 (1909).
56 Grace Abbott, Immigration and Crime, 6 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 522, 531,
532 (1916). A few years later, in her important book THE IMMIGRANT AND THE COMMUNITY, she
pushed further on this point. In a few short pages Abbott utilized a common move of reformers of
the period: tying immigrant defendants’ vulnerability with shyster lawyers. In her description of
shysters, she noted, “After the acceptance of a fee, the lawyer fails to appear at the trial. In one quite
typical case a lawyer received $90 from the sister of a German who was held in jail awaiting trial.
The sister understood that the lawyer was to secure bail and to defend the man. He did neither, and
the man was convicted.” GRACE ABBOTT, THE IMMIGRANT AND THE COMMUNITY 132 (1917).
57 Paul McBride, Peter Roberts and the YMCA Americanization Program 1907—World War I, 44
PA. HIST.: J. OF MID-ATLANTIC STUD., 145, 145 (1977).
58 PETER ROBERTS, THE PROBLEM OF AMERICANIZATION 87 (1920).
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reformers, believed that immigrants needed a legal advocate or “an advisor—
one who will tell him what his rights are and how he can meet the cunning of
the fellow who will sit up night after night laying nets to catch the unwary.”59
Race-salient concerns about ethnic immigrant defendants and
unscrupulous attorneys inﬂuenced advocacy for public defender
institutionalization in the early twentieth century. Reformers’ concern about
shysters might be read in two possible ways. An unfavorable interpretation
would suggest that this stereotyping is just one point in the bar’s sordid
history of racial stereotyping and exclusion.60 A sympathetic reading might
concede that the bar was genuinely trying to improve its standards and ethical
terrain.61 In any event, either interpretation suggests that the early
development of government-funded public defender oﬃces was inﬂuenced
by racial politics. Although the public defender model was rare during this
time period, its philanthropic counterpart—the legal aid model—relied on
similar racial rhetoric and considerations.
2. The Legal Aid Movement
The legal aid society was the preferred model for elite legal reformers on
the East Coast and in the Midwest.62 The legal aid society model took shape
through privately funded volunteer organizations, with a varying range of
assistance coming from local bar associations and philanthropists. New York
developed what is recognized as the ﬁrst oﬃce.63 The Deutscher Rechtsschutz
Verein (German Legal Protection Society) was created on March 8, 1876, in
New York City under the supervision of Edward Salmon, a Prussian lawyer
who subsequently became the governor of Wisconsin.64 In the rhetoric and
logic of the time, the organization had a mission that was explicitly racial.
That mission was to render “legal aid and assistance, gratuitously, to those of
German birth, who may appear worthy thereof, but who from poverty are
Id.
See, e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS, 99-108 (1989); Dorothy E. Finnegan,
Raising and Leveling the Bar: Standards, Access, and the YMCA Evening Law Schools, 1890-1940, 55 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 208, 221 (2005); AUERBACH, supra note 13; George B. Shepherd, No African-American
Lawyers Allowed: The Ineﬃcient Racism of the ABA’s Accreditation of Law Schools, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC.
103, 133 (2003).
61 See, e.g., Julius Henry Cohen, Unlawful Practice of the Law Must Be Prevented, 101 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 44, 48 (1922) (arguing that higher standards of ethics are needed
within the legal profession).
62 See B ABCOCK, supra note 20; Mayeux, supra note 12, at 30 (“[T]he public defender
remained primarily a West Coast and Midwestern innovation because in East Coast cities, the
private bar opposed it.”).
63 But see generally BATLAN, supra note 12 (providing a diﬀerent historical starting point).
64 Leonard McGee, The New York Legal Aid Society (1876–1925), ANNALS OF AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. SCI., Mar. 1926, at 27, 27.
59
60
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unable to procure it.”65 Donations from the bar and elite philanthropists
funded the organization. It initially handled only civil cases. Under the
leadership of Arthur von Briesen, whom President and Chief Justice Taft
aptly referred to as “the philanthropic leader of the Bar,” the organization
changed its name to the Legal Aid Society in 1890 and also eliminated its
German focus and diversiﬁed its clientele.66 This change was part-cosmetic,
part-strategic. It was cosmetic because up until this point, the society was
already assisting non-Germans. For example, in 1889, of the 3,500 clients the
Society served, approximately 2,400 were German natives, and the remainder
included Russian Poles, Hungarians, Austrians, Frenchmen, Dutch, and
Americans.67 The change was strategic and racially purposeful. In his fulllength analysis of the organization, Harvard Law professor John MacArthur
Maguire noted that there was a suspicion clouding the organization:
Judges could scarcely believe that the Society was entirely disinterested and
without bias. Had it purported to act for all poor men with just claims or
defences, impartiality might have been convincingly asserted. But when the
Attorney acted only for poor clients of German birth, there was probably a
tinge of suspicion that he must unduly favor the chosen racial group in opposition to
other racial groups. And of course the Germans’ opponents in litigation were
often or usually non-Germans. This situation was unavoidable at the
beginning, because of the Society’s origin. It cramped the development of the
legal aid idea.68

The idea that the Society favored the German “race” to the disadvantage
of other racial groups led to a change in the organization’s mission and
delivery of legal services. This change would have consequences once the
organization developed its criminal justice practice in 1919, a few years before
Congress passed restrictionist anti-immigration legislation.69 In the
meantime, the New York organization provided a template for other cities.
Legal aid societies sprouted up elsewhere, as Boston (1900), Philadelphia
(1902), Cleveland (1905), Cincinnati (1907), and Detroit (1909) followed
suit.70 Some legal aid organizations did both civil and criminal work, while

HEBER SMITH, supra note 27, at 135.
JOHN MACARTHUR MAGUIRE, THE LANCE OF JUSTICE; A SEMI-CENTENNIAL
HISTORY OF THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY, 1876-1926 xi, 23 (1928).
67 Id. at 45; see also id. at xi.
68 Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
69 Emergency Quota Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-5, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5 (1921); Immigration Act of
1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (1924).
70 HEBER SMITH, supra note 27, at 140-44.
65
66
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others focused exclusively on civil matters. Legal aid societies in the South
were rarities, with Atlanta serving as a notable exception.71
Like supporters of the public defender model, legal aid reformers also
emphasized how unscrupulous attorneys could take advantage of the racial
marginalization, poverty, and incompetence of European immigrant
defendants. But legal aid advocates also focused on Americanization. Like
many Progressive Era reformers who touted schools, recreational facilities,
and social welfare programs as Americanization devices, these legal leaders
believed that legal aid would help immigrants from southern and eastern
Europe adjust to American life and institutions. To say they were obsessed
with preventing subversive political activity would be an understatement.
Reginald Heber Smith was a Boston-based lawyer who helped spearhead
the ﬁrst national legal aid study, the Carnegie Foundation-funded Justice and
the Poor. Smith often warned the public that
[D]elay, inability to pay costs, and inability to engage counsel . . . . brings
[immigrants] to the conviction that . . . America has only laws that punish
and never laws that help. From this it is only a short step to open opposition
to all law. Wherever we deny justice to an immigrant we prepare a fertile land
in which the seeds of anarchy, sedition, and disorder quickly take root.72

During the 1920 annual ABA meeting in St. Louis, Edward Tustin, who
helped create the Legal Aid Bureau in Philadelphia the year prior, complained
to the audience that “[t]he poor and [especially] the ignorant foreigner” accused
of a crime “is bewildered and dazed by unaccustomed surroundings and
proceedings, which he does not understand.”73 Like other reformers, Tustin
argued that legal aid organizations were the solution to immigrants’ vulnerability
and potential political dissidence. Such institutions were “one of the greatest
organized influences ever presented to our people for the Americanization of
the ignorant and the foreigner.”74 In Tustin’s view, “there is no department of
our great municipalities which will so work for the Americanization of the
foreigner, the alleviation and quieting of the unrest among the poor and the
ignorant, as a well-established municipal legal aid bureau.”75
Charles Evans Hughes was arguably the most notable leader to articulate
the race-poverty-incompetence framework in service of Americanization
71 Id. at 187; see also KRIS SHEPHARD, RATIONING JUSTICE: POVERTY LAWYERS AND POOR
PEOPLE IN THE DEEP SOUTH 5 (2007).
72 Reginald Heber Smith, Elimination of Imposition and Exploitation of Immigrants, in
PROCEEDINGS AMERICANIZATION CONFERENCE: HELD UNDER THE AUSPICE OF THE
AMERICANIZATION DIVISION 270, 272 (1919).
73 Ernest L. Tustin, The Relation of Legal Aid to the Municipality, 6 VA. L. REG. 891, 899 (1921).
74 Id. at 896.
75 Id. at 902.
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goals. Hughes did so with surprising consistency. As governor of New York
in 1909 he spearheaded the Commission that found that “[j]ustice is a costly
privilege to the mute and illiterate alien” and recommended legal aid reform
to the New York State Legislature.76 During his time as President of the New
York Legal Aid Society from 1916 to 1921 he noted famously that “[t]here is
no more serious menace than the discontent which is fostered by a belief that
one cannot enforce his legal rights because of poverty. To spread that notion
is to open a broad road to Bolshevism.”77 As described in more detail below,
Hughes’ advocacy for institutionalized legal aid, particularly for the
marginalized racial other, would reappear in subtle ways once he returned to
the Court as Chief Justice and once the Court began to recognize the right to
counsel as a limited but an aﬃrmative obligation.78
The race-poverty-incompetence framework was not reserved exclusively
for ethnic whites. For example, Lewis Meriam was the author of The Problem
of Indian Administration, a 1928 Rockefeller Foundation-funded report that
inspired American Indian policy reform. In the report, Merriam deployed
this same logic to recommend government-funded legal aid for Native
Americans.79 Nevertheless, legal aid reformers’ concern about socialism and
anarchism caused them to cater their services primarily to southern and
eastern Europeans to the neglect of other racial minorities. For example, in
volumes 1–27 of the Legal Aid Review—which served as an annual report for
the New York Legal Aid Society and spanned the years of 1903 to 1924—
sixteen cases involving African-Americans and three cases involving Chinese
individuals are discussed. Discussions about Hungarian, Italian, Irish,
Norwegian, Russian, Polish, and other European clients dominate the
reports. Each volume typically contains a discussion of ﬁfteen to eighteen
cases, for a total of more than 300 cases. The legal aid societies of
Philadelphia, Chicago, and Boston also make sparing references to
nonwhites.80 Yet primary source texts from this period suggest that racial
REPORT, supra note 50, at 7.
Charles R. Hughes, Legal Aid Societies, Their Function and Necessity, 43 ANN. MEETING AM.
B. ASS’N 227, 235 (1920).
78 See infra notes 157–158 and accompanying text.
79 LEWIS MERIAM, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION 778 (1928) (“In order that
the extension of the normal processes of government over the Indians may not lead to
misunderstanding, abuses, and oppressions, some organized system of legal aid should be provided
for the ignorant and needy among them . . .there are many who are unacquainted with the white
man’s laws and methods of business, and have not suﬃcient means to hire competent help . . .no
Indian should be brought before a court for a criminal oﬀense without capable and honest counsel
to defend him”). Importantly, the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, which was informed by the
report, not only declined Meriam’s recommendation, but actively prohibited the participation of
attorneys in tribal proceedings.
80 The annual reports for the Boston Legal Aid Society are available online through Harvard
University’s library. The annual reports for the Legal Aid Society of Philadelphia are available at
76
77
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minorities had signiﬁcant unmet legal aid needs.81 Thus, while many legal aid
societies did not preclude nonwhites from receiving legal service, they
certainly did not oﬀer rhetorical or administrative attention to these groups.
The archival evidence of purposeful outreach to nonwhites is thin when
compared to the actual legal aid needs of these groups. Ultimately, the focus
of legal aid reformers on southern and eastern Europeans helped contribute
to a culture of self-help within African-American, Latinx, and AsianAmerican communities.
B. Race and Civil Society
What did racial minorities do amidst racial neglect, and how should we
understand mainstream legal reformers’ relative inattention to their needs? On
the former, this section details how racial minorities developed their own legal
aid schemes that also hinged on race. On the latter, it would be tempting to
interpret legal aid reformers’ neglect of racial minorities as a manifestation of
outright bigotry, but the historical record tells a more complex story. In 1902
Arthur von Briesen, who served as the first president of the Legal Aid Society
of New York, wrote a letter to President Theodore Roosevelt that is instructive.
They were friends from Roosevelt’s political days in New York when Roosevelt
supported legal aid’s development. Von Briesen mentioned that his son Fritz,
who worked in Washington, D.C., had alerted him to the need of a legal aid
society for African-Americans in the capital. Von Briesen insisted:
Washington needs a Legal Aid Society much more than New York. Especially
the colored people in Washington, who have no vote, no political power, no
means of making themselves heard, are so completely subdued and at the
mercy of the ill-will of neighbors, police oﬃcers and the like, that they are
very frequently deprived of liberty and property without an opportunity of
being heard.82

Such comments, expressed through private correspondence, demonstrate
the absence of race-based animus but also highlight the lack of attention given
to African-American and Chinese indigents in von Briesen’s own backyard of

the Urban Archives at Temple University. The Legal Aid Society of Chicago’s Annual Reports are
available at the Joseph Regenstein Library at the University of Chicago.
81 For discussions on race in Philadelphia, Boston, and Chicago see CHI. COMM’N ON RACE
RELATIONS, THE NEGRO IN CHICAGO: A STUDY OF RACE RELATIONS AND A RACE RIOT (1922);
JOHN DANIELS, IN FREEDOM’S BIRTHPLACE: A STUDY OF THE BOSTON NEGROES (1914);
W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE PHILADELPHIA NEGRO (1899).
82 Letter from Arthur von Briesen to Theodore Roosevelt, United States President (June 9,
1902) (on ﬁle with the Library of Congress, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Manuscripts Division).
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New York City (especially considering their ensnarement with the New York
criminal justice system during the same time).83
Other legal aid ﬁgures were also attuned to the issues facing nonwhites
and worked in service of addressing those needs. Richard W. Hale (of
WilmerHale fame) served in various leadership capacities in the Boston
Legal Aid Society and linked lynching to problems in criminal procedure and
legal aid.84 Hales’s colleague Moorﬁeld Storey, who served as the ﬁrst
president of the NAACP, was a Boston attorney who fought vigorously for
the Dyer Anti-Lynching Bill that would have made lynching a federal felony.
Appointed to the National Committee on Legal Aid Work in 1921, Storey
convinced Charles Evans Hughes to oﬀer ﬁnancial and symbolic support to
his anti-lynching eﬀorts.85 Nevertheless, the mainstream legal aid movement
fell short of addressing the legal aid needs of racial minorities. The absence
of outright bigotry and exclusion as well as the willingness of some legal aid
reformers to demonstrate a commitment to racial justice issues involving
blacks belie an easy story about monolithic racial discrimination. But these
themes do show that parts of the legal reform world prioritized the needs of
ethnic whites in their creation of a system of legal aid that had consequences
in the criminal and civil systems.
In a pre-Powell era that failed to establish an aﬃrmative right to an
attorney and in the midst of bureaucratic development of legal aid and public
defender oﬃces that tepidly addressed the needs of nonethnic whites, mutual
aid societies stepped in to ﬁll the gap. Often deprived of human capital,
saddled by ﬁnancial limitations, and constrained by the ubiquitous nature of
racial discrimination, these groups had to run multipurpose organizations
that provided civil and criminal legal aid as well as a host of other social
services. During the Chinese Exclusion Era, one notable organization that
provided legal aid was the St. Bartholomew’s Chinese Guild (Bao Niang Hui),
which was established by the St. Bartholomew’s Episcopalian Church in 1889
in New York City.86 The Guild’s primary projects included missionary work,
social welfare services, and legal advocacy for the Chinese community in New
York, which comprised approximately 2,000 people.87 Several of the New
83 See generally CHERYL D. HICKS, TALK WITH YOU LIKE A WOMAN: AFRICAN AMERICAN
WOMEN, JUSTICE, AND REFORM IN NEW YORK, 1890-1935 (2010); JEFFERY SCOTT
MCILLWAIN, ORGANIZING CRIME IN CHINATOWN: RACE AND RACKETEERING IN NEW YORK
CITY, 1890–1910 (2004).
84 Richard W. Hale, Lynching Unnecessary: A Report of Commonwealth v. Christian, 45 AM. L.
REV. 875, 878-79 (1911).
85 Letter from Mooreﬁeld Storey to Charles Evans Hughes (1918) (on ﬁle with author).
86 MARY TING YI LUI, THE CHINATOWN TRUNK MYSTERY MURDER, MISCEGENATION, AND
OTHER DANGEROUS ENCOUNTERS IN TURN-OF-THE-CENTURY NEW YORK CITY 124-125 (2004).
87 XINYANG WANG, SURVIVING THE CITY: THE CHINESE IMMIGRANT EXPERIENCE IN
NEW YORK CITY, 1890–1970, at 136 (2001).
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York City social service directories listed the organization in their “Legal Aid
and Advice” sections.88 In fact, in the 1903 edition of The New York Charities
Directory, the Guild is described as an organization that “renders legal aid and
advice to Chinamen.”89
In its ﬁrst year, the Guild maintained a membership of 466 people.90 The
annual dues were two dollars, which covered a third of the organization’s
expenses, while the church covered the balance.91 Notably, Guy Maine (Yee
Kai Man), who led the Guild but did not have a law degree, was crucial to its
legal operations. Maine served mainly as an interpreter, legal advocate, and
liaison between the Chinese community and bureaucrats in the New York
City legal system. In 1891, under the aegis of the Guild, Maine sought “justice
in the courts in 217 cases of crimes against Chinese—everything from thirtysix assaults-and-batteries, to eighty-seven laundry windows smashed, to
eighty-ﬁve instances of boy annoyance in various ways.”92 Considering
Maine’s lack of formal credentials, such a caseload is quite impressive. In 1897,
Maine documented what his typical day looked like:
7:10 A.M. To Brooklyn to settle business dispute between two members.
9:30 A.M. Got transcript of judgment of $105 for member.
10:15 A.M. Filed transcript in court and placed in hands of sheriﬀ.
11:30 A.M. Took member to Gouverneur Hospital for dressing of wound.
12:45 P.M. Took two wounded men to Police Station to have assailant
apprehended.
1:30 P.M. Went to Delancy Street [sic] to see landlord about lease.
2:40 P.M. Went to corner of 44th Street and 2nd Avenue about alteration of
store.
3:30 P.M. Went to 57th Street police court for warrant of arrest of man who
broke window of member.
4:40 P.M. Went to West 48th Street to see landlord about having water meter
installed.

88 See e.g., CHARITY ORGANIZATION SOCIETY, NEW YORK CHARITIES DIRECTORY 225
(1890); CHARITY ORGANIZATION SOCIETY, NEW YORK CHARITIES DIRECTORY 281 (1906);
CHARITY ORGANIZATION SOCIETY, NEW YORK CHARITIES DIRECTORY 101 (1914).
89 CHARITY ORGANIZATION SOCIETY, NEW YORK CHARITIES DIRECTORY 86 (1903).
90 Id.
91 ARTHUR BONNER, ALAS! WHAT BROUGHT THEE HITHER?: THE CHINESE IN NEW
YORK 1800–1950, at 123 (1996).
92 BRUCE HALL, TEA THAT BURNS: A FAMILY MEMOIR OF CHINATOWN 93-94 (2002).
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5:15 P.M. Went to 43rd Street and 8th Avenue to see member ordered by
Health Department to have trap connections in store.93

This timetable also highlights an important thematic thread that runs
throughout this Article. Marginalized groups like the descendants of Chinese
and Mexicans, along with African-Americans, did not have the privilege of
running strictly legal aid organizations but operated institutions that provided
a variety of social services. Moreover, the timetable allows for more expansive
ways of thinking about legal aid that are not only tied to legal representation.94
African Americans also participated in their own forms of self-help and
legal innovation. In African-American legal history, the common objects of
analysis are mainstream organizations such as the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People, local movements, and pioneering
attorneys.95 But African-American newspapers also served as a source of legal
advice; such publications provide interesting insights into the legal landscape
of the early twentieth century, especially since many of them were founded
by lawyers.96 The Chicago Defender was one of the most widely circulated black
newspapers in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century.97 It ran a legal advice
column called “Legal Helps” between 1914 and 1917 during the First Great
Migration.98 Richard E. Westbrook, an African-American attorney who
helped create the Cook County Bar Association in 1914 as an alternative to
the exclusionary Chicago Bar Association, penned the column.99 The wide
range of cases listed in the newspaper involved criminal justice matters, labor,
housing, real estate, child support, tort claims, consumer debt, and
BONNER, supra note 91, at 124.
See BATLAN, supra note 12, at 20-24 (illustrating how working women’s protective unions
provided quasi-legal services).
95 See generally KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER (2012); TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA
AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2012); J. CLAY SMITH JR., REBELS
IN LAW: VOICES IN HISTORY OF BLACK WOMEN LAWYERS (2000); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE
NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (2005).
96 In addition to Robert Abbott, who founded and edited the Chicago Defender and graduated
from Kent College of Law, there was Robert Lee Vann, who ran the Pittsburgh Courier and graduated
from law school at the University of Pittsburgh. Ferdinand Lee Barnett founded the Chicago
Conservator (Chicago’s ﬁrst black newspaper) and was a graduate of Chicago’s College of Law.
William Calvin Chase, who was the editor of the Washington Bee throughout its existence (18821922), attended Howard University School of Law.
97 See generally ETHAN MICHAELI, THE DEFENDER: HOW THE LEGENDARY BLACK
NEWSPAPER CHANGED AMERICA (2016).
98 Joel E. Black, A Theory of African-American Citizenship: Richard Westbrooks, The Great
Migration, and the Chicago Defender’s “Legal Helps” Column, 46 J. SOC. HIST. 896, 898 (2013).
99 See id. (“By organizing the Cook County Bar Association in 1914 ‘to promote good
fellowship’ among the Black lawyers who were racially ineligible for membership in the white
Chicago Bar Foundation, [Westbrook] signaled his intent to make law a mechanism of Black equality,
and to combat racial discrimination.”).
93
94
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employment issues.100 In his pioneering study, The Negro Press in the United
States, University of Chicago sociologist Frederick Detweiler noted that the
Chicago Defender
[S]eeks to live up to its title of Defender. Colored people from all over the
country turn to it when in trouble; the staﬀ interests itself in securing legal
aid and justice for individual Negroes . . . . When Negroes have trouble of
any sort they write to the paper, sometimes, merely to utter their cry for
justice.101

Much of the advice oﬀered in the newspaper centered on Chicago’s
notorious court system.102 Consider the following column:
[Question]: I was arrested, charged with disorderly conduct, and the trial in
the Municipal Court, at 35th street. Now before my case was reached or the
court had opened, a policeman brought me a paper and stated that if I wished
to have my trial at once I should sign the paper: I signed the paper, and when
court opened and my case was called, I demanded a jury, but the judge said
that I had made the demand too late as I had waived my right to a jury trial.
Now please explain the law concerning jury trials in the state of Illinois.
[Response]: We have noticed the actions of the police and others connected
with the Municipal Court, at the place you mention and other places where
said Municipal Courts are held, and such practice is very common and our
readers are warned not to sign any paper presented unless you fully
understand the contents of same. The paper no doubt was a formal waiver of
a jury trial, but you should have then and there explained to the judge why
you signed the paper and the circumstances connected therewith. No person
shall be imprisoned for non-payment of a ﬁne or a judgment in any civil,
criminal, quasi criminal or quit tam action except upon conviction by a jury;
provided, that the defendant or defendants in any such action may waive a
jury trial by executing a formal waiver in writing; and when such waiver of
jury is made, imprisonment may follow the judgment of the court without
conviction by the jury. This section shall not apply to ﬁnes inﬂicted for
contempt of court. Ch. 79, Sec. 175, Hurds Revised Statues of Illinois.103

A cursory glance at this section might lead one to understand it simply as
a legal advice column. A more complicated reading would consider the
column not only as a contributor to legal consciousness, or how people
Id. at 900, 902, 903, 904, 905.
FREDERICK GERMAN DETWEILER, THE NEGRO PRESS IN THE UNITED STATES 65-66 (1922).
For a useful discussion on Chicago courts during this period, see MICHAEL WILLRICH,
CITY OF COURTS: SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN PROGRESSIVE ERA CHICAGO (2003).
103 Defender’s Legal Helps, CHICAGO DEFENDER, Mar. 7, 1914, at 8.
100
101
102
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understand the law, but also as a venue for blacks seeking legal assistance. As
K. Nousiainen notes in a study of the Finnish press and indigent clients, if a
person can clearly present her problem in a legal advice column, then it can
operate as an easy and cheap method of obtaining legal advice.104 In his
analysis of Chinese legal advice columns in the 1990s, sociologist Ethan
Michelson argues that “[b]y virtue of its greater popular exposure through
newspapers and other mass media, public legal advice has a wider and more
politically signiﬁcant impact than private legal advice.”105 Isaac Metzker has
oﬀered a similar argument about the importance of advice columns in his
book on the Jewish Daily Forward. Established in 1897 as a Yiddish-language
daily, this newspaper maintained a column that provided social, economic,
and legal advice to Eastern European immigrants attempting to adjust to
American life.106 At stake in considering such legal advice columns such as
the Defender’s is not only the actual provision of legal information but also
educative eﬀorts used by black elites to demystify law. These legal
consciousness-raising techniques were similar to legal aid reformers’ attempts
to Americanize and politicize European immigrants.
Mexican-American civil society also bubbled with legal aid activity. The
career of Manuel C. Gonzales intersected with various permutations of legal
aid for Mexicans and Mexican-Americans during the pre-Powell era. Born in
San Antonio, Texas, Gonzales worked as a secretary at the law ﬁrm of A.M.
Love and B.F. Patterson in 1917.107 The bilingual Gonzales sought to leverage
the capital he had to beneﬁt the Mexican-American community; in 1917 he
convinced his employers to provide organized legal assistance for MexicanAmericans.108 This resulted in La Liga Protectora Mexicana (the Mexican
Protective League), which provided legal assistance between 1917 and 1921.109
While working for the League, Gonzales and the attorneys “advised members
of Texas’s tenant laws, labor contracts, interest rates for loans, constitutional
rights of assembly and free speech, workers’ compensation, and due

See generally K. NOUSIAINEN, LEGAL AID AND THE PRESS (1980).
Ethan Michelson, Dear Lawyer Bao: Everyday Problems, Legal Advice, and State Power in
China, 55 SOC. PROBS. 43, 44 (2008).
106 See generally ISACC METZKER, A BINTEL BRIEF: SIXTY YEARS OF LETTERS FROM THE
LOWER EAST SIDE TO THE JEWISH DAILY FORWARD (1971).
107 See MAGGIE RIVAS-RODRIGUEZ, TEXAS MEXICAN AMERICANS AND POSTWAR CIVIL
RIGHTS 3 (2015).
108 JULIE LEININGER PYCIOR, LA RAZA ORGANIZES: MEXICAN AMERICAN LIFE IN SAN
ANTONIO 1915–1930, AS REFLECTED IN MUTUALISTA ACTIVITIES 146 (1979); see also Julie
Leininger Pycior, Mexican Protective League, in HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE (2013),
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/pqmuk [https://perma.cc/ZYX8-PJ4S] (noting
Gonzalez’s founding of the Mexican Protective League).
109 PYCIOR, supra note 108, at 150.
104
105
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process.”110 Membership in La Liga increased from 73 in 1917 to 500 in 1920,
with “[m]embers pa[ying] one dollar their ﬁrst year and ﬁve dollars annually
thereafter.”111 The nature of the legal assistance oﬀered by the League was
advisory and informational, but it occasionally provided legal representation
and lobbied for legislative changes in laws that would beneﬁt land tenants.112
Mutualistas like La Liga, which were buoyed by the often unrecognized dayto-day labor of women,113 helped buﬀer Mexicans and Mexican-Americans
from a hostile labor market with exploitative employment practices.114 The
importance of these organizations increased with the development of The
United States Border Patrol in 1924. La Liga also melded legal advice and
education. Throughout the organization’s existence, it maintained a legal
advice column in the newspaper El Imparcial de Texas.115 Like the Chicago
Defender’s legal advice column, this outlet was particularly important
considering the occupational exclusion of Latinos and Latinas from the legal
profession, their lack of access to the legal process, and the unique literacy,
civic, and linguistic issues that they encountered.116 The league also published
a small compendium titled Leyes de Texas, Civiles y Criminales, Traducidas al
Espanõl (Texas Law, Civil and Criminal, Translated into Spanish), which
oﬀered a wealth of legal information on issues that included divorce, fraud,
suﬀrage, vagrancy, labor, and naturalization. In Spanish, the authors indicated
that their many years of experience “convinced them that there is an urgent
need for such a compilation, as a guide to Mexicans living in Texas for easy
knowledge and understanding of their legal rights.”117
In 1926, Gonzales took his talents to the Mexican Consul in San Antonio,
which “often asked him to serve as a friend of the court in trials of policemen

Mutualista Organizations, in THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LATINOS AND LATINAS
(2006), https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/
9780195156003.001.0001/acref-9780195156003-e-651 [https://perma.cc/T6L3-5B5U].
111 PYCIOR, supra note 108, at 147-48.
112 See id. at 152 (“Nevertheless the Liga did lobby in Austin for some speciﬁc reforms . . . .
This legislation would have helped to eliminate landholders’ use of local law enforcement oﬃcers to
harass Mexican-Texan and other tenants.”).
113 See VICKI RUIZ, FROM OUT OF THE SHADOWS: MEXICAN WOMEN IN TWENTIETHCENTURY AMERICA 72-98 (1998) (describing Mexican women’s contributions to political organizing).
114 Id.
115 RIVAS-RODRIGUEZ, supra note 107, at 3.
116 Berkeley sociologist Paul Taylor studied Mexican crime and wrote, “Mexicans get little
protection in the courts. The Mexicans are now learning that you must buy justice . . . The Mexican
is in the same position as the Negro in the South. He is always wrong unless there is a white man
to speak for him.” Paul S. Taylor, Crime and the Foreign Born: The Problem of the Mexican, in
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT: REPORT ON CRIME AND
THE FOREIGN BORN 199, 230-32 (1931).
117 B. PATTERSON & T. MONROE, LEYES DE TEXAS, CIVILES Y CRIMINALES, TRADUCIDAS
AL ESPAÑOL 5 (1920).
110
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who killed Mexicans.”118 Gonzales would work for the consulate until 1958.119
The role of the consulate in the provision of legal services cannot be
understated. As early as 1903, the Mexican Consulate in Los Angeles had “a
special fund that, according to the [L.A.] Times, was ‘to be used in assisting
Mexican subjects, who became involved in diﬃculty, either through ignorance
of the laws of this country or through mistaken arrest or accusation of
crimes’” 120 and by 1928 there were more than 60 consuls in cities across the
country.121 Across the Southwest, consuls in major cities such as San Antonio,
Tucson, and Los Angeles “prepared legal briefs, assessed the impact of
American laws or proposed legislation . . . defended Mexican nationals who
lacked funds, submitted petitions for pardons or paroles for mexicanos
serving jail sentences, reviewed requests of victims or criminal oﬀenses, and
presented claims from industrial accidents to appropriate authorities.”122
These consuls often worked in tandem with local mutualistas.123 Consulates
obtained legal aid from individual attorneys or ﬁrms “for Mexican nationals
who were unable to aﬀord their own attorney or did not speak English well
enough to navigate the US legal system.”124 Consular legal aid was not
restricted to the southwest either. Zaragosa Vargas similarly notes, “In one
year, Detroit lawyer Charles Benjamin (a Panamanian) helped the Mexican
consul with over 400 cases involving work-related accidents.”125 What is
important here is the seemingly circuitous routes Mexicans and MexicanAmericans had to take to receive legal services. While legal aid reformers
catered their services to ethnic whites in the Northeast and the Midwest,
some Mexicans and Mexican-Americans essentially had to rely on another
country to receive legal aid.

118 FRANCISCO ARTURO ROSALES, CHICANO! THE HISTORY OF THE MEXICAN AMERICAN
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 82 (1996).
119 Cynthia E. Orozco, Gonzales, Manuel C., HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE,
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/fgo57 [https://perma.cc/B7KK-KQCY] (last
visited Feb. 23, 2019).
120 EDWARD J. ESCOBAR, RACE, POLICE, AND THE MAKING OF A POLITICAL IDENTITY:
MEXICAN AMERICANS AND THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 1900–1945, at 34 (1999).
121 See FRANCISCO ARTURO ROSALES, ¡POBRE RAZA!: VIOLENCE, JUSTICE, AND
MOBILIZATION AMONG MÉXICO LINDO IMMIGRANTS, 1900–1936, at 42 (1999) (noting that “62
[consular oﬃcers] existed in 1928”).
122 FRANCISCO E. BALDERRAMA, IN DEFENSE OF LA RAZA, THE LOS ANGELES MEXICAN
CONSULATE, AND THE MEXICAN COMMUNITY, 1929–1936, at 9 (1982).
123 RUIZ, supra note 113.
124 Genevieve Carpio, Unexpected Allies: David C. Marcus and His Impact on the Advancement of Civil
Rights in the Mexican-American Legal Landscape of Southern California, in BEYOND ALLIANCES: THE
JEWISH ROLE IN RESHAPING THE RACIAL LANDSCAPE OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 1, 5 (2011).
125 ZARAGOSA VARGAS, PROLETARIANS OF THE NORTH: MEXICAN INDUSTRIAL
WORKERS IN DETROIT AND THE MIDWEST, 1917–1933, at 121 (1999).
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These brief examples demonstrate that legal aid is not divorced from race
in ways that previous histories suggest. Additionally, this Section
demonstrates that, for some organizations, the distinction between civil and
criminal legal aid was quite durable; for others, the delineation was less
salient. Finally, this subsection illustrates how, in the absence of the Court’s
and mainstream civil society’s serious engagement with minorities’ legal
problems, these communities relied on self-help strategies.
II. FROM POWELL TO GIDEON: A STUNTED RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. Race and the Judicial Enshrinement of the Right to Counsel
This section details the relationship between race and indigent defense in
the years before the Court decided Powell in 1931, and in the three decades
after the case was decided. The typical explanation for the Court’s silence on
the right to counsel before Powell is usually interpreted as a byproduct of its
shift from negative liberties to positive liberties. This is correct, but despite
the Court’s minimalist approach, it also faced questions about the right to
counsel before Powell. This Part ﬁrst describes the Court’s continued
inattention to the right to counsel before Powell. It then describes Powell and
how that decision created a template for future right to counsel cases that
emphasized the race, indigence, and illiteracy of defendants for almost three
decades. The Court’s intervention in cases involving uncounseled minority
defendants came by way of the Fourteenth Amendment and mirrored its
growing concern about racial discrimination in criminal justice and in
society.126 Although its treatment of the right to counsel was pioneering at
the time, its use of the Powell template—which focused on racial pathology—
stunted the development of indigent defense and caused it to make case-bycase determinations as opposed to prophylactic rules.
Moore v. Dempsey, which emerged out of the 1919 race riots in Elaine,
Arkansas, was one of the ﬁrst cases to involve a constructive ineﬀective
assistance of counsel claim.127 The case concerned unionization eﬀorts
undertaken by black farmers in Elaine. In the words of one paper, farmers
sought to develop “a legal aid society through which they planned to take
action through the courts to end vicious economic exploitation.”128 Two white
126 This is particularly true of the Vinson Court and its treatment of restrictive covenants and
segregation in higher education. See Whittington B. Johnson, The Vinson Court and Racial Segregation,
1946–1953, 63 J. NEGRO HIST. 220, 223 (1978) (describing the “crippling blow to restrictive
covenants” that Chief Justice Vinson dealt by “wedding their legal enforcement with state action”).
127 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
128 Arkansas Court Frees Six Peons: Have Been Awaiting Retrial for More Than Two Years; Decision
Is Reversed by U.S. Supreme Court, N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS, June 27, 1923, at 3.
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oﬃcers who came to investigate the meeting were denied entry.129 Shooting
commenced after “words were exchanged” between the white oﬃcers and the
black occupants, but “the question of who ﬁred ﬁrst will likely never be
answered.”130 Mass arrests of blacks, tortures, and a full-scale riot ensued.131
African-American activist Ida B. Wells-Barnett, who operated a mutual aid
society that provided legal aid in Chicago, met with the wives and mothers
of the detainees and was able to sneak into the jail.132 The mother of Frank
Moore, the lead defendant in the case, claimed that Wells-Barnett was her
“cousin” from St. Louis.133 With the company of “a group of insigniﬁcant
looking colored women who had been there many times before,”134 WellsBarnett was able to obtain their accounts of torture and publish her ﬁndings
nationally in a pamphlet titled The Arkansas Race Riot. One of the black
defendants in the case discussed his abduction from his home and said,
I was taken to Elaine and put in the schoolhouse and I was there about six
days. I was brought to Helena jail and whipped near to death to make me lie
on myself and the others . . . .[I] was put in an electric chair in Helena jail
and shocked. I have the scars on my body to show now.135

After tortured confessions and a hasty trial, the defendants were
convicted.136 They appealed the mob-dominated trial and, for our purposes,
the failure of counsel to demand a delay, change of venue, or separate trials.137
The Court focused solely on the mob-oriented nature of the proceedings.138
The case is typically understood for the proposition that mob-dominated
trials are unconstitutional.139 At this point in history, it was one of the few
moments where the Supreme Court overturned a southern state’s criminal
conviction of an African-American.140 But the Court’s short treatment of
representation would be a common theme in the decade before and after
Powell; claims brought by defendants challenging the appointment or
DAVID F. KRUGLER, 1919, THE YEAR OF RACIAL VIOLENCE 171 (2014).
Id.
Id. at 171-75, 271.
IDA B. WELLS & ALFREDA M. DUSTER, CRUSADE FOR JUSTICE: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY
OF IDA B. WELLS 401 (1970).
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 IDA B. WELLS-BARNETT, THE ARKANSAS RACE RIOT 15 (1920).
136 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 89 (1923).
137 Id.
138 Id. at 90-91.
139 See MEGAN MING FRANCIS, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN
AMERICAN STATE 127-28 (2014); Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection
of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1306 (1982); Klarman, supra note 1, at 51. See generally RICHARD C.
CORTNER, A MOB INTENT ON DEATH: THE NAACP AND THE ARKANSAS RIOT CASES (1988).
140 Klarman, supra note 1, at 48.
129
130
131
132
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eﬀectiveness of counsel would be overshadowed by more shocking legal
infractions such as mob-dominated trials and coerced confessions.
The Court’s pre-Powell minimalism and failure to address right to counsel
issues may have been a byproduct of its misguided understanding of how
indigent defense actually worked at that time. This misunderstanding is best
exempliﬁed in the Court’s decision in Patton v. United States.141 This case dealt
with the constitutionality of an eleven-person jury.142 Toward the end of the
decision the Court spoke more broadly about the “humane policy of modern
criminal law” and boasted that “[t]he man now charged with crime is
furnished the most complete opportunity for making his defense . . . if he be
poor, he may have counsel furnished him by the state . . . not infrequently he
is thus furnished counsel more able than the attorney for the state.”143 Such
claims conﬂicted with the professional debates on indigent defense at the
time as well as the Court’s own conclusions a year later in Powell. Notably,
the liberal faction of the Court—Justices Brandeis, Cardozo, and Stone—
concurred only in judgment whereas Chief Justice Taft, who was well versed
in the legal aid landscape, took no part in the decision.144 As Judge A. Leon
Higginbotham Jr. has noted, “[t]he Supreme Court’s new direction in
criminal justice matters became apparent shortly after [Charles Evans]
Hughes became Chief Justice in 1930.” 145 This shift is most notable in Powell,
where the Court adopted the framework developed by Progressive Era legal
aid reformers who emphasized racial marginalization, poverty, and
incompetence in their push for institutionalization.
The facts of Powell v. Alabama146 entailed more issues than a criminal
procedure final exam. Nine black boys in the Depression-era South were
accused of raping two white girls on a train and arrested in Scottsboro,
Alabama.147 The defendants—who are commonly referred to as the
“Scottsboro Boys”—were rushed through trials that were dominated by
mobs, entailed minimal counsel, and were decided by all-white juries.148 The
Supreme Court overturned their convictions and, for the first time, required

281 U.S. 276 (1930).
Id. at 276.
Id. at 308.
See WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, Preface to REGINALD HEBER SMITH & JOHN S. BRADWAY,
GROWTH OF LEGAL AID WORK IN THE UNITED STATES iv (1926) (“The growth of these legal aid
organizations is the most satisfactory proof of their necessity.”).
145 A. LEON HIGGENBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND
PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 160 (1996).
146 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
147 Id. at 51.
148 Id.; see also Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 591 (1935) (holding that exclusion of blacks
from juries violates the Equal Protection Clause).
141
142
143
144

2019]

The Sixth Amendment Facade

1193

states to appoint counsel for indigent capital defendants. 149 It ruled that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required such
appointments.150 Powell is important not only for its doctrinal significance,
but also because of the socio-political context in which it emerged. Some
diplomatic historians and legal scholars rightly point to post–World War II
developments and Cold War posturing as integral to civil rights victories in
the United States,151 but the Scottsboro incident should be situated more
firmly in this history. The boys were represented in the appeals stage by the
International Labor Defense (ILD), the legal arm of the Communist Party
USA. The ILD cut its teeth by providing legal assistance in high-profile cases
involving labor leaders, political activists, and anarchists in the late 1920s.152 At
this point in history, only the cases of Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti
equaled the Scottsboro Boys in international scrutiny.153 Moreover, the Soviet
Union pummeled the U.S. in the international media for its failure to address
lynching, which was seen as the “close cousin [of] mob-dominated trials.”154
Causal links between this international attention and the Court’s decision
are unavailable, but it is safe to say that these currents did not exist in a silo.
Thomas Emerson, who served on the Scottsboro Boys’ defense team and
subsequently taught at Yale Law School, commented on how international
scrutiny inﬂuenced American racial egalitarianism. He stated,
We profess to believe in racial equality and in recent years, contrary to the
general trend, we have made some progress in achieving this goal. This is due
in part, no doubt, to the fact that the attention of the outside world has been
focused upon our conduct in this area.155

In line with this Article’s core argument, it is important to note that the
deﬁning case that carved out a limited right to counsel was infected by racial
politics. Moreover, the Powell Court’s decision made repeated references to
the defendants inability to obtain meaningful counsel and their illiteracy in

Powell, 287 U.S. at 73.
Id.
See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980) (suggesting that post-World War II black disillusionment
inﬂuenced the Court’s race cases); Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN.
L. REV. 61, 64 (1988) (noting the connection between “civil rights and anticommunism” during the
Cold War).
152 See generally REBECCA HILL, MEN, MOBS, AND LAW: ANTI-LYNCHING AND LABOR
DEFENSE IN U.S. RADICAL HISTORY (2008).
153 See generally MOSHIK TEMKIN, THE SACCO-VANZETTI AFFAIR: AMERICA ON TRIAL (2009).
154 MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 123 (2006).
155 Thomas I. Emerson, The Trend of American Democracy 11 LAW. GUILD REV. 194, 195 (1951).
149
150
151
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ways that correspond with early legal aid reformers’ discourse around poverty
and incompetence.156
Chief Justice Hughes’ role in this decision and the shift in the Court’s
right to counsel jurisprudence is undertheorized but noteworthy. Recall that
Hughes was one of the primary advocates of organized legal aid and, like
other reformers, deployed the aforementioned framework. Hughes’ AfricanAmerican-friendly rulings during his ﬁrst stint as an Associate Justice
between 1910–1916157 and when he returned as Chief Justice from 1930–1941,158
make the Powell decision somewhat unsurprising. Edwin McElwain, who
clerked for the Chief Justice for three years, documented how Hughes treated
in forma pauperis cases involving “civil rights or racial minorities” with “the
most care” and noted how Hughes would often “slight the rule that the Court
will not consider cases which turn upon their individual facts” to “smell out
possible prejudice by the prosecuting authorities or the lower courts.”159
Curiously, Hughes did not pen Powell. This could have been a byproduct of
the general division of labor on the Court or a result of the seemingly selfserving optics of a legal aid leader authoring a decision that mandates the
limited provision of counsel to indigent defendants. The historical and
scholarly record suggests that Hughes’ decision to give authorship duty to
Justice Sutherland was a pragmatic one. Harvard Law professor Paul Freund,
who clerked for Justice Brandeis a term after Powell, noted how the former
politician-turned-Chief Justice “regarded the assignment of opinions as the
most delicate” and was “inclined, in cases of sharp division, to assign the
opinion . . .to a Justice who was not likely to take the most extreme
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 52, 57-58, 71 (1932).
See, e.g., McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151, 161-62 (1914) (noting,
in dicta, that an Oklahoma statute that allowed railroads to oﬀer luxury accommodations for whites
and not blacks was unconstitutional irrespective of diﬀerential racial demand); Bailey v. Alabama,
219 U.S. 219, 245 (1911) (ruling that a debt peonage statute was unconstitutional); A. Leon
Higginbotham, Jr. & William C. Smith, The Hughes Court and the Beginning of the End of the “Separate
but Equal” Doctrine, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1099, 1108 (1992) (acknowledging that although Hughes
downplayed the racial aspects of the case, he “undoubtedly held together a majority of a court that
was decidedly unsympathetic to legal claims by blacks”); Note, Governor on the Bench: Charles Evans
Hughes as Associate Justice, 89 HARV. L. REV. 961, 993 (1976) (arguing that although the McCabe
decision upheld Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) and barred injunctive relief, the concurrence
of the three Southern members of the Court and Justice Holmes suggests that Hughes was able to
incorporate that dicta by yielding to the result of the case and noting that the holding was
transformed years later in the landmark case of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938)).
158 See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 349-50 (1938) (ruling that states
that provide in-state education to whites must also provide in-state education to blacks); Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936) (ruling that the use of confessions attained through coercion
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587,
596 (1935) (holding that exclusion of blacks from juries violates the Equal Protection Clause).
159 Edwin McElwain, The Business of the Supreme Court As Conducted by Chief Justice Hughes, 63
HARV. L. REV. 5, 24 (1949).
156
157
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position.”160 Justice Sutherland, a member of the conservative bloc of the
Court often referred to as the Four Horsemen and the Justice who penned
decisions that sharply deﬁned the boundaries of whiteness, was given the
job.161 Despite his conservatism, Sutherland’s opinion used the same racial
framework that was utilized by reformers like Hughes and expressed in the
legal profession.162 The race-poverty-incompetence framework would persist
for decades after Powell but in service of black defendants.
Presumably, the Court’s recognition in Powell of how important lawyers
were to procedural fairness would portend a continued extension of the right
to counsel. Although the Court would extend the right to counsel to federal
courts in 1938,163 this expansion only applied to what was a relatively small
federal docket. What was more consequential was the Court’s refusal to
require appointment of counsel in state cases. In Betts v. Brady, Maryland
charged Smith Betts with robbery.164 He could not aﬀord a lawyer, and the
state did not provide him with one.165 This was constitutionally permissible
because the right only extended to federal cases and capital cases. Betts
appealed and lost.166 The case could be understood as a battle about federalism
and the incorporation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to states.167
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s this battle was waged between Justice Black,
who believed in total incorporation, and Justice Frankfurter, who opposed

160 Paul A. Freund, Charles Evans Hughes as Chief Justice, 81 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40 (1967); see
also McElwain, supra note 159, at 18 (noting how Hughes would “assign ‘liberal’ opinions to
‘conservative’ judges, and vice versa” and describing how in the Powell case, Hughes assigned the
decision to Justice Sutherland “probably in the hope that he could bring over Justices Butler and
McReynolds while some of the more ‘liberal’ Justices could not”).
161 HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND: RESTORING A
JURISPRUDENCE OF NATURAL RIGHTS 23 (1997). For Justice Sutherland opinions that sharply
deﬁned the boundaries of whiteness, excluding Indian and Japanese individuals from citizenship,
see United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 214-15 (1923); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 198
(1922) (ruling that the Japanese individuals are not white and eligible for naturalization).
162 Sara Mayeux helpfully points out that Walter Pollack, the attorney who argued Powell,
utilized similar language and repeatedly cited an Illinois Supreme Court opinion in his brief “to
support his argument that nine illiterate black teenagers had been denied the eﬀective assistance of
counsel in rural Alabama” by pointing “to precedents in which illiterate immigrants had been denied
that assistance in the urban Midwest.” Sara Mayeux, Ineﬀective Assistance of Counsel before Powell v.
Alabama: Lessons from History for the Future of the Right to Counsel, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2161, 2181 (2014).
163 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467 (1938) (holding that the Sixth Amendment “entitles
one charged with crime to the assistance of counsel”).
164 316 U.S. 455, 456 (1942).
165 Id. at 457.
166 Id.
167 See Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 294 (1982) (noting
that Gideon v. Wainwright overruled Betts v. Brady in holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
“requires appointment of counsel in state courts under the same standard that the [S]ixth
[A]mendment imposes on federal courts”).
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it.168 But the case could also be seen as a statement about race. Louis Lusky, a
Columbia law professor who drafted the famous “Footnote 4” as a law clerk
for Justice Stone, complained that the Court oﬀered no serious distinction
between Powell and Betts. Unsatisﬁed with the capital/noncapital distinction,
he argued that Betts could be explained as “a muﬄed and possibly unconscious
ruling against Federal intervention in the absence of a showing that the case
involves some national interest, such as that in the minorities problem.”169 He
added “Betts was not shown to be a member of any minority group, whereas
. . . Powell . . . involved ‘ignorant and friendless negro youths.’”170 Lusky also
noted that “it must be admitted that there is a special reason for Federal
intervention where the minorities problem has impinged upon the State’s
machinery of criminal justice.”171 Lusky’s observations were prescient; the
Court’s subsequent decisions, and the rhetoric behind them, lent considerable
credence to his suspicions. Betts produced the “fundamental fairness”
doctrine. That doctrine, which was sometimes referred to as the “special
circumstances” test, required courts to examine the appointment of counsel
on a case-by-case nature.172 The test, which proved unworkable and yielded
inconsistent results, also hinged heavily on race.
B. Race, Pathology, and the “Special Circumstances Test”
Throughout the 1940s and the 1950s, the period between Powell and
Gideon, the Court decided a series of right to counsel cases that were partially
informed by racial concerns. These decisions were a result of Betts’ unwieldy
special circumstances test. The test was a byproduct of the formula developed
by legal aid reformers and emphasized in Powell. A perceived constitutional
violation—in this case, a Due Process failure to appoint counsel—along with
168 This has been a topic of interest for constitutional scholars and judges for decades. See
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1196 (1992)
(recounting Justice Black’s arguments for incorporation); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights
and the States, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 768-69 (1961) (highlighting Justice Black’s support for full
incorporation of the Bill of Rights); Felix Frankfurter, Memorandum on “Incorporation” of the Bill of
Rights into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 746, 748
(1965)(arguing that incorporation “is not warranted by the Court’s careful choice of language” in
earlier cases); Louis Henkin, “Selective Incorporation” in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74,
76 (1963) (discussing Justice Black’s support of incorporation, as compared with “selective
incorporation”). See generally RAOUL BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL
OF RIGHTS (1989).
169 Louis Lusky, Minority Rights and the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 1, 28 (1942).
170 Id. at 28-29.
171 Id. at 30. But see Victoria Nourse, Gideon’s Muted Trumpet, 58 MD. L. REV. 1417, 1421 (1999)
(“[T]he Court in Powell used the right to counsel to avoid the real question: the question of race—
the question of how and whether a state could convict someone when it was committed to seeing
them guilty-by-race.”).
172 Tracey L. Meares, What’s Wrong with Gideon, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 215, 221 (2003).

2019]

The Sixth Amendment Facade

1197

some combination of indigence, status as a racial minority, illiteracy, poverty,
and often youth was not necessarily enough to be granted certiorari since such
grants are statistically rare events; but that combination was an undeniable
feature of the Court’s constitutional criminal procedure docket during this
period. The decisions described below explicate this point. Regrettably, criminal
procedure scholars have largely ignored these cases and with good reason; the
decisions simply did not and do not have the doctrinal luster or significance of
the subsequent landmark Warren Court interventions. But in addition to
comprising part of what Michael Klarman defines (but does not necessarily
include) as part of “racial origins of criminal procedure,” these decisions map
onto the Court’s civil rights race jurisprudence at the time, which was quite
incremental due to its composition and its relatively new racial vocabulary in
regard to criminal procedure.173 Still, these decisions offer a window into how
race figured into law after that category helped sustain the creation of legal aid
and public defender offices. The decisions also show how race helped create an
edifice of decisions that the Gideon line of cases could draw upon.
Between Powell and Gideon, the Court’s decisions invariably involved
indigent black defendants who were young, poor, illiterate, or some
combination of the three. Gabriel Chin makes this observation in one of the
few meaningful articles on race and the right to counsel when he states,
“[c]ourts granting relief, including the Supreme Court, often described
defendants as ‘ignorant negroes.’”174 He discusses a few Supreme Court
decisions but focuses particularly on state cases. Professor Chin’s important
discovery is understated and can be taken significantly further. Throughout the
1940s and 1950s illiterate black defendants were the most common parties in
Supreme Court right to counsel cases. The frequency of such cases is a sign of
race’s importance in influencing the Court’s jurisprudence during this period
as well as of the incremental but limited ways the Court considered indigent
defense.
In a two-decade span, the Court decided ten cases involving poor, black,
illiterate, and uncounseled defendants and was quite explicit about its
approach; those were the “special circumstances” that the Betts decision seems
to demand for judicial scrutiny. The Court recognized that the special
circumstances test was inelegant and idiosyncratic but did not fashion a
prophylactic rule, which allowed many cases—invariably by black
defendants—to come to the Court.175 NAACP attorneys William Robert
See generally Klarman, supra note 1.
Gabriel J. Chin, Race and the Disappointing Right to Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2236, 2241 (2012).
For a general and helpful discussion of how the Court has engaged in gratuitous uses of race in its
opinions, see Justin Driver, Recognizing Race, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 404 (2012).
175 As the Court stated in Gibbs v. Burke,
173
174
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Ming and Leon Ransom (the latter of whom served as dean of Howard
University School of Law) argued Ward v. Texas in 1942.176 That case involved
an uncounseled confession in which the police moved “an ignorant negro by
night and day to strange towns.”177 Two years later, Pollock v. Williams
overturned the conviction of an “illiterate Negro laborer” who was indigent,
and “not told that he was entitled to counsel, and that counsel would be
provided for him if he wished.”178 At the end of the 1940s, the Court decided
Harris v. South Carolina, which overturned the conviction of “a slightly built
Negro” who was “an illiterate” and not informed of his right to secure a
lawyer.179 Chandler v. Fretag, decided in 1954, overturned the uncounseled
conviction of “a middle-aged Negro of little education” who waived the right
of counsel on a housebreaking and larceny charge but promptly requested a
continuance to obtain an attorney after ﬁnding out that he would be tried as
a habitual criminal.180 A year later the court heard Reece v. Georgia,181 which was
successfully argued by Daniel Duke, a former Atlanta prosecutor who had
previously engaged in social and political battles against the Ku Klux Klan and
an anti-Jewish Klan offshoot.182 Reece reversed the conviction of a “semi-illiterate
Negro of low mentality” who had not been provided counsel.183
By 1957, defendants were beginning to rely more heavily on two-decadeold formulaic jurisprudence that focused on the unique due process concerns
facing young illiterate defendants. That year the Court decided two cases that
implicated indigent defense. Moore v. Michigan overturned the uncounseled
conviction of a seventeen-year-old “Negro with a seventh-grade education.”184
Counsel for the defendant emphasized his client’s race, ignorance, and
intellect in his brief and juxtaposed the facts of the case with some of the

Respondent argues that to hold to such precedents leaves the state prosecuting
authorities uncertain as to whether to oﬀer counsel to all accused who are without
adequate funds and under serious charges in state courts. We cannot oﬀer a panacea
for the diﬃculty. Such an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment would be an
unwarranted federal intrusion into state control of its criminal procedure. The due
process clause is not susceptible to reduction to a mathematical formula.
337 U.S. 773, 780-81 (1949).
176 316 U.S. 547, 547 (1942).
177 Id. at 555.
178 322 U.S. 4, 6, 15 (1944).
179 338 U.S. 68, 69-70 (1949).
180 348 U.S. 3, 8 (1954).
181 350 U.S. 85 (1955).
182 JOHN EGERTON, SPEAK NOW AGAINST THE DAY: THE GENERATION BEFORE THE
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE SOUTH 379 (1995).
183 Reece, 350 U.S. at 89.
184 355 U.S. 155, 156 (1957).
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cases described above.185 The same year, in Fikes v. Alabama, NAACP attorney
Jack Greenberg similarly marshalled his client’s race, poverty, and
intelligence.186 Fikes involved “an uneducated Negro, certainly of low mentality,
if not mentally ill” who was kept in isolation and prevented from seeing his
father and lawyer.187 Greenberg and his co-counsel emphasized that the
petitioner was a “27 year old Negro who left school at the end of the third grade
when he was 16 years of age.”188 He deployed the testimony of two psychiatrists
who found that the defendant was “seriously mentally ill” and added that the
defendant’s mother testified that he had always been “thick-headed.”189
Greenberg won. Wiley A. Branton was up next in Payne v. Arkansas, which
was decided the following year in 1958.190 Branton, who played a role in the
desegregation of the University of Arkansas and also served as dean of Howard
University School of Law, helped overturn the uncounseled conviction of a
“19-year-old Negro with a fifth-grade education.”191 In his brief—from the
question presented to the conclusion—Branton emphasized his client’s race
and mental capacity. After describing a series of other constitutionally
questionable behavior that included the systematic exclusion of blacks, food
deprivation, and threats to the defendant’s mother while Payne was held
incommunicado, Branton argued that “[t]he totality of the circumstances that
preceded this confession by the nineteen year old mentally retarded petitioner
was a denial of due process.”192 He prevailed.
By 1961, the Court was still hearing cases involving poor, black, and
illiterate defendants. McNeal v. Culver,193 decided that same year, involved
“an indigent, ignorant and mentally ill Negro” named Elijah McNeal, Jr. who
“advised the court that he was without, and unable to obtain, counsel to
conduct his defense and asked that counsel be appointed to represent him.”194
While the race of the petitioner was incontestable, the parties clashed on the
other features of the special circumstances test—namely his poverty,
intelligence, and youth. In its brief, Florida referred to the petitioner as a
185 See id. at 159 (holding that “petitioner’s case falls within that class” of cases discussed in the
Petitioner’s Brief—cases where “the intervention of counsel, unless intelligently waived by the
accused, is an essential element of a fair hearing”); see also Brief for Petitioner at 12-13, Moore v.
Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957) (No. 42), 1957 WL 87710, at *12-13 (highlighting the similarities
between the defendant in Moore and the defendants in Powell and Fikes v. Alabama).
186 See 352 U.S. 191, 193 (1957) (describing the defendant as being a minority of low wealth
and education).
187 Id. at 196.
188 Brief for Petitioner at 4, Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) (No. 53), 1956 WL 89141, at *4.
189 Id.
190 356 U.S. 560, 560 (1958).
191 Id. at 562.
192 Brief for Petitioner, Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958), at *14.
193 365 U.S. 109 (1961).
194 Id. at 110.
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“29-year-old Negro man, a veteran of almost six years in the army; a G.I.
student and employee at a nursery.”195 In the ﬁrst section of petitioner’s brief,
titled, Youth, Ignorance, and Mental Illness, counsel wrote that McNeal “was a
twenty-nine year old Negro, in court for the ﬁrst time in his life” and noted
that in 1952, the petitioner “suﬀered head injuries which left him subject to
‘blackout spells.’ Four years later, the pathetic creature spen[t] four months
locked up in the ‘psycho’ ward of a veterans’ hospital.”196 Although the
petitioner prevailed, it became increasingly clear that the Court recognized
the unworkability of a special circumstances test that repeatedly brought the
same kind of defendants before it. A concurrence by Justices Douglas and
Brennan maligned the Betts decision and the test that it produced. They
emphasized that Betts was decided by a divided Court, noted how “six Justices
now sit on the Court who had no hand in fashioning the rule,” and suggested
that the Court would not support the decision if it reappeared de novo.197 The
two Justices ended their opinion by asking: “Are we to wait to overrule [Betts]
until a case arises where the indigent is unable to make a convincing
demonstration that the absence of counsel prejudiced him?”198 Fatigue around
seeing similar cases was evident; momentum to overturn Betts was growing.
The 1961 decision Hamilton v. Alabama199 concluded the indigent defense
line of cases that emphasized race and ignorance but would not overturn Betts.
Hamilton involved a death sentence of a 30-year-old black man who was
accused of breaking into the home of an 80-year-old white woman “with the
intent to ravish.”200 The case was successfully argued by Constance Baker
Motley for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund; it was the ﬁrst
time that a black woman argued before the Court.201 By this time the NAACP
had a good sense of how to prevail. One of the two questions it put forth to
the Court was:
Whether petitioner, an indigent, ignorant, unstable Negro, completely untutored
in the ways of the law, charged with a capital sex crime against a white woman
in Alabama, in open conﬂict with his court appointed attorney during trial
which otherwise was marked by petitioner’s bungling eﬀorts to defend himself at

195 Brief for Respondent at 4, McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109 (1961) (No. 52), 1960 WL 98651,
at *4 (parenthetical omitted).
196 Brief for Petitioner at 14-15, McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109 (1961) (No. 52), 1960 WL
99131, at *14-15 (citation omitted).
197 McNeal, 365 U.S. at 117 (Douglas, J., concurring).
198 Id. at 119.
199 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
200 Id.; Brief for Petitioner, Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961), 1961 WL 101910, at *2.
201 Walter J. Walsh, Speaking Truth to Power: The Jurisprudence of Julia Cooper Mack, 40 HOW.
L.J. 291, 301 (1997) (describing Julia Mack and Constance Baker Motley as the ﬁrst AfricanAmerican women to argue before the Supreme Court).
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the Court’s invitation, was deprived of due process secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment by lack of court appointed counsel at arraignment, the
appropriate time under Alabama law to raise certain defenses, and the only
time prior to trial that the Court practicably could have made provision to
reconcile counsel and client or appoint another attorney.202

Curiously, this was the one case where the Court, while siding with the
defendant, avoided the language of race. The full context of Gideon, as
explained in the next section, makes it clear why.
The Court’s post-Powell and pre-Gideon right to counsel cases illustrate the
importance of race in ways that might not be easily gleaned from the typical
indigent defense overview. Causal explanations are often elusive, so it is
difficult and even unproductive to argue that race was a decisive factor in the
Court’s decisions. But its cases do demonstrate that race had a seat at the table
by way of the “special circumstances” test. In fact, its decisions often considered
some of the most spectacular versions of race, namely ignorance, poverty, and
illiteracy. It is worth noting that African-Americans did not have a monopoly
on pathological representation of defendants. The Court issued decisions
involving several indigent whites, a Winnebago Indian who pled that he “was
ignorant of the law” and did not receive counsel after being charged with
burglary in Nebraska,203 and an undocumented farm worker who did not speak
or write English, was held incommunicado, and was not provided counsel.204
The emphasis on black defendants, however, is unmistakable. This
emphasis was clear in cases involving white defendants, where either the
Court or the prosecution used the trope of the poor illiterate Negro to keep
the defendants outside the purview of the special circumstances test.205 Race
haunted much of this jurisprudence. In their arguments, defendants and
advocates were not shy about harnessing the power of race. Their intentions
and motives are similarly diﬃcult to suss out. The deployment of race could
have been a matter of garden-variety zealous advocacy, manipulation, or
factual relevance. Irrespective of the motivational source—and in line with
this Article’s argument—defendants and attorneys of the 1940s and 1950s
emphasized race in indigent defense cases, especially after the Court decided
202 Brief for Petitioner, Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961), 1961 WL 101910, at *2
(emphasis added).
203 Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 787 (1945).
204 Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 56-57, 60 (1951).
205 See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 173–74 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“This
is not the case of an ignorant and unrepresented defendant who has been the victim of prejudice.
Ashcraft was a white man of good reputation, good position, and substantial property . . . . [H]e was
not detained, although his stories to the oﬃcers did not hang together, but was at large, free to
consult his friends and counsel. There was no indecent haste, but on the contrary evident
deliberation, in suspecting and accusing him.”).
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cases that essentially oﬀered a blueprint to overturning uncounseled
convictions. While the Court’s interventions were welcome developments
from its previously lax approach to legal aid and racial inequality, its narrow
focus on defendants with exceptional qualities stagnated its jurisprudence in
ways that made indigent defense less commensurate with the general
modernization of criminal justice administration. Put another way, the
Court’s primary concern with a particular and unrepresentative group of
racial minorities impeded the development of indigent defense. Post-Gideon
developments would accelerate indigent defense bureaucratization in ways
that were also racial but far less familiar.
III. GIDEON AND THE EXPANSION OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. The Racial Selection and Reception of Gideon
The 1960s ushered in a new era of right to counsel expansion that
coincided with racial progress. In the 1960s, and shortly thereafter, the Court
impelled states to provide counsel for diﬀerent kinds of crimes and at
diﬀerent stages of criminal adjudication. This expansion of the right to
counsel occurred during a moment in which the federal government and
philanthropic organizations such as the Ford Foundation helped prop up
public defender and criminal legal aid organizations, and at the same time
that populist concerns were creeping into law and order.206 This period also
mapped on neatly to the Court’s attempts to address racial injustice in a
myriad of domains (e.g., education, voting, marriage). This Part of the Article
does two things. First, it shows how Gideon, a case that is typically understood
as race neutral, was actually inﬂuenced by racial considerations. The Court
purposefully selected Gideon as its vehicle to expand the right to counsel in
an attempt to move far away from a decidedly racialized special circumstance
test. Second, this Part shows how the popular reception to Gideon, and its
progeny—the latter of which occurred amidst a racialized law and order
campaign—would portend how the Court would treat the right to counsel in
the last quarter of the twentieth century.
206 See, e.g., Sam D. Johnson, The Houston Legal Foundation: Advocate for the Indigent, 9 S. TEX.
L.J. 1, 4-5 (1967) (describing how funds from the Ford Foundation and the Houston Endowment,
among others, were used to fund the Houston Legal Foundation, which provided legal services to
indigents); Robert E. Oliphant, Reflections on the Lower Court System; The Development of a Unique
Clinical Misdemeanor and a Public Defender Program, 57 MINN. L. REV. 545, 549 (1972) (noting that
“funds from a Ford Foundation grant” were used by Minnesota’s Public Defender oﬃce to hire
additional criminal defense lawyers); Owen E. Woodruﬀ, Jr. & Robert A. Falco, The Defender
Workshop: A Clinical Experiment in Criminal Law, 52 A.B.A.J. 233, 234 (1966) (“The Ford Foundation
. . . allocated approximately $4 million to the National Legal Aid and Defender Association to create
the National Defender Project.”).
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Improvements in indigent defense reﬂected external and internal
developments. Externally, the weakening of McCarthyism helped create an
environment in which new intellectual considerations of poverty could
ﬂourish without stigma. The related War on Poverty and the Civil Rights
Movement spurred old and new questions about government’s
responsibilities to vulnerable populations, particularly poor people and racial
minorities. The Court increasingly chimed in too. Beginning in the middle
of the 1950s, it issued criminal procedure decisions that unmistakably
demanded an equal playing ﬁeld for all defendants, both indigent and rich.207
The most notable exempliﬁcation of this commitment is Griﬃn v. Illinois,208
which overturned a state’s refusal to provide transcripts to indigent
defendants.209 Thereafter, in a series of less notable cases, the Court ruled in
favor of poor parties who lost their cases because of an inability to pay court
fees;210 in essence, the Court emphasized equal treatment by requiring
waivers of fees and making states internalize the costs of defendants’
indigence. Gideon would weave concerns about race and poverty, but in
counterintuitive ways.
The Court’s right to counsel decision in Carnley v. Cochran,211 a 1962 case
decided a year before Gideon, oﬀers instructive insights on the Gideon case
itself and the racial politics of indigent defense. By the early 1960s, the Court,
through a combination of strong language in majority opinions and
concurrences, appeared ready to overturn Betts and enshrine a national right
to counsel.212 Carnley provided an opportunity. The case involved an illiterate
defendant who claimed that he had been wrongfully denied counsel and that
his conviction was unconstitutional.213 The Court agreed, but ruled
narrowly.214 While it had the votes, the case was not the best vehicle. Carnley
involved a defendant who was accused of molesting and having “incestuous
sexual intercourse with his 13-year-old daughter.”215 Justice Whittaker, who
previously suﬀered from depression, had a nervous breakdown that term and
207 For a thoughtful account on the Warren Court’s application of Equal Protection principles
to criminal procedure, see Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Reclaiming Equality to Reframe Indigent Defense
Reform, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1197, 1221-25 (2013).
208 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
209 Id. at 13-14, 19.
210 See, e.g., Bond v. Green, 366 U.S. 271, 271 (1961); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 710-11
(1961); Douglas v. Green, 363 U.S. 192, 192-93 (1960); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 258 (1959); Ellis
v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675 (1958); see also Lucas, supra note 207, at 1220-1240.
211 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
212 See infra Section IV.
213 Carnley, 369 U.S. at 506, 511.
214 See id. at 517 (“Where, as in this case, the constitutional inﬁrmity of trial without counsel
is manifest, and there is not even an allegation, much less a showing, of aﬃrmative waiver, the
accused is entitled to relief from his unconstitutional conviction.”).
215 Id. at 507.
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retired from the Court.216 His replacement, Justice White, did not take part
in the case. Justice Frankfurter, the lone member of the Betts Court and a
ﬁerce defender of its special circumstances test, was recovering from a stroke
that would ultimately force him to retire.217 Chief Justice Warren, in the
words of one his biographers, thought that “it would be unwise to overrule an
important precedent by a bare majority of only a seven-man Court.”218
Afterwards he instructed his clerks to search through in forma pauperis
applications for an appropriate case to reconsider Betts.219 One of Chief
Justice Warren’s former clerks was instructed by another clerk to “[k]eep your
eyes peeled for a right to counsel case. The Chief feels strongly that the
Constitution requires a lawyer.”220 The clerks discovered Gideon.
The facts of Gideon require little rehearsal. Clarence Earl Gideon was a white
man in his early fifties who drifted between prison and poverty.221 He was
accused of robbery, was not appointed an attorney despite his indigence, and
was subsequently convicted.222 After his handwritten petition to the Supreme
Court was granted, Gideon became the vehicle for a national and incorporated
right to counsel. Three factors highlight how racial politics influenced what is
arguably the most defining right to counsel decision: the comments of parties
involved with the case, popular reception to the decision, and how the opinion
is situated relative to other criminal procedure decisions of the period.
Oral histories featuring the lead counsel for both parties in Gideon, as well
as Anthony Lewis, who covered the case in his award-winning book, conﬁrm
that the Court was quite purposeful in picking this case as its vehicle to
expand the right to counsel, in part because of race.223 Abe Krash, who served
as co-counsel for Gideon, said that when the Court granted certiorari:
216 DAVID N. ATKINSON, LEAVING THE BENCH: SUPREME COURT JUSTICES AT THE END
128 (1999).
217 See L.A. Powe, Jr., Situating Schauer, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1519, 1521 (1997) (“The
NAACP victory—or Frankfurter’s stroke, take your choice—signaled the beginnings of the true
Warren Court, a grouping of ﬁve to six or seven votes for civil liberties or civil rights claimants that
would last for a decade.”).
218 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, DECISION: HOW THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES CASES 111 (1996).
219 Id.
220 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT—A
JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 458 (1983) (internal quotations omitted).
221 See
Facts and Case Summary: Gideon v. Wainwright, U.S. COURTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/educational-activities/facts-and-case-summarygideon-v-wainwright [https://perma.cc/VHL5-6BL4] (last visited May 8, 2019) (“[Gideon] was a man
with an eighth-grade education who ran away from home when he was in middle school [and] spent
much of his early adult life as a drifter, spending time in and out of prisons for nonviolent crimes.”).
222 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 337 (1963) (summarizing Gideon’s state court
proceedings, in which he “made an opening statement to the jury, cross-examined the State’s
witnesses, presented witnesses in his own defense, declined to testify himself, and made a short
argument ‘emphasizing his innocence’” before being convicted).
223 See generally ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET (1989).
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[T]hey did two very important things. First, was they issued an order at the
time they agreed to review it saying counsel are requested to brief the
question of whether or not Bet[ts] against Brady should be overruled. That
was a clear cut signal that something very signiﬁcant was about to happen.
Secondly, they appointed Fortas . . . they did not appoint an unknown, they
appointed a very distinguished lawyer. It was a very strong signal that
important events were in the course of taking place.224

Bruce Jacob, who represented Florida in Gideon, emphasized the Court’s
intentions in selecting Gideon as its vehicle to overturn Betts. He noted that
in the pre-Gideon world:
[Y]ou were only entitled to have counsel appointed for you if there was some
special circumstance present such as the fact that the defendant was illiterate,
was extremely ignorant, extremely young, if the defendant had mental
problems or something of that nature . . . . [Gideon’s petition] did not allege
any special circumstances . . . . [W]e knew immediately that this would
probably be the case that would be used to overturn Betts v. Brady because,
as I said, Gideon did not allege any special circumstances . . . . [B]y doing
this he put the Supreme Court in the position in order to rule with him . . .
so we knew that this was probably the case that the Supreme Court would
use to reverse overrule Betts v. Brady.225

Jacob did not explicitly name race as a decisive feature in the Court’s
certiorari decision, but his discussion of special circumstances, which the
previous section demonstrated was inextricably racial, is telling. In any event,
Anthony Lewis, who is the deﬁning source on the case, noted that Abe Fortas,
who served as co-counsel for Gideon:
knew that the very fact that the Court had asked the question “Should we
overrule Betts against Brady?” meant in all likelihood that it was going to—you
don’t ask that question unless there’s a pretty clear indication that you are going
to overrule it. And in fact we now know that there had been one or two previous
times when the Court was about ready to overrule it, and then something
happened and they didn’t. And they finally picked on this case as the case that
would be the appropriate one to overrule it. Why did they do so? Probably

224 Interview by Victor Geminiani with Abe Krash, NAT’L EQUAL JUST. LIBRARY ORAL
HIST. COLLECTION (Mar. 17, 1993).
225 Interview by Victor Geminiani with Bruce Jacob, NAT’L EQUAL JUST. LIBRARY ORAL
HIST. COLLECTION (July 9, 1993).
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because there was nothing special about Gideon. He wasn’t mentally defective. He
wasn’t a black person overwhelmed by racial prejudice in a community.226

Others have underlined the racial specificity of Gideon.227 The point here is
that the Court’s utilization of Gideon to put forth a prophylactic rule, along with
its ostensibly race-neutral attempt to bury the special circumstances test, were
racial considerations themselves. The Court’s abandonment of the test and the
related logic put forth by early legal reformers represented a new approach to
a longstanding tradition of considering race in right to counsel jurisprudence.
The reception of Gideon also highlights how race inﬂuenced the
development of indigent defense. Gideon is an outlier in the Warren Court’s
reformist jurisprudence. Although people lament the lack of commitment to
the decision, it arguably received much less criticism as a doctrinal matter.
This could be a byproduct of the penal bureaucrats involved. Other notable
Warren Court criminal procedure cases like Mapp v. Ohio,228 Escobedo v.
Illinois,229 Miranda v. Arizona,230 and Terry v. Ohio231 primarily involved
curtailments on police oﬃcers,232 while Brady v. Maryland233 limited
prosecutors. Such limitations would not bode well given the rising crime rates
of the era and impending law and order campaigns.234 This perspective is
persuasive, although conservative concerns that public defenders would help
free guilty people—which existed before and after Gideon—would suggest
that this decision and its progeny might also be similarly controversial.235
226 Interview by Victor Geminiani with Anthony Lewis, NAT’L EQUAL JUST. LIBRARY ORAL
HIST. COLLECTION (Mar. 17, 1993) (emphasis added).
227 In addition to being a former Director of the Public Defender Service (PDS) for the
District of Columbia and a scholar of indigent defense, Professor Barbara Babcock was a
contemporary and colleague of, and 1963 Yale Law graduate with, John Hart Ely, who helped brief
Gideon. Babcock has noted that Gideon involved “no violence, no weapons, no personal confrontation,
and—because Gideon was a white man—no issues of racial unfairness.” Barbara Allen Babcock, The
Duty to Defend, 114 YALE L.J. 1489, 1495 (2005).
228 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
229 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964).
230 384 U.S. 436, 498-99 (1966).
231 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968).
232 Escobedo and Miranda did bring counsel into the space of police interrogation. Miranda,
384 U.S. at 498-99; Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490-91.
233 373 U.S. 83, 86-88 (1963).
234 See Darryl K. Brown, The Warren Court, Criminal Procedure Reform, and Retributive
Punishment, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1411, 1418 (2002) (“It is easy enough to characterize Warren
Court decisions as hindering the government’s ability to ﬁght crime at precisely the moment that
we needed to ﬁght crime more eﬀectively.”). For a discussion of the conservative backlash to Warren
court decisions like Miranda, which were largely seen as having “handcuﬀed” the police, see
MICHAEL W. FLAMM, LAW AND ORDER: STREET CRIME, CIVIL UNREST, AND THE CRISIS OF
LIBERALISM IN THE 1960S (2007).
235 See RICHARD NIXON, TOWARD FREEDOM FROM FEAR 11-12 (1968) (explaining how
Miranda and Escobedo prevented eﬀective prosecution and punishment of crime, which strengthened
criminal forces).
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Gabriel Chin helps clarify the racial contours of Gideon when he argues that,
although the case involved a white petitioner and was not decided on those
terms, it was a race case that was nestled among several decisions also
concerned with racism.236 I would add to Professor Chin’s suggestion that
race and notions of “deservingness” simmered underneath the surface of the
reasonable reception to Gideon. The decision represented the American story
of “rugged individualism” and the “David-and-Goliath plot that we
Americans love, [where] the under-educated common man takes on the
fancy-pants bigwigs at the Supreme Court.”237 In a comment that was typical
of the period, Texas judge John F. Onion Jr. spoke gushingly about Clarence
Gideon when he eﬀused, “[h]e huﬀed and he puﬀed and he blew a forceful
sound, and down came tumbling the walls of the penitentiary for Gideon and
many, many more.”238 Onion predicted that Gideon would “take its place in
the Hall of Fame with Madison v. Marbury, the Dred Scott decision, [and]
Brown v. the Board of Education.”239
Gideon was seen as sympathetic ﬁgure; he was a poor white man who
cycled in and out of prison and was denied justice. But it is diﬃcult to think
of any convicted felon—irrespective of race—who has received such
sympathy in the popular imagination and in legal lore. As one commentator
notes, “[t]hough he is now a folk-hero for indigent defense, Clarence Gideon
was no choir boy. In one case he admitted to stealing guns, robbing stores and
planning a bank heist.”240 Yet, Gideon’s triumphant narrative, along with the
Court’s actual ruling in the case, resonated with many Americans’ ideas of
fairness and equality. The story was documented in the award-winning book
and movie Gideon’s Trumpet, which invoked the Judeo-Christian narrative of
Gideon and entailed a similarly unlikely victory by an overmatched
opponent.241 Kim Taylor-Thompson astutely observes that the American
public may have warmly embraced the outcome, “[b]ut it is unlikely that most
Americans viewed the average accused criminal quite so sympathetically.”242
Suﬃce to say, barring an unforeseen commercial intervention, there will
probably be no award-winning books or movies about Dollree Mapp, Danny
Escobedo, or Ernesto Miranda. In fact, the one piece of mail in Justice Black’s
Gideon folder in the Library of Congress perfectly illustrates the racialized
Chin, supra note 174, at 2239 n.5.
KAREN HOUPERT, CHASING GIDEON: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR POOR PEOPLE’S
JUSTICE 63 (2013).
238 John F. Onion, Jr., A Texas Judge Looks at the Right to Counsel, 28 TEX. B.J. 357, 357 (1965).
239 Id.
240 Tom
Elden,
Gideon
Remembered,
O R.
S T.
BULL
(2003),
https://www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin /03augsep/parting.html [https://perma.cc/VV8L-JBS3].
241 See generally ROBERT L. COLLINS, GIDEONS’S TRUMPET (1980); LEWIS, supra note 223.
242 Kim Taylor-Thompson, Tuning Up Gideon’s Trumpet, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1461, 1480 (2003).
236
237
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reception of the decision. Someone made sure to send Justice Black, the
author of Gideon, a report that denounced the release of Wallace Pless, “[a]
Negro who pleaded guilty to two murders but went free because of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Gideon decision, [and was] charged with killing two more
persons.”243 To be sure, to indicate that Gideon is about race is not to imply
that all right to counsel cases are about race; rather, I want to suggest that the
reception of the case was not insulated from the progressive but contentious
racial politics of the time.
The racial sympathy surrounding Gideon dissipated a year later in Escobedo
v. Illinois.244 While Escobedo is often considered in the context of the Fifth
Amendment and is imagined as a case that necessitated clariﬁcation in
Miranda, it is also a Sixth Amendment right to counsel case that emerged out
of Gideon. No doubt it implicated police oﬃcers in a way that Gideon did not,
but it also broadcasted the racialized law and order politics during this period
of right to counsel expansion. It was the ﬁrst case Richard Nixon identiﬁed
in his calls for law and order. Escobedo involved the Chicago Police
Department’s 1960 arrest of Danny Escobedo, a “22-year-old of Mexican
extraction,” for the murder of his brother-in-law.245 While in police custody,
oﬃcers prodded him into confessing.246 Escobedo, who was not formally
charged, refused to confess and repeatedly asked to see his attorney, but his
request was not honored.247 Simultaneously, Escobedo’s attorney was at the
police precinct and demanded to see his client, but he was also denied and
was told that he could not see Escobedo until the police were done with their
questioning.248 During the interrogation, Oﬃcer Montejano, who was also
Latino and grew up in Escobedo’s neighborhood, conferred with Escobedo
alone for about ﬁfteen minutes in Spanish and told him that his sister, who
had also been arrested, would be released if he made a statement.249 Escobedo
made a statement, was convicted of murder, and appealed.250
The Court reversed his conviction and ruled that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel extends to police interrogations.251 In a terse dissent, Justice
Harlan wrote, “I think the rule announced today is most ill-conceived and
that it seriously and unjustiﬁably fetters perfectly legitimate methods of
criminal law enforcement.”252 Putting aside his misplaced faith in a Chicago
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252

Negro Released in Slayings Held in More Killings, BLACK PAPERS (copy on ﬁle with author).
378 U.S. 478 (1964).
Id. at 482.
Id. at 482-83.
Id. at 481-82.
Id. at 482.
Id. at 483.
Id.
Id. at 490-91.
Id. at 493 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Police Department that had a half-century long history of police corruption
that resulted in the creation of a reparations program for victims of police
torture,253 public opinion was on his side. One writer penned, “[t]he public,
the police, and the press viewed [Escobedo] simply as a convicted killer
released by a meddling Supreme Court on a ‘mere technicality’” and
contended that “[f]ive justices on the nation’s highest court simultaneously
slipped on a stray banana peel.”254
Previous criminal procedure cases until this point were feel-good stories
for the median American: overturned cases involving black Southerners made
to scurry through kangaroo courts; an older white man who obtained justice
after receiving counsel; even Mapp, with its black woman protagonist,
involved a libertarian-friendly rule against unreasonable searches and seizures
that some in the mainstream could ﬁnd palatable. But Escobedo was diﬀerent.
During this period, African-Americans were not the only ones tethered to
popular assumptions about criminality; they shared that spotlight with Latinx
people in Chicago and in big cities across the country. As historian Lilia
Fernández notes, “By the 1960s, police declared war not only on AfricanAmericans on the South and West Sides [of Chicago]; they also did battle
with Puerto Ricans, suspected ‘illegal’ Mexican immigrants, and Latino youth
gangs.”255 Escobedo’s case broadcasted the anti-Latinx animus of the time. A
1966 cover of Time, which prominently displayed Escobedo’s mug shot and
the caption “Moving the Constitution into the Police Station,” did not help
matters.256 The fact that Escobedo brought defense attorneys into the police
station for the beneﬁt of a Latino criminal who may have been factually guilty
was unpopular.257 The expansion of that requirement to imagined black and
brown criminals was similarly unwelcome. This sentiment did not go
unnoticed. On the campaign trail Richard Nixon singled out both Escobedo
and Miranda. He claimed that the two decisions helped “set free patently
253 See ELIZABETH DALE, ROBERT NIXON AND POLICE TORTURE IN CHICAGO, 1871–1971,
at 1 (2017) (highlighting the Chicago police department’s practice of torturing witnesses and
suspects, which eventually led to the creation of a torture victims reparation fund); ROBERT O.
HARLAND, THE VICE BONDAGE OF A GREAT CITY: OR, THE WICKEDEST CITY IN THE WORLD
174-89 (1912) (describing the Chicago police as “crooked, corrupt, and purchased”).
254 Robert Kroll, Danny Escobedo: The Law Seen on Two Levels, 3 STUDENT LAW. 7, 10 (1974).
255 LILIA FERNÁNDEZ, BROWN IN THE WINDY CITY: MEXICANS AND PUERTO RICANS IN
POSTWAR CHICAGO 12 (2012); see also IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, RACISM ON TRIAL: THE CHICANO
FIGHT FOR JUSTICE 134-56 (2009) (describing police violence against Chicanos in Los Angeles in the
1960s and 1970s); JOHN D. MÁRQUEZ, BLACK-BROWN SOLIDARITY: RACIAL POLITICS IN THE NEW
GULF SOUTH 124-28 (2014) (noting police violence against Latinos in Houston in the 1960s and 1970s).
256 TIME, Apr. 29, 1966.
257 JOHN MORTON BLUM, YEARS OF DISCORD: AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY, 1961–
1974 209-10 (1991); see also J. Edward Lumbard, New Standards for Criminal Justice, 52 A.B.A.J. 431,
432 (1966) (noting the “debate [that] has ranged in the law reviews, the press and in the court
opinions of almost every state as to the extent to which confessions may be used” post-Escobedo).

1210

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 167: 1161

guilty individuals on the basis of legal technicalities.”258 What has gone
unnoticed by historians and criminal procedure scholars is this: Escobedo was
the ﬁrst Warren Court case that Nixon would argue necessitated his racialized
law and order campaign because of “legal technicalities.” That case helped
produce the trope of black and Latino/a criminals who were factually guilty
but secured freedom because of Warren Court liberalism. That trope, along
with a broader set of Warren Court decisions, led to Nixon’s promise that he
would nominate law and order judges to the Court. Three of the four Justices
he appointed espoused “law and order” skepticism towards Warren Court
expansions before joining the Court.259 Moreover, as described in the next
section, these Justices voted in right to counsel cases in ways that aligned with
law and order politics.
Racialized calls for law and order would gain momentum, but the Warren
Court continued to expand the right to counsel, much to the chagrin of law
and order advocates. These decisions were partially inﬂuenced by racial
concerns. Burt Neuborne notes that “the right to counsel cases from Gideon
to Argersinger were driven, in part, by concern over a criminal justice system
where white judges and prosecutors processed poor, unrepresented blacks and
Hispanics.”260 Barry Feld similarly contends that “[t]he Court’s criminal
258 NIXON, supra note 235, at 12. He also claimed that such proceduralism did not help
deterrence eﬀorts and noted, “[t]he tragic lesson of guilty men walking free from hundreds of
courtrooms across this country has not been lost on the criminal community.” Id.
259 As President of the American Bar Association, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. claimed that society was
being confronted with a “present and accelerating crisis” that contributed to “a partial breakdown in
the processes of law and order.” Lewis F. Jr. Powell, An Urgent Need: More Eﬀective Criminal Justice,
51 A.B.A.J. 437, 438 (1965). Powell recognized that Warren Court criminal procedure decisions
would be viewed as “signiﬁcant milestones” in history. Id. at 439. But, he claimed that there was
imbalance between procedural safeguards for the accused and the “rights of law-abiding citizens,”
and suggested that the “pendulum may indeed have swung too far.” Id. In a speech before joining
the Court, Rehnquist noted that “law and order will be preserved at whatever cost in individual
liberties and rights.” Law-Order Man: Rehnquist Conservative, ATL. J. Oct. 22, 1971, at 19-A (copy on
ﬁle with author). Chief Justice Warren Burger was heralded the most as a “law and order” judge
after his appointment. See generally Chief Justice Choice ‘Law-and-Order’ Man, MINN. STAR, May 22,
1969 at 27B (copy on ﬁle with author). While on the Court, Justice Burger warned the legal
profession that the “search for true justice must not be twisted into an endless quest for technical
errors unrelated to guilt or innocence” and questioned whether “a society [is] redeemed if it provides
massive safeguards for accused persons . . . defense lawyers at public expense, trials and appealsalmost without end-and yet fails to provide elementary protection for its law-abiding citizens?”
Warren E. Burger, Report of the Chief Justice to the A.B.A., 67 A.B.A.J. 290, 291-92 (1981).
260 Burt Neuborne, The Gravitational Pull of Race on the Warren Court, in SUPREME COURT
REVIEW 59, 86 (Dennis J. Hutchinson et al. eds., 2011). There was a longstanding critique about the
lack of legal aid oﬀered to Native Americans accused of crime inside and outside of tribal courts.
See, e.g., Ray A. Brown, The Indian Problem and the Law, 39 YALE L.J. 307, 318 (1930) (“[W]hen the
Indian is placed under the laws of the white man, there should be a vast strengthening in the forces
of legal aid for the Indians, for many of these inexperienced and impecunious people will suﬀer, as
do the same class of people everywhere, where they are unaided in the courts of law.”); Felix S.
Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy, 62 YALE L.J. 348, 355
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procedure decisions followed closely upon its civil rights opinions because
those accused of crimes consisted disproportionately of the poor, minorities,
and the young.”261 The Warren Court’s expansion of the right to counsel
helped erect a national, albeit scattered, indigent defense apparatus.262 But its
lack of clarity on the scope of indigent defense—due in part to the relative
novelty of post-Gideon jurisprudence as well as its inattention to issues of
administrability—created doctrinal inﬁrmities. The Burger Court would
delineate the boundaries of indigent defense, but in ways that were not as
expansive and, on some occasions, were quite restrictive.
IV. THE POST-1970S RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND MASS INCARCERATION
This Part details the post-Gideon curtailment of indigent defense
jurisprudence, which began after Argersinger v. Hamlin,263 the 1972 case that
expanded the right to counsel to misdemeanors. Curtailment typically refers
to reductions or restrictions.264 The curtailment that occurred in the Court’s
right to counsel jurisprudence has diﬀerent ideological registers. It coincides
with the typical “liberal” critique of how the Court—particularly during the
Burger era—scaled back the rights of the criminally accused and racial
minorities while limiting lower courts’ ability to redress rights violations.265
(1953) (“For Indians, as for other underprivileged groups, denial of the right to independent counsel
means undermining of all the rights which require independent counsel for enforcement.”). But this
need was not attended to by the Court. Congress would ultimately pass the Indian Civil Rights Act
of 1968, which provided various procedural rights to tribal-court defendants that were similar to
those in the Bill of Rights, but it did not include the right to appointment of counsel.
261 Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the Conservative
“Backlash,” 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1477 (2003).
262 See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967) (holding that right to counsel applied to posttrial proceeding for revocation of probation and deferred sentencing); United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 237 (1967) (applying right to counsel to post-indictment lineup); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
41 (1967) (guaranteeing right to counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings); Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-06 (1964) (holding that incriminating statements deliberately elicited by
law enforcement in the absence of counsel after the proceeding has begun violate the Sixth
Amendment); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 59 (1963) (reversing a conviction because there was
no appointment of counsel at preliminary hearing).
263 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
264 See Curtail, OXFORD DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/deﬁnition/curtail
[https://perma.cc/VGB6-W8RR] (last visited May 8, 2019).
265 See Henry W. McGee, Jr., Blacks, Due Process, and Eﬃciency in the Clash of Values as the
Supreme Court Moves to the Right, 2 BLACK L.J. 220, 220 (1972) (describing the eﬀect of the Burger
Court’s law enforcement-oriented criminal justice decisions on racial minorities); Donald E. Wilkes,
Jr., The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 KY. L.J. 421,
423 (1974) (noting that it “has grown increasingly obvious that the Burger Court intends to reverse
the trend of the past decade and . . . constrict rather than expand the rights of the accused”). But
political liberals are not the only ones who are skeptical about the reduced potency of the right to
counsel. For example, Republican state representative Christy Perry has been a leader in reforming
indigent defense in Idaho, successfully passing a bill that allocated $5.5 million for public defense.
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But this curtailment also corresponds with the common “conservative”
criticisms about the Warren Court’s allegedly unprincipled decisions and
permissiveness toward criminal defendants.266 Finally, the post-1970s
curtailment of the right to counsel also accords with “liberal” critiques of the
Warren Court’s inadequate diagnosis of and prescriptions for indigent
defense.267 All of these views have some merit. For our purposes, the judicial
curtailment here points to how the post-Argersinger Court simultaneously
ﬁlled in Gideon’s gaps while also limiting its scope. No doubt, the interpretive
responsibilities of the Court and its lower counterparts require molding and
modifying law. What is unique in the right to counsel context is that this
curtailment occurred amidst a historically and geographically unprecedented
rise in incarceration.268 The right to counsel was not a nominal part of the
mass incarceration story, but rather a signiﬁcant feature of it. Accordingly,
the post-Argersinger Court, through its decisions, helped institutionalize
indigent defense as we know it.
The Court’s curtailing of the right to counsel was part of a larger shift in
its understanding of criminal procedure that was in part caused by President
Nixon’s purposeful nomination of law and order judges—three out of four of
whom fulﬁlled that agenda.269 Instead of propping up a due process model,
Alysia Santo, How Conservatives Learned to Love Free Lawyers for the Poor, POLITICO (Sept. 24, 2017),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/24/how-conservatives-learned-to-love-freelawyers-for-the-poor-215635 [https://perma.cc/Q7VB-829W]. Perry, ﬁxated on the fact that “95
percent of criminal cases are plea-bargained, in part because public defenders are too overwhelmed
to take them to trial” was concerned that “the state never even has to prove you did anything . . .
they hold all the cards.”
266 NIXON, supra note 235, at 11-13 (“The Miranda and Escobedo decisions of the high court
have had the eﬀect of seriously ham stringing the peace forces in our society and strengthening the
criminal forces . . . . [T]he barbed wire of legalisms that a majority of one of the Supreme Court
has erected to protect a suspect from invasion of his rights has eﬀectively shielded hundreds of
criminals from punishment as provided in the prior laws.”). Again, the “conservative” label cannot
be used so easily. Scholars have recently begun to examine the ways in which African Americans, a
group that often identiﬁes as liberal and Democratic, had their own versions of law and order. See
generally JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK
AMERICA (2017); MICHAEL JAVEN FORTNER, BLACK SILENT MAJORITY: THE ROCKEFELLER
DRUG LAWS AND THE POLITICS OF PUNISHMENT (2015).
267 For example, Tracey Meares maintains that Gideon’s emphases on incorporation and the
Bill of Rights led the Court to move away from Due Process and notions of “fundamental fairness”
that, notwithstanding their ﬂaws, inhibits courts’ ability to ﬂexibly deal with current criminal justice
disparities. See Meares, supra note 172, at 215; see also Emily Buss, The Missed Opportunity in Gault,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 39, 42 (2003) (making a similar argument about Gault’s narrow ideas about
fairness and its continuing impact on children’s constitutional rights).
268 KELLY LYTLE HERNÁNDEZ, CITY OF INMATES: CONQUEST, REBELLION, AND THE
RISE OF HUMAN CAGING IN LOS ANGELES: 1771-1965 2 (2017); see also MAX FELKER-KANTOR,
POLICING LOS ANGELES: RACE, RESISTANCE, AND THE RISE OF THE LAPD (2018).
269 These four judges were Justices Burger, Rehnquist, Blackmun, and Powell. LAURA
KALMAN, THE LONG REACH OF THE SIXTIES: LBJ, NIXON, AND THE MAKING OF THE
CONTEMPORARY SUPREME COURT (2017). Justice Blackmun was perhaps the exception. See Kit
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the Court emphasized a crime control model. The due process model is
associated with the Warren Court and, as Herbert Packer famously explained,
emphasized adversarialism, equality, dignity, and error reduction by imposing
prophylactic rules.270 This vision of criminal justice was admirable but
imperfect: it occasionally and incompatibly utilized criminal procedure as a
social justice tool in ways that privileged legal guilt over factual guilt.271 The
late 1960s cocktail of urban riots, increased street crime, anti-Vietnam
activism, and black-brown militancy—much of which were interconnected—
made such über-proceduralism unacceptable.272 Zealous advocacy on behalf
of factually innocent people was tolerable, but eﬀective counsel for factually
guilty people was unpalatable. Poor people and racial minorities—the
perceived beneﬁciaries of the due process model—would not fare so well
when this approach was partially abandoned by subsequent courts.
In contrast, the crime control model adopted by the Burger Court and
adhered to by subsequent courts was principally concerned with the valid goal
of punishing criminal conduct. The means to that end, however, were
similarly problematic. This vision curtailed procedural obstacles to crime
enforcement, including a robust right to counsel; promoted speed and
informality at the occasional expense of accuracy; and emphasized ﬁnality in
ways that minimized defendants’ ability to lodge challenges to their
convictions.273 The due process model and the crime control model do not
neatly correspond with the Warren and Burger Courts, as there are cases that
refute these categorizations.274 Packer’s model has also been subject to
critique over the past few decades, but his general sketches still have analytical
purchase and historical support, particularly in the area of indigent defense.
The Court’s embrace of crime control, which was in part inspired by the racial
politics of law and order, informed the Court’s right to counsel jurisprudence.
It is important to note that race operates diﬀerently during this period
because of the unavailability of strategic deployments of race, the post-1960s
social impermissibility of bigoted language, and the simultaneous emergence
of dog-whistle politics. The Court was not as explicit about race as it was in
Kinports, Justice Blackmun’s Mark on Criminal Law and Procedure, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 219,
224-69 (1998) (summarizing Justice Blackmun’s contributions to the areas of search and seizure,
confessions, right to counsel, habeas corpus, and right to jury trial, including the ways in which he
defected from Nixon’s “law and order” platform).
270 Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 15, 18 (1964).
271 See Seidman, supra note 8, at 442.
272 MARY D. EDSALL & THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL, CHAIN REACTIONS: THE IMPACT OF
RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 71 (1992).
273 Packer, supra note 270, at 10, 14, 53.
274 For a counterintuitive outcome reached by the Burger Court, see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972). For crime control model decisions during the Warren Court, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968); Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). See generally Brown, supra note 234.
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its early right to counsel jurisprudence, and there is no smoking gun evidence
that its decisions hinged on race. Still, the lack of incontrovertible evidence
as it relates to the Court’s racial motivations is not necessary to advance this
Part of the Article or the Article’s larger argument about race inﬂuencing
indigent defense jurisprudence and policy. In the post-1970s, welfare and law
and order increasingly became metonyms for race. In fact, there is a wellestablished, cross-disciplinary body of scholarship that illustrates how
politicians smuggled ideas about race by using both terms.275 Ultimately, the
rhetorical proxies of welfare and law and order ﬁltered into the advocacy of
attorneys in landmark right to counsel cases in ways that proved
consequential for indigent defense administration. The following subsections
describe both, respectively.
A. Post-Argersinger Austerity: Race, Social Welfare, and Indigent Defense
Scholars have argued that, in addition to serving a variety of penological
purposes, mass incarceration is a de facto poverty management program that
is disproportionately racial in its operation.276 If they are right, and the
economic proﬁles of the imprisoned seem to suggest that they are,277 then
indigent defense lawyers would be noteworthy ﬁgures in such a regime. These
275 On welfare, see MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA,
AND THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY (1999); ANGE-MARIE HANCOCK, THE POLITICS
OF DISGUST: THE PUBLIC IDENTITY OF THE WELFARE QUEEN (2004). On law and order, see
KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
POLITICS (1997); MICHAEL W. FLAMM, LAW AND ORDER: STREET CRIME, CIVIL UNREST, AND
THE CRISIS OF LIBERALISM IN THE 1960S (2007). On both, see IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG
WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL APPEALS HAVE REINVENTED RACISM AND
WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS (2015); TALI MENDELBERG, THE RACE CARD: CAMPAIGN
STRATEGY, IMPLICIT MESSAGES, AND THE NORM OF EQUALITY (2001).
276 See generally JOE SOSS, ET. AL, DISCIPLINING THE POOR: NEOLIBERAL PATERNALISM
AND THE PERSISTENT POWER OF RACE (2011); LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE
NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY (2009). For general discussions of mass
incarceration, see MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND
SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001); ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON
POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA
(2016); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007); Michael

Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 457 (2010); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in AfricanAmerican Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004).
277 See, e.g., Bernadette Rabuy & Daniel Kopf, Prisons of Poverty: Uncovering the Pre-incarceration
Incomes of the Imprisoned (2015), Prison Policy Initiative (July 9, 2015),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/income.html [https://perma.cc/E6QT-HL9U] (ﬁnding that,
in 2014 dollars, the median income for people before incarceration is $19,185, or forty-one percent
less than nonincarcerated people of comparable ages and noting that this gap in income existed
regardless of race, gender, and ethnicity).
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attorneys would be important whether they are understood as idealized
zealous defenders, as plea bargain-compliant bureaucrats, or as resourcedeprived attorneys. In any event, this section illustrates how the Court
cautiously embraced the idea of indigent defense but curtailed the right to
counsel in ways that have resonance with this idea of racialized poverty
management. The Burger Court accepted the fundamental premise of state
support for indigent defendants, but its curtailment of the right to counsel
also coincided with its repeated rejections of claims brought by parties in the
ﬁeld of poverty law and its budding skepticism of claims brought by racial
minorities.278 During this period, the Court shaped how indigent defendants
would get assistance from the state and interface with the criminal justice
system after arrest.
Argersinger marked the beginning of a right to counsel jurisprudence that
emphasized austerity. That case involved the reversal of a misdemeanor
conviction and held that a defendant may not be imprisoned unless provided
with counsel.279 Although this case was decided unanimously, Justices Powell
and Rehnquist, who were central to the Court’s law and order holdings,
conveyed serious concerns in a thoughtful concurrence.280 They worried that
the opinion was “disquietingly barren of details as to how this rule will be
implemented.”281 During the same year that mass incarceration is understood
to have begun, they reasonably worried that the extension of the right to
counsel to thousands of statutes, “ranging from spitting on the sidewalk to
certain traﬃc oﬀenses,” would ﬂood lower courts.282 Their concerns about
reduced criminal justice eﬃciency and government largesse by way of
indigent defense bureaucratization blossomed in subsequent majority
opinions that curtailed the right to counsel. Such limitations were not
uniform; both Justices helped push the ball forward in cases that involved

278 See generally Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding an amendment limiting
funding for certain medically necessary abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (validating
the constitutionality of a state regulation that imposed conditions on payment for abortion services
by indigent women); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (ﬁnding that the
Texas school ﬁnance system was constitutional and absolute equality or precisely equal advantages
is not required); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding a state maximum grant
provision thereby limiting private welfare funds). But see generally Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978) (holding that certain state limitations on obtaining a marriage license were unconstitutional);
U.S. Dep’t. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (invalidating a classiﬁcation which limited
certain individuals from receiving aid under the Food and Stamp Act); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971) (allowing the state denial, because of inability to pay, of access to its courts to
individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their marriages).
279 407 U.S. 25, 26-27 (1972).
280 Id. at 44 (Powell, J., concurring).
281 Id. at 52.
282 Id.
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counsel during probation proceedings,283 regulation of defendants’
communication with their attorneys,284 and prisoners’ access to legal
assistance.285 In other instances, Justice Powell joined the Court when it
required the appointment of mental health experts for indigent defendants286
and facilitated prisoners’ right of access to courts.287 Justice Powell also joined
the majority in decisions that held that a state violates the Sixth Amendment
when it prevents defense counsel from giving a closing argument288 or
requires defendants to testify prior to other defense witnesses.289 Despite
these advancements, the Burger Court and its successors, on balance, engaged
the right to counsel in ways that are eerily similar to social welfare programs
for the poor, which have their own well-documented historical and empirical
relationship to racial discrimination.290 This approach involved a precarious
preservation of rights and entitlements.291 But it also involved the
establishment of sharp eligibility restrictions and minimum thresholds that
are generally considered to be insuﬃcient for adequate support and, in the
view of some, an actual deterrent in itself.292
283 See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) (holding that although the Constitution
does not require representation for probation hearings, court appointment should be applied on a
case-by-case basis).
284 See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976) (holding that an order preventing a
defendant from consulting with his attorney during an overnight recess violates the defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
285 See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 420-22 (1974) (striking down a regulation that
prevented prisoners from receiving legal assistance from law students and paraprofessionals).
286 See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76, 83-84 (1985) (holding, albeit on Due Process
principles as opposed to Sixth Amendment grounds, that when a defendant’s sanity is a signiﬁcant
factor at the time of the oﬀense, the State must assure access to a competent psychiatrist).
287 See Bounds v. Smith, 430 US 817, 833 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring) (recognizing that a
“prison inmate has a constitutional right of access to the courts . . . as may be available to him under
state and federal law”).
288 See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 856-65 (1975) (holding that a denial of the
opportunity for ﬁnal summation deprives the accused of basic Sixth Amendment rights).
289 See Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 610-13 (1972) (declaring it unconstitutional for a
court to exclude a defendant from the stand for failing to testify ﬁrst).
290 MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE
POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 67-68 (1999); see, e.g., HANCOCK, supra note 275, at 23;
HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 275, at 69-75; ELLEN REESE, BACKLASH AGAINST WELFARE
MOTHERS PAST AND PRESENT 63 (2005).
291 For a discussion on indigent defense as a form of entitlement, see Darryl K. Brown,
Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument from Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
801, 810-12 (2004). The closest means-test analog in the right to counsel context is the Courts’
endorsement of a recoupment statute that allowed states to recover fees from defendants who
became able to pay. See Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 54 (1974) (“Oregon’s legislation is tailored to
impose an obligation only upon those with a foreseeable ability to meet it, and to enforce that
obligation only against those who actually become able to meet it without hardship.”).
292 Frances Piven and Richard Cloward famously argued that governments provide meager
welfare beneﬁts to ensure that poor people would not be incentivized into avoiding the most
undesirable jobs. See FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR:
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The 1979 case Scott v. Illinois293 returned to the Argersinger issue of what kinds
of offenses the right to counsel covers, and it did so in ways that were tied to the
racial and social welfare politics of crime. Aubrey Scott was a fifty-two-year-old
black man who was arrested for theft of a briefcase and an address book from
a Woolworth’s in downtown Chicago.294 Unrepresented during his bench trial,
Scott was convicted.295 The punishment for the crime was a ﬁne.296 He
appealed and argued that he should have been appointed an attorney.297 The
Court ruled that the appointment of counsel is limited to cases in which
defendants are actually imprisoned; appointment was not constitutionally
required in cases involving a fine.298 Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority.
He maintained that interpreting Argersinger as a mandate to provide counsel
in misdemeanor cases not involving incarceration, as the petitioner requested,
“would create confusion and impose unpredictable, but necessarily substantial,
costs on 50 quite diverse States.”299 This suggestion, read alone or in the
context of the whole opinion, could be reasonably understood in a variety of
ways: as a federalist’s unwillingness to impose, by judicial fiat, a new national
rule on states; as a separation of powers statement that invited local
legislatures to determine the boundaries of the right to counsel; or as a rational
policy difference. But Scott was about more than appropriate linedrawing.
Scott was also about judicial eﬃciency and curtailing the right to counsel
during a moment in which the defendant population was growing and was
almost invariably represented in the government reports, scholarship, and
media as black or brown. To be sure, such racialization was a byproduct of
actual increases in minority crime as well as caricatured representations of it.
300 But what remains unstated about Scott is that the case was decided during
a moment of stagﬂation in the American economy. During this period, some
people believed that the welfare state was bloated and scholars increasingly
characterized municipal courts as worlds of pandemonium.301 Perhaps more
THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 7-8 (1971). Though that is not my argument here, it is not
unreasonable to suggest that the underfunding of indigent defense has its own deterrent function
that signals to individuals what kind of counsel they will receive if they are accused of a crime and
unable to aﬀord their own attorney.
293 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
294 Glen Elasser, Six Chicagoans Lose Battle on Police List, CHI. TRIB., May 31, 1978, at 3.
295 Scott, 440 U.S. at 368.
296 Id.
297 Id. at 368-69
298 Id. at 369.
299 Id. at 373.
300 See STEVE MACEK, URBAN NIGHTMARES: THE MEDIA, THE RIGHT, AND THE MORAL
PANIC OVER THE CITY 149-50 (2006); JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS
INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017).
301 MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 3 (1979) (“The[] courts are chaotic and confusing . . . .Their facilities
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importantly, local tax revolts—inspired in part by defenses of property and
the new geography of white ﬂight—were a feature of the landscape as well.302
Historian Robin Kelley describes the racial mood of this period and its
relationship to taxation in ways that make Scott intelligible beyond its
doctrinal conﬁnes. He notes that Ronald Reagan, who was on the campaign
trail during the Scott litigation, “rode into oﬃce backed by a largely white
middle-class tax revolt, resentful of what it perceived as state largesse for
undeserving, lazy, and crime-prone Black and Brown people.”303 Taxpayers
were uninterested in funding more innocuous social welfare provisions such
as health care and education (the latter of which was endorsed by the
Court);304 legal aid for poor people accused of petty crimes was not a priority.
Importantly, the anger of some taxpayers “was not entirely invented, it was
misplaced. . . . the commensurate rise in property taxes alongside the
economic downturn of the 1970s created a genuine economic crisis for a large
segment of the white middle class.”305 Thomas and Mary Edsall have taken
this one step further and shown how conservative politicians harnessed this
anxiety and through the less odious language of welfare, divided citizens
along the lines of taxpayers and tax recipients. This distinction, at least in the
eyes of the general public, coincided with racial divisions: whites were
taxpayers and racial minorities were not only tax recipients, but unmerited
beneﬁciaries of poverty programs and government attempts to create
rights.306 Indigent defense—which is both a poverty program for the poor and
the byproduct of judicial rights creation—would not be immune to the
racially infected tax rhetoric.
The national tax revolt and its attendant racial undertones touched Illinois
the same year Scott was litigated. In an investigative story that questioned the
integrity of indigent defense and was the criminal justice analog to the “welfare
are terrible. Courtrooms are crowded, chambers are dingy, and libraries are virtually nonexistent.”).
For an earlier take, see Michele Washington, Black Judges in White America, 1 BLACK L.J. 241, 243
(1971), which describes a New York judge who likened his job to being “a keeper in the Black and
Hispanic zoo where those crippled by America’s sabre-toothed racism have given themselves over to
narcotics, hard liquor and hopeless[ness]”.
302 ISAAC WILLIAM MARTIN, THE PERMANENT TAX REVOLT: HOW THE PROPERTY TAX
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN POLITICS 135 (2008).
303 Robin D.G. Kelley, Over the Rainbow: Third World Studies Against the Neoliberal Turn, in
REFLECTIONS ON KNOWLEDGE, LEARNING AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: HISTORY’S SCHOOLS
211 (Aziz Choudry et al. eds., 2017).
304 See, e.g., Beverlee A. Myers & Rigby Leighton, Medicaid and the Mainstream: Reassessment
in the Context of the Taxpayer Revolt, 132 WESTERN J. MED. 550, 559-60 (1980) (implying that the
taxpayer revolt was connected to opposition to publicly funded healthcare); see also San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (rejecting the lower court’s ﬁnding that education
was a fundamental right or liberty).
305 Kelley, supra note 303, at 211.
306 EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 272, at 131.
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queen” (which was also a Chicago figure), the Chicago Tribune found that,
contrary to Illinois law, many criminal defendants represented by the Cook
County Public Defender’s Office failed to provide sworn statements of
indigency.307 In the 40% of cases where defendants did provide statements,
many listed “well-paying occupations” such as “plumber, machinist, and drill
press operator.”308 The periodical was not coy about what it perceived to be
bureaucratic excess and borderline-malfeasance. It noted the Cook County
Public Defender Office’s 169% increase in expenditures from 1974–1978 (from
$3 million to $8 million a year) as well as the staff’s 90% growth during that
same period (from 211 employees to 400 employees).309 Finally, the Tribune
intimated that since positions in the Public Defender’s Office were political
patronage jobs, more clients, irrespective of their actual indigency, provided
justification for those jobs.310 This growth occurred in an office where ninety
percent of the clients served were black or brown.311
Unsurprisingly, the state of Illinois repeatedly used cost concerns and the
tax revolt as cudgels in its brieﬁng. Illinois Attorney General William J. Scott,
who would ironically be convicted for tax evasion a year after Scott was
decided,312 argued that
this Court must consider the economic burdens which will be imposed upon the
courts by any extension of the right to counsel beyond Argersinger. . . .
[Commentators] have agreed that such an extension will tremendously over-tax
the system. . . . Legislatures are in the best position to decide what allocation
should be made of their own dwindling resources in this era of tax revolt.313

Illinois used the specter of publicly funded indigent defense gone wild in
its brieﬁng and was successful. Justice Brennan’s dissent identiﬁed the
majority’s reception to the taxpayer argument. He complained, “This Court’s
role in enforcing constitutional guarantees for criminal defendants cannot be
made dependent on the budgetary decisions of state governments.”314
Nevertheless, indigent defense would become dependent on state and local
coﬀers. At a moment when crime was highly racialized and the federal
government infused local governments with unprecedented levels of criminal

Charles Mount, Taxpayers Foot Law Fees for Some Who Can Pay, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 11, 1979, at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Blacks, Latinos Lacking as Defenders Here: Study, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 31, 1979, at 9.
Jay Branegan & Robert Benjamin, Scott Gets 1-year Jail Term, CHI. TRIB., July 30, 1980, at 1.
Brief for the Respondent, State v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (No. 77-1177), 1978 WL
206719, at *25, 32, 34.
314 Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 384 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
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justice funds by way of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, the
media, the public, and the Court would look askance at indigent defense.
The Scott decision was an understandable outcome at the time, but its
racial ramiﬁcations have, until recently, eluded scholars. Beth Colgan oﬀers a
valuable and contemporary analysis of Scott and the punitive fees and ﬁnes
that were at the center of the Ferguson Report.315 In addition to pointing out
the Scott Court’s possibly anarchistic distinction between incarceration and
ﬁnancial penalties, Colgan suggests that lack of access to counsel may have
helped produce some of Ferguson’s problems.316 “Had people subjected to
Ferguson’s municipal court scheme been aﬀorded indigent defense
representation,” she argues, “they would have been better able to challenge
violations of numerous procedural and substantive constitutional rights,
making many of the abuses that occurred illegal and ﬁscally impossible.”317
Scott’s conclusion, that counsel is only constitutionally necessary in cases
involving incarceration, helps make better sense of the Ferguson debacle.
Taken as a whole, we can understand Scott as accomplishing several things.
Most simply, the decision limited the kinds of oﬀenses that required states to
provide counsel. As scholars have noted, this is particularly important
considering the havoc that misdemeanors can wreak on people’s lives,
particularly racial minorities.318 Second, the decision shows how actual
315 See Beth A. Colgan, Fines, Fees, and Forfeitures, Reforming Crim. Just., 205, 225 (2017)
[hereinafter Colgan, Fines, Fees, and Forfeitures] (“[T]he Scott decision suﬀers from a failure to
consider whether cases for which ﬁnancial sanctions are imposed raise diﬃcult factual or
constitutional questions necessitating the need for counsel to ensure that the outcome of the trial is
reliable.”); Beth A. Colgan, Lessons from Ferguson on Individual Defense Representation as a Tool of
Systemic Reform, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1171, 1178 (2017) [hereinafter Colgan, Lessons from Ferguson]
(“Ferguson’s political system failed its poor and black citizens in signiﬁcant part because they were
unrepresented by counsel.”); see also Neil L. Sobol, Charging the Poor: Criminal Justice Debt & ModernDay Debtors’ Prisons, 75 MD. L. REV. 486 (2016) (focusing on the growth in criminal justice debt,
which includes “ﬁnes, restitution charges, and fees”). See generally ALEXES HARRIS, A POUND OF
FLESH: MONETARY SANCTIONS AS PUNISHMENT FOR THE POOR (2016).
316 Colgan, Fines, Fees, and Forfeitures, supra note 315, at 225.
317 Colgan, Lessons from Ferguson, supra note 315, at 1178.
318 See ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL
CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2018) 25-60; Eisha Jain, Proportionality
and Other Misdemeanor Myths, 98 B.U. L. REV. 953, 957-58 (2018) (“Misdemeanor arrests and
convictions trigger a patchwork of penalties. Minor oﬀenses may lead to hefty civil penalties, such
as deportation.”); Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, Rethinking Misdemeanor Neglect, 64 UCLA L. REV. 738,
758-63 (2017) (suggesting that public defender prioritization of felony defendants is misguided,
considering the volume of misdemeanor convictions); Alexandra Natapoﬀ, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1313, 1319 (2012) (“As the misdemeanor world makes clear, the system does not ‘care’ that
poor, black, brown, young, illiterate or addicted suspects are arrested, charged, and convicted of
minor oﬀenses on the thinnest possible bases.”); Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1090 (2013) (noting that individuals who are prosecuted for minor
charges have a “permanent, easily accessible electronic record of that contact that can aﬀect future
employment, housing, and many other basic facets of daily life”).
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concerns about crime, along with a social welfare austerity that was partially
imbued by race, inﬂuenced the Court’s attempts to deﬁne the boundaries of
Gideon. With the kinds of cases that Gideon required states to provide counsel
for deﬁned, the Court would turn its attention to quality, an issue that would
also be inﬂuenced by racial politics.
B. Ineﬀective Assistance of Counsel, Punishment, and Race
In the 1980s, the populist desire for law and order was expressed through
punishment and attempts to close perceived legal loopholes that exonerated
defendants. Recall that President Nixon promised to nominate law and order
judges that would attend to such technicalities. He fulfilled that promise by
appointing judges who generally hewed to the retributivist aspects of that
principle and often emphasized finality in criminal adjudication.319 In 1981
President Reagan carried on the tradition by nominating Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor, who ran as a “law and order” state judge in Arizona and authored
opinions in that vein immediately after her appointment to the Court.320 These
are descriptive points, rather than evaluative ones. During a period where the
penal system experienced exceptional expansion, there are salutary aspects of
the Court’s stringency. Nevertheless, the Burger Court’s law and order posture
produced a right to counsel jurisprudence that was more specific than that of
its predecessor but also emphasized the retributive features of criminal law in
ways that arguably compromised procedure. This subsection shows how
Strickland v. Washington, the paradigmatic ineffective assistance of counsel case,
was not just about effectiveness. Instead, Strickland was a fulfillment of law and
order’s goal of closing procedural escape mechanisms, particularly for the
racialized defendant who was understood as factually guilty.
It goes without saying that race is an operative aspect of the criminal
justice system, particularly since the 1970s,321 and this holds true for the
319 See Kinports, supra note 269, at 219 (noting Nixon’s campaign promise to “put ‘law and
order’ judges on the court”); Madhavi M. McCall & Michael A. McCall, Chief Justice William
Rehnquist: His Law and Order Legacy and Impact on Criminal Justice, 39 AKRON L. REV. 323, 331 (2006)
(describing Rehnquist as the Supreme Court appointment who “best lived up to Nixon’s pledge to
name ‘law and order’ conservatives to the bench.”). See generally Warren E. Burger, Paradoxes in the
Administration of Criminal Justice, 58 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, & POLICE SCI. 428 (1967); Lewis
F. Powell, Jr., A Lawyer Looks at Civil Disobedience, 23 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 205 (1966).
320 See NANCY MAVEETY, JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR: STRATEGIST ON THE
SUPREME COURT 15 (1996); Robert E. Riggs, Justice O’Connor: A First Term Appraisal, 1983 BYU L.
REV. 1, 20, 45 (1983) (“In dispensing criminal justice her ﬁrst term [Justice “O’Connor] reveals a
stronger commitment to law and order than her state court record might have suggested.”).
321 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2016) 98-99 (“In the drug war, the enemy is racially deﬁned.”);
ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING OF
MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2016) 174 (“[I]n cities like Philadelphia . . .the percentage of
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criminal legal aid to the poor as well.322 Conventional wisdom might hold
that indigent defense is just about class, but race oftentimes—though not
inevitably—has a seat at the table as well. The most striking example relates
to the disproportionate number of racial minorities who constitute the
carceral population,323 many of whom relied on some form of appointed
counsel.324 But this is not a story that is exclusively about minorities. A
substantial number of incarcerated people are poor and white and relied on
appointed counsel for their defense.325 Lest it be forgotten, poor whites are
racialized too, as demonstrated in the beginning of this paper,326 throughout
history,327 and in the recent debate about how the opioid crisis has been treated
black prisoners in the county jail increased from 50 percent in 1970 to 95 percent in 1974.”); Roberts,
supra note 276, at 1272-73 (“The extraordinary prison expansion involved young black men in grossly
disproportionate numbers.”).
322 See Miriam S. Gohara, James S. Hardy & Damon Todd Hewitt, The Disparate Impact of an
Under-funded, Patchwork Indigent Defense System on Mississippi’s African Americans: The Civil Rights
Case for Establishing a Statewide, Fully Funded Public Defender System, 49 HOWARD L.J. 81, 84 (2005)
(“African Americans in Mississippi, as throughout the nation, are disproportionately among the poor
and the criminally accused. Therefore, the state’s failure to fund attorneys for the indigent accused
acutely aﬀects African Americans.”); Katayoon Majd & Patricia Puritz, The Cost of Justice: How LowIncome Youth Continue To Pay the Price of Failing Indigent Defense Systems, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L.
& POL’Y 543, 569 (2009) (“The impact of these broken indigent defense systems falls
disproportionately on youth of color.”); Rebecca Marcus, Note, Racism in Our Courts: The
Underfunding of Public Defenders and Its Disproportionate Impact Upon Racial Minorities, 22 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 219, 219 (1994) (“[C]riminal defendants’ right to equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment is also being denied because the ineﬀective assistance of counsel provided
by public defenders has a disproportionate impact upon racial minorities.”).
323 A snapshot of state prisons, which hold 1.3 of the 2.3 million people conﬁned in the criminal
justice system, is helpful. In 2014, 38% of state prisoners were black and 21% were Hispanic, despite
comprising approximately 13% and 17% of the national population, respectively. This does not
account for states which include Hispanics as white or states like Alabama and Maryland that do
not report ethnicity data to the Bureau of Justice Statistics. See generally ASHLEY NELLIS, THE
COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITY IN STATE PRISONS (2016); PETER
WAGNER & BERNADETTE RAUBY, MASS INCARCERATION: THE WHOLE PIE (2017).
324 BESIKI KUTATELADZE ET. AL, RACE AND PROSECUTION IN MANHATTAN 7 (2014)
(ﬁnding that blacks and Latino/as were less likely to be represented by private counsel and more
likely to be represented by court-assigned defense attorneys). The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS)
has not updated its racial data on indigent defense since 2014, but its last report indicated that 69%
of white inmates reported having lawyers appointed by the court, whereas 77% of blacks and 73% of
Hispanics had public defenders or assigned counsel. See also CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, DEFENSE
COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES, 9 (2000).
325 John Gramlich, The Gap Between the Number of Blacks and Whites in Prison is Shrinking, PEW
RES. CTR. (Apr. 30 2019), www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/12/shrinking-gap-betweennumber-of-blacks-and-whites-in-prison/
[https://perma.cc/VM8W-6WQP]
(noting
that
approximately 436,500 of approximately 1.4 million sentenced state and federal prisoners are white);
Rabuy & Kopf, supra note 277, at 2 (indicating that incarcerated white men and women had annual
incomes of $21,975 and $15,480, in 2014, respectively).
326 See Part II.A.
327 See Paul H. Buck, The Poor Whites of the Ante-Bellum South 31 AM. HIST. REV. 41, 42 (1925)
(describing poor Whites in the South as the “very bottom of society”); James C. Klotter, The Black
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differently than the crack epidemic.328 Still, it would be foolhardy to ignore the
salience that black and brown criminality has had, both historically and culturally.
Against the background of mass incarceration, the Court made a series of
decisions that would have implications for the racial minorities that comprise
a disproportionate share of the defendant population. Guidance could be
culled from Morris v. Slappy,329 where the Court underlined the limitations of
the right to counsel by ruling that criminal defendants do not have a right to
a meaningful relationship with their appointed attorneys.330 The decision
validated the impersonal and sometimes aloof representation that some
minority defendants receive.331 U.S. v. Cronic332 held that some contextual
circumstances (e.g., an attorney’s youth, lack of expertise in criminal law, and
unpreparedness for trial relative to the state) do not lead to an automatic
inference of ineﬀective assistance of counsel. Save some exceptions, only
speciﬁc errors can lead to ineﬀectiveness claims. That burden of proof is
weighty for any defendant whose counsel had lapses in competence, but such
requisite proof would be particularly burdensome for innocent minorities
saddled with presumptions about race and guilt and almost insurmountable
for factually guilty minority defendants who were punished because of their
counsel’s ineﬀectiveness. The Court decided Strickland v. Washington333 on the
same day as Cronic. Strickland is widely considered to be the sine qua non of
any discussion about the failures of indigent defense. This case best illustrates

South and White Appalachia, 66 J. AM. HIST. 832, 832 (1980) (chronicling the rising interest in poor
white Appalachia over freed slaves, i.e. poor blacks, despite the striking similarities between these two
groups in the late 1800s). See generally GEORGE MELVILLE WESTON, THE POOR WHITES OF THE
SOUTH (1856) (discussing the undesirable traits of non-slaveholding, poor white Southerners); NANCY
ISENBERG, WHITE TRASH: THE 400-YEAR UNTOLD HISTORY OF CLASS IN AMERICA (2016).
328 Dahleen Glanton, Race, the Crack Epidemic and the Eﬀect on Today’s Opioid Crisis, CHI. TRIB.
(Aug. 21, 2017), www.chicagotribune.com/news/columnists/glanton/ct-opioid-epidemic-dahleenglanton-met-20170815-column.html [https://perma.cc/9BAQ-VRM5] (highlighting the diﬀerences
between the treatment of the crack epidemic in the 1980s when drug-users were termed “junkies”
and jailed, as compared to today’s reaction to the opioid crisis); Eugene Scott, Native Americans,
Among the Most Harmed by the Opioid Epidemic, Are Often Left out of Conversation, WASH. POST (Oct.
30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/10/30/native-americans-amongthe-most-harmed-by-the-opioid-epidemic-are-often-left-out-of-conversation/?noredirect=
on&utm_term=.a0f409f91f86 [https://perma.cc/CCP6-Y8KS] (noting that Native Americans have
been dying at double or triple the rates of Hispanics and blacks but their deaths have received much
less attention).
329 461 U.S. 1 (1983).
330 Id. at 13-14.
331 In Florida misdemeanor courts, 82% of arraignments took less than three minutes. 66% of
defendants did not have counsel during arraignments. 70% of cases were resolved at this stage. ALISA
SMITH & SEAN MADDAN, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, THREEMINUTE JUSTICE: HAST AND WAST IN FLORIDA’S MISDEMEANOR COURTS 5 (2011).
332 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
333 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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how the racial politics of law and order interfaced with the Court’s right to
counsel jurisprudence.
If the remixed Oliver Wendell Holmes adage “bad facts make bad law” is
true, then Strickland is a case in point.334 Lost in the doctrinal takeaways from
the case is the social context within which Strickland arose and which is
important to describe before delving into the decision itself. Before images
of Willie Horton circulated on television screens in the late 1980s, David
Leroy Washington zigzagged across state and federal tribunals while
garnering attention in legal journals and in the mainstream media.335 He
actually was a choirboy, and although one person in his community described
him as “a non-violent young black man who did not use drugs or alcohol,”336
he committed a series of heinous crimes.337 He stabbed a minister, shot an old
lady, and robbed and killed a University of Miami student who was in the act
of reciting the Lord’s Prayer.338 As the Fifth Circuit noted, “Washington’s
victims included black and white, young and old, male and female, all
intentionally murdered in torturous ways.”339 Washington epitomized the
uncomfortable fact of black criminality. The case, as any reader with even a
hazy recollection of criminal procedure might recall, involved Washington’s
claim that he received ineﬀective assistance of counsel because of his
attorney’s failure to seek out character witnesses or request a psychiatric
evaluation.340 The Court, in an 8–1 decision that left Justice Marshall alone
in dissent, disagreed.341 In its denial of Washington’s claim, the Court
resolved a circuit split on how to evaluate such claims and adopted a uniform
test.342 For defendants to prevail in an ineﬀective assistance of counsel claim,
334 See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 319 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I suspect that this
case is a prime example of the adage that ‘bad facts make bad law.’”); N. Sec. Co. v. United States,
193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (White, J., dissenting) (“Great cases like hard cases make bad law.”).
335 See, e.g., Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. Unit B), on reh’g, 693 F.2d 1243
(5th Cir. Unit B 1982), rev’d, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Washington v. State, 397 So.2d 285 (Fla. 1981);
Washington v. State, 362 So.2d 658 (Fla. 1978).
336 Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 5, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (No.
82-1554), 1983 WL 482731, at *5; see also id. (arguing that an adequate investigation would have
produced “generally favorable information from [Mr. Washington’s] family, friends, former
employers, and medical experts” that should have been presented to the sentencing tribunal).
337 See Florida Inmate Executed; Second to Die in Two Days, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 1984, at A2
(noting that Mr. Washington “killed three Miami-area residents in three robberies over a 12-day
span in 1976”).
338 Strickland, 673 F.2d at 907-08.
339 Id. at 908.
340 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668.
341 Id. at 668, 697, 701, 706.
342 See Richard L. Gabriel, The Strickland Standard for Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel:
Emasculating the Sixth Amendment in the Guise of Due Process, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1259, 1264 (1986) (noting
the variety of standards used to evaluate ineffective assistance of counsel claims pre-Strickland); see also
Brief for Amici Curiae of the States of Alabama et al., in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
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they would have to show that (1) counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) counsel’s performance
prejudiced the defense and had an eﬀect on the judgment.343
Scholars often focus on Strickland’s high threshold, but the law and order
politics of Florida—a repeat player in the Court’s criminal procedure
docket—help illuminate the racial substance of indigent defense in the 1980s
in ways that provide new insights. To be sure, Washington’s actual guilt most
likely animated Florida’s determination to ensure that he got his just deserts.
But other developments provide context as to how this case fit into the larger
crime control zeitgeist. Dade County, where Washington committed his
crimes, had a criminal justice system that was precarious. In 1980, Miami,
the largest city in Dade County, was the locale of a strikingly violent and
under-studied race riot.344 That year also witnessed Miami’s murder rate
climb seventy-eight percent,345 an increase so large that the Dade County
medical examiner had to store corpses in a refrigerated meat truck previously
used by Burger King.346 Such mayhem tarnished Miami’s national
reputation, impacted tourism, and influenced the willingness of corporations
to invest in the city.347
Florida Attorney General James (Jim) Smith is a crucial player to this
story. Smith’s self-identiﬁcation as a tough, Democratic, law and order
attorney general illustrates the ubiquitous and bipartisan nature of war on
crime politics during this period and coincides neatly with Jonathan Simon’s
argument about prosecutors’ increased inﬂuence over politics during this
period.348 In 1981, a year after the riot, and the same year Smith was
challenging appeals ﬁled by Washington, he complained about the Dade
County Jail being “crammed” with Cuban and Haitian criminals and

3, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (No. 82-1554), 1983 WL 482732, at *3 (urging the
Court to resolve the circuit split between the Eleventh Circuit, on the one hand, and the D.C.
Circuit and the Florida Supreme Court, on the other).
343 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 692.
344 See Robert Sherrill, Can Miami Save Itself ?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (July 19, 1987),
https://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/19/magazine/can-miami-save-itself-a-city-beset-by-drugs-andviolence.html [https://perma.cc/G6WV-DS3F] (“Angered by the exoneration of four white policemen
who had killed a black insurance man, the residents of Liberty City, a predominantly black section of
Miami, launched what was arguably the worst race riot of this century. It wasn’t just a civil protest.
Blacks went out specifically to get whites, to assault them, to kill them. Some whites were doused with
gasoline and set on fire. Some were beaten senseless in the street and run over, repeatedly.”).
345 JAN NIJMAN, MIAMI: MISTRESS OF THE AMERICAS 63 (2011).
346 EDNA BUCHANAN, THE CORPSE HAD A FAMILIAR FACE 105 (1987).
347 Sherrill, supra note 344.
348 SIMON, supra note 276, at 34-38.
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suspects.349 A federal judge ordered the County to decrease its inmate
population, which caused the federal government to take on some of the
county’s inmates. Simultaneously, Smith lobbied for a statewide five percent
increase in the state’s sales tax to help fund law enforcement.350 In 1982, Smith
and the State of Florida lost a death penalty case in the Supreme Court
involving a black man who was a getaway driver and unknowing accomplice in
the killing of an elderly couple.351 Strickland, argued one year later in 1983, was
an easier case with very few redeeming facts. It also took place at a time when
the problem of multiple murder attracted more national attention.352 Strickland
provided Florida—the state that lost Gideon and Argersinger—with an
opportunity to prevail nationally while advancing an ineffective assistance
doctrine that would coincide with crime control imperatives. There are some
important observations that have gone unstated in indigent defense scholarship.
First, the case that established the modern ineffective assistance of counsel
doctrine involved a murderous black man who sought leniency because of
putative procedural errors. This is precisely what law and order hawks assailed
against a decade and a half before: actually guilty (minority) defendants walking
scot free due to technicalities. Relatedly, the Strickland case was brought by a law
and order attorney general and the opinion was written by a law and order Justice
who sat on a Court led by a law and order Chief Justice. The case was decided
during a war on crime that scholars have shown was inextricably tied to racial
considerations. While Strickland is often and correctly understood as defanging
Gideon, it was also an indirect response to Escobedo—the first right to counsel
case that augurated Nixonian law and order critiques of indigent defense
expansions. In its reversal of the appellate court, the Strickland Court sought to
limit perceived procedural excesses that benefitted defendants.
Even though many commentators have glossed over this racial context in
their discussions of Strickland, some have honed in on the surrounding
jurisprudential setting. Anthony O’Rourke is most helpful in this regard,
noting that the same year that the Court granted certiorari in Strickland, it
rejected another Eleventh Circuit case involving an ineﬀective assistance of
349 Dade County’s carceral population problem did not abate. See Wendy Spirduso, Add Prisons
or Let Inmates Out, Smith Says, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 29, 1982, at 167 (copy on file with author);
Jim Smith Exploits Growing Fear of Crime, MIAMI NEWS, Mar. 25, 1982, at 14 (copy on file with author).
350 Sharen Johnson, Budget This Year a Grim Guessing Game, PENSACOLA NEWS-JOURNAL,
Apr. 5, 1981, at 2F (copy on ﬁle with author).
351 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 782-83 (1982).
352 In the 1980s, “both the rate of growth and the actual scale of the multiple-murder problem
became a hotly contested issue, and it was widely claimed that serial murders annually represented
a ﬁfth or a quarter of all homicides in the United States.” PHILIP JENKINS, USING MURDER: THE
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SERIAL HOMICIDE 49 (1994). But see ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA L.
SMITH, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 1980–2008, at 2 (2011) (showing how murder
rates “peaked to 10.2 per 100,000 [in 1980] and subsequently fell to 7.9 per 100,000 in 1984”).
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counsel claim.353 The Eleventh Circuit decision, Goodwin v. Balkcom,354 was
replete with the ingredients of a high-proﬁle criminal procedure case: a black
criminal defendant accused of murder who had been diagnosed with
borderline mental retardation; the failure of appointed counsel to challenge
the racial composition of the grand and petit jury pool in a southern county
that was sued in federal court for having racially unrepresentative juries; and
aforementioned counsel’s errant references to his client in his closing as a
“little old nigger boy . . . . [T]he kind of people that we have historically put
to death here in Georgia.”355 Although the defendant won and Georgia
appealed, the Court denied certiorari. O’Rourke captures the implications of
this choice nicely: “[o]ne need not be a legal realist to conclude [that] the
ineﬀective assistance standard might be diﬀerent today if, in 1984, the Court
had been considering Terry Lee Goodwin’s representation rather than David
Leroy Washington’s.”356 The legal facts in Strickland lend themselves more
easily to a restrictive right to counsel. Strickland allowed the Court to advance
a highly circumscribed vision of eﬀectiveness that was hardly pro-defendant,
deferential in its assumptions about attorney competence, and would
ultimately impact minority defendants.357 A recitation of the comically bad
lawyering that the Strickland standard has permitted—by junkie, alcoholic,
and narcoleptic attorneys—is unnecessary, as this has been capably
enumerated elsewhere.358 I’m far more interested in the nexus between race
and ineﬀective assistance of counsel, which I deﬁne more ﬂexibly as the actual
or constructive absence of legal representation (e.g., by way of underfunding,
excessive workload, or inexperience).359
353 Anthony O’Rourke, The Political Economy of Criminal Procedure Litigation, 45 GA. L. REV.
721, 764-66 (2011).
354 Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 794 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1098 (Apr.
18, 1983) (No. 82-1409).
355 Goodwin, 684 F.2d at 805 n.13.
356 O’Rourke, supra note 353, at 766.
357 Id. at 764-765; see also Richard Klein, Civil Rights in Crisis: The Racial Impact of the Denial of
the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 14 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIG., GENDER & CLASS 163, 182
(2015) (“It is especially ironic that attorneys who actively litigate claims that other professionals
failed to act appropriately, are somehow themselves provided with a presumption of competence.”).
358 See, e.g., Jeﬀrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to
Eﬀective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV. 425, 427
(1996) (“Unfortunately, indigent criminal defendants are not always provided with competent
appointed counsel.”); Ira Mickenberg, Drunk, Sleeping, and Incompetent Lawyers: Is It Possible to Keep
Innocent People Oﬀ Death Row?, 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 319, 321 (2004) (“Courts and legislatures
often try to reconcile their inconsistent beliefs about the administration of the death penalty by
refusing to acknowledge that there is a serious problem with the adequacy of lawyers who represent
people charged with death-eligible crimes.”).
359 See also Cara H. Drinan, The National Right to Counsel Act: A Congressional Solution to the
Nation’s Indigent Defense Crisis, 47 HARV. J. LEGIS. 487, 497-499 (2010) (proposing a broader
deﬁnition of ineﬀective assistance of counsel).

1228

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 167: 1161

Besides the racialized context from which Strickland emerged and the
racial demography that the decision may have helped produce, there is a
symbolic and symbiotic relationship between race and ineﬀective assistance
of counsel. This Article has shown how racial politics inﬂuence indigent
defense jurisprudence and administration, and this assertion applies to the
Strickland regime. Ineﬀective assistance of counsel doctrine is interestingly
similar to the Court’s treatment of racial discrimination claims. There are
many similarities between the two. I can brieﬂy conjure at least six, not
counting the strong probability that some minority defendants are likely to
experience or have already experienced both.360 First, racial discrimination
and ineﬀective assistance claims have their own versions of deﬁnitional
imprecision that are partly due to the range of activity they attempt to capture
as well as narrow understandings of how both operate.361 Second, both claims
involve parties—minorities and criminal defendants—who are immediately
considered untrustworthy and are therefore not likely to be believed.362
Third, and relatedly, jurisprudence in both areas imposes what some scholars
consider to be unreasonably high evidentiary burdens on these claimants.363
Fourth, racial discrimination and ineﬀective assistance of counsel claims
commonly invite accusations of frivolity or instrumentalism.364 Fifth,
360 See, e.g., Peter A. Joy, Unequal Assistance of Counsel, 24 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 518, 519
(2015) (“If one does not have the ﬁnancial means to hire eﬀective counsel, or is poor and not lucky
enough to have a well-funded, eﬀective public defender or appointed counsel, the defendant’s right
to counsel is unequal. This disparity is driven largely by the wealth of the accused and falls most
harshly on people of color, who are twice as likely as whites to live in poverty and are accused of
crimes at rates much higher than their proportion of the population. As a result, class and race are
largely determinative of the lawyer, and often the amount of justice one receives.”).
361 RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, THE RACE CARD: HOW BLUFFING ABOUT BIAS MAKES
RACE RELATIONS WORSE 7 (2008) (maintaining that the social and legal meaning of racism has
“no single clear and agreed-upon meaning” and, as a result, is used “to describe an increasingly wide
range of disparate policies, attitudes, decisions, and social phenomena”); Haney López, supra note
9, at 1838 (critiquing the Supreme Court’s obsession with “purposeful racism” and noting that it
“seems to be developing an equal protection jurisprudence that deﬁnes racism both too narrowly
(race must be openly considered) and too broadly (any consideration of race constitutes racism).”).
362 See, e.g., Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 738
(2011) (discussing how changes in state and federal pretrial practice have impacted the pretrial
presumption of innocence for criminal defendants); Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Racial
Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 190 (2010) (ﬁnding
that study participants held strong associations between black and guilty).
363 See Richard Klein, The Constitutionalizing of Ineﬀective Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV.
1433, 1433-34 (1999) (discussing a host of problems involved in both prongs of the Strickland test);
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) (arguing that the intent standard does not account for unconscious
racial motivation); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105,
1106 (1989) (“Our general fascination with process theory, I believe, has led us to accept uncritically
a description of the intent requirement that the cases do not support.”).
364 ELLEN BERREY ET. AL, RIGHTS ON TRIAL: HOW WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION LAW
PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 277 (2017) (describing how critics of antidiscrimination law suggest
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appellate review of both does not easily lend itself to identifying or mitigating
the subtle biases that may impact case disposition.365 Sixth, save for some
extreme examples in what is already a quantitatively and qualitatively
exceptional docket, the Supreme Court appears to be unfazed by the status
quo in both areas.366
My argument here is simple. If Powell embodies a shift from the Court’s
minimalism to a more incremental, albeit stunted, approach to race and the
right to counsel, and Gideon typiﬁes the Court’s imprecise but optimistic
vision on both, then Strickland represents a more restrictive vision. Whether
one takes a critical view of Strickland as an unfettered attack on Gideon or a
more generous view of the decision as an eﬀort by the Court to elaborate on
how eﬀectiveness should ﬁt in Gideon’s mandate, the result is the same:
weaker post-conviction remedies for defendants. As Michael Graetz and
Linda Greenhouse note, the Burger Court “made it diﬃcult to win a claim of
that the ﬁeld has become an “excuse factory” where “incompetent employees attempt to use the law
to receive unwarranted monetary gains and job protection” whereas plaintiﬀs also believe that too
many people sue without valid claims); Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-theFact Review of Ineﬀective Assistance of Counsel, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1, 4 (“[An ineﬀectiveness claim is]
one of the few claims that can be raised in almost every case, as almost every defendant has a lawyer.
Courts of appeals, ﬂooded with frivolous ineﬀectiveness claims, approach each one with a jaundiced
eye.”); Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineﬀective Assistance of
Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 681-82 (2007) (“[T]he issues that the defendant may raise
on direct appeal are limited only to those matters that appear on the face of the trial court record.
Accordingly, if an attorney fails to preserve issues at trial, appellate counsel is generally left without
grounds for appeal. To a defendant who bears no cost for appealing, however, a groundless appeal is
more attractive than no appeal at all. As a result, public defenders routinely spend their time arguing
frivolous appeals . . . .”). In a survey of federal habeas litigation, the authors found that eighty-one
percent of litigants raised ineﬀective assistance of counsel claims. NANCY J. KING ET. AL, NAT’L
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT
COURTS 5 (2007).
365 See Ryan Patrick Alford, Appellate Review of Racist Summations: Redeeming the Promise of
Searching Analysis, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 325, 326 (2006) (describing how prosecutors use indirect
racist summations to obviate appellate review); Bibas, supra note 364, at 4 (“[G]uilty pleas dispense
with trial records, so appellate courts have scant evidence to review . . . With little evidence to go
on, judges may fall back on their presumption of correctness or inevitability.”); Jeﬀrey J. Rachlinski
et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Aﬀect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1231 (2009)
(“Existing forms of accountability, such as appellate review . . . primarily focus on a judge’s
performance in a particular case, not on the systematic study of long-term patterns within a judge’s
performance that might reveal implicit bias”).
366 See Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 154 (2016) (noting that
in the past thirty years, “the Supreme Court has steadily diminished the vigor of the Equal
Protection Clause” and rejected claims brought by racial minorities as well as claims in the areas of
gender discrimination and in abortion cases); Donald A. Dripps, Up from Gideon, 45 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 113, 120, 123 (2012) (pointing out that Strickland’s standard is “widely regarded as practically
toothless” and that the “Court is in general sympathy with mainstream political opinion. Typically,
it will move on behalf of disempowered groups after they have established a political identity [and]
achieved successes in the political realm” but noting that since indigent defense advocates have not
done this, “we should not expect ﬁve Justices in gleaming armor to gallop up upon white steeds.”).
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ineﬀective assistance of counsel, just as the stakes for having eﬀective and
competent counsel and costs of attorney incompetence ballooned.”367
The diﬃculties of proving ineﬀectiveness have been and continue to be
particularly acute for minorities. The deluge of wrongful convictions due to
deﬁcient lawyering are telling; they oﬀer a glimpse of who bore the
consequences of a right to counsel jurisprudence that enabled ineﬀectiveness.
The National Registry of Exonerations documents cases in which innocent
defendants are wrongfully convicted and later exonerated. Of the 1,900
defendants who were convicted but later exonerated because they were
innocent, forty-six percent were African-Americans, three times their rate in
the population.368 It is also important to note that these ﬁgures only capture
identified exonerations. Ultimately, these racialized outcomes, among many
others, bear some relationship to an indigent defense regime that has a
constrained view of government’s responsibility to poor defendants and an
intellectually dishonest characterization of the legal profession’s relationship
to these same individuals.
CONCLUSION
A. Life Since Strickland
The post-Strickland indigent defense story is a familiar one. A large
portion of the Court’s right to counsel cases have been idiosyncratic and fall
in the “death is diﬀerent” category. The Strickland standard animated these
decisions. In most of these cases the Court simply determined whether the
accused received ineﬀective assistance, a question typically answered in the
negative.369 But this was not uniformly the case. As Stephen Smith has
367 MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & LINDA GREENHOUSE, THE BURGER COURT AND THE RISE OF
THE JUDICIAL RIGHT 65 (2017).
368 NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, RACE AND WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 1 (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/

Race_and_Wrongful_Convictions.pdf [https://perma.cc/PUN4-UX2Q].
369 See, e.g., Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 299 (2010) (holding that a state court’s conclusion
that a defense counsel’s decision to not “pursue or present evidence of [a defendant’s] mental
deﬁciencies” was not unreasonable, and, therefore, refusing to address the appellee’s claim of
ineﬀective counsel); Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 28 (2010) (concluding that the “notion that the
result could have been diﬀerent if only [defense counsel] had [taken a diﬀerent strategy] is fanciful”);
Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007) (reversing the Ninth Circuit’s grant of habeas relief
from a ﬁnding that a defendant was prejudiced by ineﬀective counsel, and emphasizing that
Strickland places the burden on defendants to demonstrate to a “reasonable probability” that they
were prejudiced by ineﬀective counsel); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 357, 357 (2002) (reversing
the Ninth Circuit’s grant of habeas relief from a ﬁnding that a defendant was prejudiced by
ineﬀective counsel, and holding that the state court’s denial of habeas relief was not based on an
unreasonable application of the Strickland standard); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 702 (2002)
(reaﬃrming Strickland’s “‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
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argued,370 in a few of the cases decided at the turn of the century, the Court
applied Strickland in a way that closely scrutinized the performance of counsel
and led to more favorable outcomes for capital defendants.371 But the
Rehnquist Court left indigent defense supporters with much to desire.372
Interestingly, the Roberts Court has ruled more favorably for indigent capital
defendants. These cases typically had scandalous facts that were easy to rule
on but oﬀered few doctrinal takeaways.373 Other decisions often entailed
complicated procedural niceties that are unrepresentative of the typical
criminal defendant’s trajectory.374
reasonable professional assistance,” and providing deference to trial courts to determine an
appropriate attorney-performance standard); Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 174 (2002) (holding
that where a defense attorney does not protest his inability to represent multiple defendants, a
defendant-petitioner must establish that a potential “conﬂict of interest adversely aﬀected his
counsel’s performance” to void a conviction); Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 487 (2000)
(vacating an appellate ruling that suggested that a defense attorney must consult with a client on
whether or not to ﬁle an appeal in order to provide eﬀective counsel); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S.
364, 366 (1993) (holding that a defense attorney’s failure to make an objection during sentencing
was not prejudicial within the Strickland context).
370 See Stephen F. Smith, Taking Strickland Claims Seriously, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 515, 517 (2009)
(“Interestingly, the Supreme Court’s recent ineffectiveness decisions have finally begun to take the right
to counsel as seriously as the access-to-counsel cases would require. In a line of recent cases, the Court
has granted relief to several defendants whose death sentences likely resulted from attorney error.”).
371 See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 377 (2005) (holding that “even when a capital
defendant’s family members and the defendant himself have suggested that no mitigating evidence
is available, his lawyer is bound to make reasonable eﬀorts to obtain and review material that counsel
knows the prosecution will probably rely on as evidence of aggravation at the sentencing phase of
trial.”); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 538 (2003) (holding that counsel’s failure to investigate and
present mitigating evidence in capital sentencing proceedings was prejudicial to the defendant);
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399 (2000) (holding that a defendant’s right to eﬀective assistance
in a capital punishment case was violated when his attorney failed to “[present] and [explain] the
signiﬁcance of all the available evidence”).
372 See Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 607 (2005) (requiring appointment of counsel for
indigent defendants who are convicted on their pleas and seek first-tier review in Michigan Court of
Appeals); Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 656(2002) (holding that a suspended sentence that may
end up in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty cannot be imposed unless counsel is appointed).
373 See, e.g., Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 767, 780 (2017) (holding that defense counsel’s
performance was deﬁcient during the penalty phase of capital murder trial where counsel presented
expert testimony that his client was statistically more likely to act violently because he was black);
Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263, 267-69 (2014) (holding that defense counsel’s performance was
deﬁcient where counsel did not know that state law allowed him to request additional funding for
expert witness, and where he relied upon a one-eyed civil-engineer who graduated more than a
century before trial, had little experience with ﬁrearms, and needed help from state experts in
operation of equipment to testify as an expert on ﬁrearm forensics).
374 See e.g., Jennings v. Stephens, 135 S. Ct. 793, 798, 802 (2015) (allowing an appellee state
prisoner who “was required neither to take a cross-appeal nor obtain a certiﬁcate of appealability”
to argue that his counsel was ineﬀective to obtain habeas relief in a death penalty case); Trevino v.
Thaler, 569 U.S. 413, 415-417 (2013) (holding that ineﬀective assistance of counsel during state habeas
proceeding excused defendant’s failure to properly claim ineﬀective assistance at trial level);
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 17 (2012) (holding that “[w]here, under state law, claims of ineﬀective
assistance of trial counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding,” a federal habeas
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But some recent cases have oﬀered encouragement, especially where the
Court has been more generous in its understanding of the plea-bargain
stage.375 Nevertheless, the jury is still out on how these cases will develop.376
As I have shown, progressivism does not characterize the Court’s indigent
defense jurisprudence. Moreover, the Court is aware of the problems of
indigent defense. In 2016, it decided Luis v. United States, which involved the
government’s attempt to freeze approximately $45 million in assets belonging
to a defendant accused of Medicare fraud.377 The defendant argued that the
pretrial restraint of his untainted assets, which he needed to retain his counsel
of choice, violated the Sixth Amendment. The Court agreed.
Writing for a ﬁve-person majority, Justice Breyer discussed how ruling for
the government and allowing such seizures would impoverish people who
could aﬀord their own counsel. “[T]hese defendants, rendered indigent,
would fall back upon publicly paid counsel, including overworked and
underpaid public defenders. As the Department of Justice explains, only 27
percent of county-based public defender oﬃces have suﬃcient attorneys to
court may hear “a substantial claim of ineﬀective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral
proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel . . . was ineﬀective”); Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 946
(2010) (holding that state court failed to apply the proper prejudice inquiry when applying
Strickland test to counsel’s mitigation investigation during penalty phase of capital murder trial).
375 See, e.g., Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1962, 1969 (2017) (granting a defendant’s
ineffective assistance claim where his counsel erroneously assured defendant that he would not face
deportation if he pled guilty, thereby causing the defendant to accept the plea); Lafler v. Cooper, 566
U.S. 156, 174 (2012) (holding that where counsel’s ineffective advice led to rejection of a plea offer that
ultimately was more favorable than the trial’s outcome, the state should reoffer the plea to the
defendant, but the trial court has ultimate discretion over whether to change the defendant’s
sentencing); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 145 (2012) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires
defense counsel “to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and
conditions that may be favorable to the accused”); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359 (2010) (holding
that in order for defense counsel for a non-citizen defendant to be competent, counsel must inform the
defendant of the deportation consequence of a guilty plea); see also Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 447
(2011) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require states to provide counsel in civil
contempt cases but does require safeguards to prevent the “erroneous deprivation of liberty”).
376 Compare Daryll K. Brown, Why Padilla Doesn’t Matter (Much), 58 UCLA L. REV. 1393, 1397
(2011) (“Padilla is signiﬁcant . . . for the Court’s new recognition of the dominance of plea bargaining
. . . and for its understanding of the nature of plea bargaining.”), with Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret
Love, Status as Punishment: A Critical Guide to Padilla v. Kentucky, 25 CRIM. JUST. 21, 21 (2010)
(describing Padilla as one of a “handful of Supreme Court decisions in the past 50 years that can be
said to have transformed the operation of the criminal justice system”). Also, compare Josh Bowers,
Laﬂer, Frye, and the Subtle Art of Winning by Losing, 25 FED. SENT’G. REP. 40, 128 (2012) (noting
that “genuine constitutional reform would demand much more” than the holdings of Lafler and Frye)
and Albert W. Alschuler, Laﬂer and Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for a Festering Wound, 51 DUQ. L.
REV. 673, 679 (2013) (arguing that “Lafler and Frye did not change the law”) with Jenny Roberts,
Eﬀective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650, 2656 (2013) (“In Padilla, Frye, and Lafler, the
Supreme Court established a signiﬁcant body of plea bargaining and guilty-plea jurisprudence
grounded in the Sixth Amendment right to the eﬀective assistance of counsel.”).
377 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1087 (2016).
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meet nationally recommended caseload standards.”378 Justice Breyer also
noted that public defenders are underresourced and contended that allowing
for such seizures would “render less eﬀective the basic right the Sixth
Amendment seeks to protect.”379 John Rappaport incisively points out
important contradictions and questions: “[i]f forcing the defendant in Luis to
rely on a public defender would have been unfair, then what of all these other
defendants?”380 Going further, he adds: [e]ither appointed counsel are
presumptively eﬀective notwithstanding the constraints under which they
operate—in which case the fairness theory cannot explain the outcome in
Luis—or they’re not, in which case Luis is correct but implicitly acknowledges
a constitutional crisis.”381 The same term, the Court upheld the use of
uncounseled convictions in tribal court proceedings as predicate oﬀenses
under the Violence Against Women Act in ways that some argue
detrimentally and disproportionately impact Indian defendants.382
Considering the Court’s relative inaction on indigent defense, I do not
look to it as a place of inspiration for normative possibilities. But courtId. at 1095 (citations omitted).
Id.
John Rappaport, The Structural Function of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel of Choice 23
(Chi. Pub. Law Legal Theory Working Paper No. 611) (2017).
381 Id. at 24.
382 United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1959 (2016). Although the Court’s decision was
unanimous, there are debates about the soundness of the opinion in federal Indian law and in
criminal justice scholarship. For example, the National Congress of American Indians wrote a brief
in support of the United States and argued that not respecting tribal courts’ domestic assault
convictions would encroach on tribal sovereignty and fail to achieve Congress’ statutory goal of
addressing the unique violence Indian women encounter. See Brief for National Congress of
American Indians as Amicus Curiae, United States v. Bryant 136 S. Ct. 1954 (U.S. 2016) (No. 15420), 2016 WL 447645. Barbara Creel, a scholarly expert on Indian Country criminal defense, and
a former tribal, state appellate, and federal public defender, co-authored a brief for the Tribal
Defender Network in support of the respondent which argued that using uncounseled tribal
convictions violates fundamental fairness and Equal Protection principles by creating a legal
landscape where only American Indians appear in federal court with prior uncounseled convictions.
See Brief for Professor Barbara L. Creel and the Tribal Defender Network as Amici Curiae, United
States v. Bryant 136 S. Ct. 1954 (U.S. 2016) (No. 15-420), 2016 WL 1055615; see also Greg Ablavsky,
U.S. v. Bryant: Congress, Not Justices’ Interpretations of History, Better Arbiter of Tribal Sovereignty,
STAN. L. SCH. BLOGS (June 19, 2016), https://law.stanford.edu/2016/06/19/u-s-v-bryant-congressnot-justices/ [https://perma.cc/86KU-WAN4] (arguing that Congress, not the Court, is the best
institution to resolve the provision of counsel question); Bethany R. Berger, Hope for Indian Tribes
in the U.S. Supreme Court?: Menominee, Nebraska v. Parker, Bryant, Dollar General . . . and Beyond, 2017
U. ILL. L. REV. 1901, 1931-32 (arguing that the Court could have used the doctrine of comity in its
analysis of prior convictions, which would have retained the presumption of valid previous
judgments while still subjecting them to fundamental fairness analysis). For further discussion of
the lack of rights and due process protections aﬀorded to Indian defendants in tribal court, see
Barbara L. Creel, The Right to Counsel for Indians Accused of Crime: A Tribal and Congressional
Imperative, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 317 (2013); Angela R. Riley, Crime and Governance in Indian
Country, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1564 (2016).
378
379
380
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centered reform eﬀorts are not worth abandoning, a premise conﬁrmed by
some of the successes of structural reform litigation.383 However, the history
oﬀered here suggests that some normative solutions to the problems of
indigent defense lie outside of courts. Here is where the history oﬀered in
this paper becomes especially salient.
B. Making Race Important in Contemporary Indigent Defense
The history oﬀered in this paper demonstrates how racial meanings and
their inﬂuence on indigent defense ebbed and ﬂowed in the last century.
During this time period, prominent legal actors—speciﬁcally the Court and
the bar—showed a special, if inconsistent, solicitude for the racial “other.” In
an early twentieth century that harbored an ungenerous right to counsel
jurisprudence, legal reformers innovated. They developed legal aid societies
and municipally funded public defender oﬃces that showed particular
concern for the legal problems of ethnic whites. Other racial minorities—
whose legal dilemmas were insuﬃciently attended to by mainstream legal
institutions—engaged in their own innovation. They created institutions that
attempted to address legal issues that were common and race-speciﬁc. In
these ways, race helped undergird the development of mainstream legal aid
organizations that attended to the needs of ethnic whites as well as
unconventional institutions that tackled other racial minorities’ problems.
Three decades into the twentieth century, the Court would develop an
obligatory right to counsel that was speciﬁcally concerned with penal
inequalities faced by marginalized blacks. This establishment of a right to
counsel, in hindsight, was a meaningful step in the racial justice and criminal
justice arenas. But this enshrinement was also limited, case-speciﬁc, and
invested in pathological forms of blackness. Illiterate and indigent AfricanAmerican defendants successfully weaponized their status in their claims that
they were unconstitutionally deprived of counsel. But this circumscribed way
of thinking about indigent defense produced a stagnant doctrinal terrain until
the 1960s. During that volatile decade, the Court’s signature right to counsel
case addressed general and race-specific problems in indigent defense by
counterintuitively avoiding race. Instead, it used a sympathetic white defendant
to advance the administration of criminal legal aid. Increases in crime and a
racially charged law and order campaign reduced sympathy for criminal
defendants thereafter and, as a result, curbed the advancement of indigent
defense. Unlike its predecessors, the Court of the late twentieth century would
not have special solicitude for racial minorities and, in the case of indigent
383 See Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 427, 445 (2009) (discussing the success of recent structural reform litigation suits).
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defense, became less interested in racial justice. The products of that disinterest
have, in part, produced the indigent defense landscape that we inherit today.
But history can still inform our legal present. As a normative matter, I contend
that the history in this paper offers some theoretical and institutional lessons.
1. Theoretical Lessons
The theoretical takeaways relate to how scholars, practitioners, and
policymakers think and talk about race and help. First, the history of indigent
defense provides a diﬀerent way of analyzing race that does not hinge on
animus. Of course, scholars of race have been theorizing non-animus-based
understandings of race for decades.384 The account in this Article supplies a
complementary alternative that focuses on racial neglect. Progressive Era
reformers were aware of the legal challenges African-Americans, MexicanAmericans, and Asian-Americans faced and, in some instances, attended to
those legal problems. But these reformers made ethnic white immigrants
their primary objects of concern. This deliberateness produced a form of
racial neglect that was far from innocent but, as the historical record shows,
devoid of the kind of animus associated with that period and racial
marginalization more generally. In our current world, government, rather
than philanthropy, is the primary dispenser of indigent defense services,
whether directly or indirectly. Yet neglect is still operative. The welldocumented reality that criminal legal aid institutions are underfunded and
underresourced could ﬁt into an easy narrative of outright racism. The poor
lawyering that such underfunding and understaﬃng produces could also ﬁt
into that account. But the impoverishment of indigent defense organizations
also ﬁts into a story of neglect that is not inspired by animus but is still racially
consequential. A framing of racial neglect that looks beyond animus-based
understandings of race can oﬀer new ways of thinking about indigent defense.
Relatedly, this Article oﬀers a diﬀerent way of thinking about help and
indigent defense. There are often unarticulated assumptions about the
charitable nature of organized legal assistance and help more generally. Such
assumptions have contributed to the lack of sustained analytical scrutiny of
384 See generally Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the
Prejudice Habit, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 733, 750-59 (1995); Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A
Provisional Model of Some of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1489 (2016); Peggy C. Davis, Law as
Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1577 (1989); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1489, 1506-14 (2005); Lawrence, supra note 363, at 324; Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon
Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555, 1565-66 (2013); R.A.
Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 878
(2004); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 899, 90211 (1993); Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86
GEO. L.J. 279, 294 (1997).
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public defenders. Tropes and archetypes have done much of the analytical
work, with public defenders often understood either as plea bargaincompliant bureaucrats or underappreciated heroes. But help is complicated,
and the brand of help that indigent defense lawyers are tasked with providing
is rife with problems. The Progressive Era story highlights how help is
sometimes structured by who is understood as vulnerable; such
determinations of vulnerability can be racially exclusive. Like their
Progressive Era predecessors, public defenders can harbor implicit biases and
preferences that complicate their provision of help. The period between
Powell and Gideon teaches us that help can have its limits, particularly when
it is only concerned with the most egregious forms of injustice. Today, public
defender oﬃces are obliged to triage certain kinds of defendants and crimes,
a dynamic that can potentially invite a similar kind of obsession with
egregiousness that is laudable, even as it is not necessarily the most helpful
approach for their client communities.385 Nonlegal commentators have
usefully documented the challenges and racial dilemmas involved in “helping
professions” such as education, social welfare, and child welfare.386 This
Article provides content for more exacting analytical consideration of the
constitutionally compelled “helping profession” of indigent defense.
Clearer understandings of race and indigent defense could help spawn
more critical analyses of and closer empirical attention to biases in indigent
defense. Taking the most critical view, Paul Butler argues that “Gideon bears
some responsibility” for legitimating mass incarceration because it
“diﬀuse[ed] political resistance” and “created the false consciousness that
criminal justice would get better.”387 Other scholars have similar reservations
about indigent defense. They have looked beyond police oﬃcers and
prosecutors—the typical objects of critique in criminal justice scholarship—
and pay closer attention to indigent defense attorneys.388 The history oﬀered
See Joe, supra note 385, at 758-63.
See generally SUSAN DEWEY & TONIA PRISCA ST. GERMAIN, WOMEN OF THE STREET:
HOW THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE-SOCIAL SERVICES ALLIANCE FAILS WOMEN IN PROSTITUTION
(2016) (describing how social service bureaucrats’ misunderstanding of poverty leads them to fail
sex workers); CELESTE WATKINS-HAYES, THE NEW WELFARE BUREAUCRATS:
ENTANGLEMENTS OF RACE, CLASS, AND POLICY REFORM (2009) (describing the race, class, and
gender dilemmas of welfare caseworkers); TINA LEE, CATCHING A CASE: INEQUALITY AND FEAR
IN NEW YORK CITY’S CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM (2016) (detailing how caseworkers and attorneys
contribute to a punitive child welfare system).
387 Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176, 2178,
79 (2013).
388 See, e.g., Kristin Henning, Race, Paternalism, and the Right to Counsel, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
649, 649, 651-60 (2017); Andrea D. Lyon, Race Bias and the Importance of Consciousness for Criminal
Defense Attorneys, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 755, 756-58 (2012); Alexandra Natapoﬀ, Gideon Skepticism,
70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1049, 1057 (2013); Jonathan A. Rapping, Implicitly Unjust: How Defenders
Can Aﬀect Systemic Racist Assumptions, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 999, 1019-22 (2013); L. Song
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in this Article provides context for this budding literature and can inform
future projects.
2. Institutional Takeaways
The racial history of the right to counsel also oﬀers some takeaways that
may be useful for indigent defense providers. Three takeaways in particular
stand out: racial equality as an organizing principle for legal aid institutions,
the relationship between racial subjugation and legal innovation, and the
importance of recognizing race.
In many jurisdictions, racial equality should be an important organizing
principle for indigent defense organizations. Race played a central role in the
development of legal aid schemes, and although its meaning changed over
time, it continued to operate prominently in the Court’s decisionmaking from
the 1930s to the 1960s. Thereafter, race receded into the background as an
explicit matter but still informed the law and order politics. In a moment
when racial disparities are a signiﬁcant feature of the criminal justice system,
it makes sense for providers to consider the role of race in their organizational
missions and delivery of their services. In terms of priorities, organizations
such as ArchCity Defenders in St. Louis (ACD) and the San Francisco Public
Defender’s Oﬃce are explicit about the role of racial discrimination in the
criminal justice system, take an expansive view of their clients’ speciﬁc sociolegal problems, and attempt to implement large-scale programming that
addresses the social inequalities that emanate from indigence and racial bias.
For example, ACD describes itself as a civil rights law ﬁrm that “uses direct
services, impact litigation, and policy and media advocacy as its primary tools
to promote justice, protect civil and human rights, and bring about systemic
change on behalf of the poor and communities of color directly impacted by
the abuses of the legal system.”389 The San Francisco Public Defender’s Oﬃce
established a racial justice committee that seeks to address the racial biases
that pervade the criminal justice system and disadvantage their clients.390 The
account oﬀered in this Article supplies historical context for indigent defense
providers who understand the signiﬁcance of race in indigent defense work
Richardson & Philip Atiba Goﬀ, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626,
2628, 2631-41 (2013).
389 Who We Are, ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, www.archcitydefenders.org/who-we-are/ourmission-story/ [https://perma.cc/9J7W-F6LB] (last visited May 10, 2019).
390 Jeff Adachi, San Francisco Public Defender, Inauguration Speech: In the Trenches in the
Battle Against Bias, https://medium.com/@sfdefender/at-his-inauguration-san-francisco-publicdefender-jeff-adachi-delivers-a-challenge-to-his-staff-4b0b8e90c011
[https://perma.cc/TP9EWPZ6] (last visited May 10, 2019) (“[B]iases dictate our decision making, and when we make decisions
in the justice system, these biases affect what we do . . . .[B]iases also affect how we, as public
defenders, do our jobs . . . .That’s why we started a Racial Justice Committee in our office in 2013.”).
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but do not have a complete picture of the depths of that signiﬁcance, and for
providers who ﬁnd race to be irrelevant to their organizational eﬀorts.
Although the circumstance of racial inequality is not the ideal setting for
inventiveness, history shows that such a setting helps produce legal innovation.
Progressive Era reformers developed legal aid institutions because of the
specific legal dilemmas ethnic white immigrants encountered. AfricanAmericans, Mexican-Americans, and Asian-Americans developed their own
multi-purpose self-help legal mechanisms in part because of the neglect they
received from mainstream institutions. Therefore, it is important to understand
that the legal status quo rarely suffices; rather, it demands innovation. The
Bronx Defenders in New York have pioneered a “holistic defense” approach to
representation that uniquely addresses the race-specific ways a criminal charge
can impact a defendant’s life outside the criminal context (e.g., deportation,
eviction, and termination of parental rights).391 Several public defender’s
offices in the San Francisco Bay area have teamed up to form a regional
organization called Public Defenders for Justice. This organization has countywide trainings that focus on litigating racial justice issues in the context of voir
dire, police misconduct, and search and seizure.392 In addition to encouraging
defenders to litigate race-related issues where relevant, the Minnesota Public
Defender identified police practices that may be motivated by racial bias and
created a searchable database that allows attorneys to access police reports and
analyze patterns of misconduct.393 The innovative, race-specific programming
of legal aid organizations is part of a larger historical continuum of lawyers’
prioritizing race in their delivery of legal services. The history offered here
demonstrates that such creativeness is not a chore or extraneous task, but is
integral to advanced versions of indigent defense practice.
Finally, and relatedly, the history offered here demonstrates that it is
important for indigent defense attorneys to recognize how race operates in
inconspicuous ways. The post-1970s curtailment of Gideon was achieved by law
and order campaigns that referenced race without explicitly announcing it.
This period is instructive. It shows how racial concerns and motivations can
go unstated but still have appreciable effects on indigent defense. Police
officers and prosecutors—the understood antagonists of criminal
defendants—are typically described as the bearers of implicit bias. But
indigent defense attorneys have their own prejudices that are slowly being
391 Who We Are, BRONX DEFENDERS, https://www.bronxdefenders.org/who-we-are/
[https://perma.cc/9sj4-u8d5] (last visited May 10, 2019).
392 Jeﬀ Adachi, James Williams, Amy Campanelli, Keir Bradford-Grey & Derwyn Bunton,
Blueprint
for
Racial
Justice
4
(2016)
(unpublished
proposal),
https://sﬂawlibrary.org/sites/default/ﬁles/Racial%20Justice%20Blueprint_1.pdf.
393 Melanca D. Clark, How Defenders Can Secure Racial Justice Policy Reform: Working through the
Community Oriented Defender Movement 30 CORNERSTONE MAG. Jan.-Apr. 1, 2009, at 28, 28.
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unearthed.394 Jeff Adachi, who headed the public defender’s office in San
Francisco—considered to be one of the most effective and most race-conscious
public defender’s offices—has highlighted the unconscious biases present in
his own organization. The office had partnered with social science researchers
to measure racial disparities in plea bargaining and implemented biannual bias
training sessions. Adachi had also encouraged attorneys to use checklist tools
that ask questions such as “how would I handle this case different if my client
was another race or had a different social background?”395 The historical
precedent of subtle, race-based subjugation, along with experiential and
empirically informed observations, has the potential to transform how
indigent defense attorneys think about racial inequality.
To be sure, as Gabriel Chin contends, the ideal remedies for criminal
justice inequality lie not in indigent defense, but in reduced arrests and
prosecution.396 But, in the absence of such changes—or in conjunction with
them—the history oﬀered in this Article encourages reformers to consider
indigent defense shortcomings as an issue with racial ramiﬁcations while also
pushing racial justice advocates to ﬁgure indigent defense more prominently
in their reform eﬀorts. With the revelations oﬀered in this Article, reformers,
along with scholars and indigent defense providers, can reexamine how the
right to counsel came to be as well as the limits and possibilities for
administrative change.

394 See, e.g., Richardson & Goff, supra note 388, at 2626 (“[T]he domain of [public defenders]
and triage presents a rare confluence of factors ripe for the influence of implicit biases.”); see also
Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death Penalty Lawyers, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 1539, 1542 (2004) (noting the “troubling possibility that defense counsel, who are
charged with undivided loyalty to their clients, and presumed to serve as a shield against racial bias
on the part of other criminal justice system actors, may in fact experience both compromised loyalty
and judgment when they serve African-American or Latino clients”); Vanessa A. Edkins, Defense
Attorney Plea Recommendations and Client Race: Does Zealous Representation Apply Equally to All?, 35 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 413, 416 (2011) (hypothesizing that “the deals that defense attorneys feel they can
obtain with an African American client will include a longer sentence, and be more likely to include
jail time, than the deals they feel they could obtain for a Caucasian American client”); Lyon, supra
note 388, 757 (describing an interaction where a public defenders “unconscious bias” caused him to
act in ways he would not have if his client was a “white eighteen- or nineteen-year-old young man”).
395 Jeﬀ Adachi, Public Defenders can be Biased, too, and it Hurts Their Non-White Clients, WASH.
POST (June 7, 2016).
396 Chin, supra note 174, 2240 (“The [critical] problem is a lack of fairness in deciding what to
criminalize and how to enforce those prohibitions.”).
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